From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795219822; b=yFnireCyHb1nR/FYcHY22YwbOI9rE6tMnyHkmQHlv/VxUZMAc9SgQ2S5dkUK4+FzB1I+ GcnXjpa6S1CVhOMLgZT1BCmQyd8ouSUXz3v6z3KgK+ofTSprq+CBdjfV81624Di0lVbss iYRIphzL8e8QPC+kIA9bVNXeHUu0hppaS9LkNj8JCNnzCKH2AQp5k+vyJ9WMA7qpzcCa4 bSwm+5XSzoO4VjCu1UDJetmeBq3q3A8A4VjtOdMCBxdPk3Vu+sM0cGD07yiQtz8A4UI0N DMzfjTh05pKgbh5ZdLSozDVkEz0s3bD90hAiVpisvIJ8O8sEJm8/sjbLzcrqY6g/DJA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795219822; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=Fv+4rTw2hN1zfy9KsnwOHnSYpn2531DaMXgpubCM6BE=; b=A4RZ23w828kA4G0dCuPDq8cUsAyyZuc2+xzwt5YRdrQ8HMT3IoTy7cBye0YxmaUS8jbt sIp0BxMMvvGLS/NRwsxUTqEvm8t75gMvBeo57R0WfGGaqFB+s2tyB22hFcnW4wmaR7bW0 eyhK17dE9mGeU5WP/6FiWd0O72eTq3cQA0Xd/TrI/DHtFJP4PgK6FamokAhXHHRljLr/u niXTNu5/oqyXucNzgmZgUvfzQVeDxLjRMJOU1iX33hUhsuHTHo4TOMZHKqCCrBacyMygj z5PAIJnCPXIKHQYfhUZMp4+G19GdQ1yBuMVJbJXcNaI+NtCrX/KM/gkLNEeqZd2utFw== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=QHmCpSNi; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPS id 54DDA606A699; Sat, 21 Nov 2026 00:10:22 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=QHmCpSNi Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with UTF8SMTPSA id 361621F000D2; Sat, 21 Nov 2026 00:10:21 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795219821; bh=Fv+4rTw2hN1zfy9KsnwOHnSYpn2531DaMXgpubCM6BE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=QHmCpSNi5+s2VCw6nAr8zwsBFvo9+GDOMY92DDhxqDWH5XcKurQ4h/9XEoBkpchwm 6pqeAPxWEQ1PiiBDWOB87AMs/upAJkB1UyE6R0M69FIljrbSqk5z4ym0MN2jBD+mtn BZ9TvgU+2VamFdf1innh8LeyXEcvCmy3zHuV46epEa8yuDBbQS0yYgb7Zx4uBDxEz/ 7q6xwmUT5b6IvZ/w9lX1/KtgDGGX6YC+LKc5mVobFr55Oisedr4fiNKyPAwcOcFPYR VNPa1aQl9YgueiI3a815AVmj6I+9w6ApbxP/eHxy+tM2Rad3gCTo0XNAd8tNNeUtw1 GrXNckhTs5KBQ== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Mikhalitsyn , Alexander Viro , Andy Lutomirski , Christian Brauner , David Howells , Jan Kara , Jonathan Corbet , Josef Bacik , Kees Cook , Neal Gompa , Paul Moore , Serge Hallyn , Zygmunt Krynicki Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 20/25] security: Add rootns LSM hooks Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 02:08:39 +0200 Message-ID: <20261121000844.1863324-21-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.3 In-Reply-To: <20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20261121000844.1863324-1-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Security modules need visibility into root namespace creation, teardown, process entry, and container-wide signal delivery so policies can attach per-rootns security state and mediate operations on rootns file descriptors. Add lbs_rootns and rootns->security blob management alongside security_rootns_alloc(), security_rootns_free(), security_rootns_clone(), and security_rootns_kill(). Co-developed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 7 +++ include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 ++ include/linux/rootns.h | 3 ++ include/linux/security.h | 30 ++++++++++++ kernel/rootns.c | 44 +++++++++++++----- security/lsm_init.c | 6 +++ security/security.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 7 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 87d9d06710cb..2cb90ddedc14 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -480,3 +480,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_alloc_security, struct block_device *bdev) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bdev_free_security, struct block_device *bdev) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bdev_setintegrity, struct block_device *bdev, enum lsm_integrity_type type, const void *value, size_t size) + +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_alloc, struct rootns *rootns, unsigned int flags) +LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, rootns_free, struct rootns *rootns) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_clone, struct rootns *rootns) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, rootns_kill, struct rootns *rootns, int sig) +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index 13621e9e233e..217a59d428b1 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes { unsigned int lbs_bpf_map; unsigned int lbs_bpf_prog; unsigned int lbs_bpf_token; +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS + unsigned int lbs_rootns; +#endif }; /* diff --git a/include/linux/rootns.h b/include/linux/rootns.h index 68590b27e4ee..1301bc6961f1 100644 --- a/include/linux/rootns.h +++ b/include/linux/rootns.h @@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ enum rootns_state { struct rootns { refcount_t usage; int exit_code; /* The exit code of 'init' */ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY + void *security; /* LSM security blob */ +#endif struct user_namespace *user_ns; /* Owning user namespace */ struct nsproxy *ns; /* This rootns's namespaces */ struct pid *init_pid; /* The 'init' task's TGID (pid ref) */ diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 40831fab5470..995292f1c92e 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_krule; struct ns_common; struct user_namespace; struct timezone; +struct rootns; enum lsm_event { LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, @@ -2469,4 +2470,33 @@ static inline void security_initramfs_populated(void) } #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +int security_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns, unsigned int flags); +void security_rootns_free(struct rootns *rootns); +int security_rootns_clone(struct rootns *rootns); +int security_rootns_kill(struct rootns *rootns, int sig); +#else +static inline int security_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns, + unsigned int flags) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline void security_rootns_free(struct rootns *rootns) +{ +} + +static inline int security_rootns_clone(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + return 0; +} + +static inline int security_rootns_kill(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) +{ + return 0; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ + #endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */ diff --git a/kernel/rootns.c b/kernel/rootns.c index 6fb49c20cc2d..bf3174023d97 100644 --- a/kernel/rootns.c +++ b/kernel/rootns.c @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include /* @@ -65,14 +66,8 @@ struct rootns *get_rootns(struct rootns *c) return c; } -/* - * Drop a reference on a rootns and clear it if it is no longer in use. - */ -void put_rootns(struct rootns *c) +static void free_rootns(struct rootns *c) { - if (!c || !refcount_dec_and_test(&c->usage)) - return; - if (c->ns) put_nsproxy(c->ns); if (c->init_pid) @@ -84,6 +79,18 @@ void put_rootns(struct rootns *c) kfree(c); } +/* + * Drop a reference on a rootns and clear it if it is no longer in use. + */ +void put_rootns(struct rootns *c) +{ + if (!c || !refcount_dec_and_test(&c->usage)) + return; + + security_rootns_free(c); + free_rootns(c); +} + /* * Allow the user to poll for the rootns dying. */ @@ -167,6 +174,7 @@ static int rootns_kill_members(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) bool any_perm = false; int other_err = 0; struct pid *pid; + int ret; int nr; if (!pidns_is_ancestor(pid_ns, task_active_pid_ns(current))) @@ -174,6 +182,10 @@ static int rootns_kill_members(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) if (READ_ONCE(rootns->state) != ROOTNS_RUNNING) return -ESRCH; + ret = security_rootns_kill(rootns, sig); + if (ret) + return ret; + scoped_guard(rcu) { read_lock(&tasklist_lock); idr_for_each_entry(&pid_ns->idr, pid, nr) { @@ -368,31 +380,35 @@ static struct rootns *create_rootns(unsigned int flags) user_ns = create_rootns_user_ns(); if (IS_ERR(user_ns)) { ret = PTR_ERR(user_ns); - goto err_put; + goto err_free; } c->user_ns = user_ns; ns_ref_active_get(user_ns); if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { ret = -EPERM; - goto err_put; + goto err_free; } ns = create_new_namespaces(clone_flags, current->nsproxy, user_ns, NULL); if (IS_ERR(ns)) { ret = PTR_ERR(ns); - goto err_put; + goto err_free; } timens_activate_nsproxy(ns); c->ns = ns; nsproxy_ns_active_get(ns); + ret = security_rootns_alloc(c, flags); + if (ret < 0) + goto err_free; + return c; -err_put: - put_rootns(c); +err_free: + free_rootns(c); return ERR_PTR(ret); } @@ -488,6 +504,10 @@ int rootns_prepare_fork(struct kernel_clone_args *args) if (!pidns_is_ancestor(pid_ns, task_active_pid_ns(current))) return -EXDEV; + ret = security_rootns_clone(rootns); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = mnt_ns_get_root(rootns->ns->mnt_ns, &root); if (ret) return ret; diff --git a/security/lsm_init.c b/security/lsm_init.c index 8d5ecea99c46..56b515b20812 100644 --- a/security/lsm_init.c +++ b/security/lsm_init.c @@ -316,6 +316,9 @@ static void __init lsm_prepare(struct lsm_info *lsm) lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_map, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_prog, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_bpf_token, &blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS + lsm_blob_size_update(&blobs->lbs_rootns, &blob_sizes.lbs_rootns); +#endif } /** @@ -460,6 +463,9 @@ int __init security_init(void) lsm_pr("blob(bpf_map) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_map); lsm_pr("blob(bpf_prog) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_prog); lsm_pr("blob(bpf_token) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_bpf_token); +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS + lsm_pr("blob(rootns) size %d\n", blob_sizes.lbs_rootns); +#endif } if (blob_sizes.lbs_file) diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4727b8347fc4..919d4bb63701 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -395,6 +396,22 @@ static int lsm_ns_alloc(struct ns_common *ns) return lsm_blob_alloc(&ns->ns_security, blob_sizes.lbs_ns, GFP_KERNEL); } +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +/** + * lsm_rootns_alloc - allocate a composite rootns blob + * @rootns: the rootns that needs a blob + * + * Allocate the rootns blob for all the modules + * + * Return: Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +static int lsm_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + return lsm_blob_alloc(&rootns->security, blob_sizes.lbs_rootns, + GFP_KERNEL); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ + /** * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled @@ -5795,3 +5812,72 @@ void security_initramfs_populated(void) { call_void_hook(initramfs_populated); } + +#ifdef CONFIG_ROOTNS +/** + * security_rootns_alloc() - Check creation of a new rootns and init LSM blob + * @rootns: the new rootns + * @flags: creation flags passed to rootns() + * + * Check whether a new rootns may be created and initialize its LSM security + * blob. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_rootns_alloc(struct rootns *rootns, unsigned int flags) +{ + int rc; + + rc = lsm_rootns_alloc(rootns); + if (unlikely(rc)) + return rc; + + rc = call_int_hook(rootns_alloc, rootns, flags); + if (unlikely(rc)) + security_rootns_free(rootns); + + return rc; +} + +/** + * security_rootns_free() - Release LSM security data from a rootns + * @rootns: the rootns being freed + * + * Release security data attached to @rootns before the structure is freed. + */ +void security_rootns_free(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + call_void_hook(rootns_free, rootns); + kfree(rootns->security); + rootns->security = NULL; +} + +/** + * security_rootns_clone() - Check permission to spawn a task into a rootns + * @rootns: the target rootns + * + * Check permission before spawning a child process into @rootns via + * clone3(CLONE_INTO_ROOTNS). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted, negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_rootns_clone(struct rootns *rootns) +{ + return call_int_hook(rootns_clone, rootns); +} + +/** + * security_rootns_kill() - Check permission to signal a rootns + * @rootns: the target rootns + * @sig: signal number to deliver (or 0 for permission check) + * + * Check permission before broadcasting @sig to member thread groups in @rootns + * via ioctl(ROOTNS_KILL). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted, negative error code on failure. + */ +int security_rootns_kill(struct rootns *rootns, int sig) +{ + return call_int_hook(rootns_kill, rootns, sig); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_ROOTNS */ -- 2.47.3