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From: Baolu Lu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
To: Ethan Zhao <etzhao1900@gmail.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
	Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com>,
	Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Yi Lai <yi1.lai@intel.com>
Cc: baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, iommu@lists.linux.dev,
	security@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 1/1] iommu/sva: Invalidate KVA range on kernel TLB flush
Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 15:48:28 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <206ed579-fba7-4329-a0a1-6bd287b9a54c@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6a61f3af-2d17-4261-8e54-c1117dbc289b@gmail.com>

On 8/14/2025 12:48 PM, Ethan Zhao wrote:
> 
> 
> On 8/6/2025 1:25 PM, Lu Baolu wrote:
>> In the IOMMU Shared Virtual Addressing (SVA) context, the IOMMU hardware
>> shares and walks the CPU's page tables. The Linux x86 architecture maps
>> the kernel address space into the upper portion of every process’s page
>> table. Consequently, in an SVA context, the IOMMU hardware can walk and
>> cache kernel space mappings. However, the Linux kernel currently lacks
>> a notification mechanism for kernel space mapping changes. This means
>> the IOMMU driver is not aware of such changes, leading to a break in
>> IOMMU cache coherence.
>>
>> Modern IOMMUs often cache page table entries of the intermediate-level
>> page table as long as the entry is valid, no matter the permissions, to
>> optimize walk performance. Currently the iommu driver is notified only
>> for changes of user VA mappings, so the IOMMU's internal caches may
>> retain stale entries for kernel VA. When kernel page table mappings are
>> changed (e.g., by vfree()), but the IOMMU's internal caches retain stale
>> entries, Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability condition arises.
>>
>> If these freed page table pages are reallocated for a different purpose,
>> potentially by an attacker, the IOMMU could misinterpret the new data as
>> valid page table entries. This allows the IOMMU to walk into attacker-
>> controlled memory, leading to arbitrary physical memory DMA access or
>> privilege escalation.
>>
>> To mitigate this, introduce a new iommu interface to flush IOMMU caches.
>> This interface should be invoked from architecture-specific code that
>> manages combined user and kernel page tables, whenever a kernel page 
>> table
>> update is done and the CPU TLB needs to be flushed.
>>
>> Fixes: 26b25a2b98e4 ("iommu: Bind process address spaces to devices")
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>> Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
>> Tested-by: Yi Lai <yi1.lai@intel.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/x86/mm/tlb.c         |  4 +++
>>   drivers/iommu/iommu-sva.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>   include/linux/iommu.h     |  4 +++
>>   3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> Change log:
>> v3:
>>   - iommu_sva_mms is an unbound list; iterating it in an atomic context
>>     could introduce significant latency issues. Schedule it in a kernel
>>     thread and replace the spinlock with a mutex.
>>   - Replace the static key with a normal bool; it can be brought back if
>>     data shows the benefit.
>>   - Invalidate KVA range in the flush_tlb_all() paths.
>>   - All previous reviewed-bys are preserved. Please let me know if there
>>     are any objections.
>>
>> v2:
>>   - https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/20250709062800.651521-1- 
>> baolu.lu@linux.intel.com/
>>   - Remove EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(iommu_sva_invalidate_kva_range);
>>   - Replace the mutex with a spinlock to make the interface usable in the
>>     critical regions.
>>
>> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-iommu/20250704133056.4023816-1- 
>> baolu.lu@linux.intel.com/
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
>> index 39f80111e6f1..3b85e7d3ba44 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
>> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
>>   #include <linux/task_work.h>
>>   #include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
>>   #include <linux/mmu_context.h>
>> +#include <linux/iommu.h>
>>   #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
>>   #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
>> @@ -1478,6 +1479,8 @@ void flush_tlb_all(void)
>>       else
>>           /* Fall back to the IPI-based invalidation. */
>>           on_each_cpu(do_flush_tlb_all, NULL, 1);
>> +
>> +    iommu_sva_invalidate_kva_range(0, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
> Establishing such a simple one-to-one connection between CPU TLB flush
> and IOMMU TLB flush is debatable. At the very least, not every process
> is attached to an IOMMU SVA domain. Currently, devices and IOMMU 
> operating in scalable mode are not commonly applied to every process.

You're right. As discussed, I'll defer the IOTLB invalidation to a
scheduled kernel work in pte_free_kernel(). The
sva_invalidation_kva_range() function on the IOMMU side is actually a
no-op if there's no SVA domain in use.

Thanks,
baolu

      reply	other threads:[~2025-08-15  7:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-06  5:25 [PATCH v3 1/1] iommu/sva: Invalidate KVA range on kernel TLB flush Lu Baolu
2025-08-06 15:03 ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-06 15:52   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-06 16:04     ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-06 16:09       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-06 16:34         ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-06 16:42           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-07 14:40           ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-07 15:31             ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-08  5:15               ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-10  7:19                 ` Ethan Zhao
2025-08-11  9:15                   ` Uladzislau Rezki
2025-08-11 12:55                     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-15  9:23                       ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-11 13:55                     ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-11 14:56                       ` Uladzislau Rezki
2025-08-12  1:17                       ` Ethan Zhao
2025-08-15 14:35                         ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-11 12:57                 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-13  3:17                   ` Ethan Zhao
2025-08-18  1:34                   ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-07 19:51             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-08  2:57               ` Tian, Kevin
2025-08-15  9:16                 ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-15  9:46                   ` Tian, Kevin
2025-08-18  5:58                     ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-15 14:31                   ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-18  6:08                     ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-18  6:21                 ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-21  7:05                   ` Tian, Kevin
2025-08-23  3:26                     ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-25 22:36                       ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-26  1:25                         ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-26  2:49                           ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-26 14:22                             ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-26 14:33                               ` Matthew Wilcox
2025-08-26 14:57                                 ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-27 10:58                               ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-27 23:31                                 ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-28  5:31                                   ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-28  7:08                                     ` Tian, Kevin
2025-08-28 18:56                                       ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-28 19:10                                         ` Jason Gunthorpe
2025-08-28 19:31                                           ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-28 19:39                                             ` Matthew Wilcox
2025-08-26 16:21                             ` Dave Hansen
2025-08-27  6:34                               ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-08  5:08               ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-07  6:53   ` Baolu Lu
2025-08-14  4:48 ` Ethan Zhao
2025-08-15  7:48   ` Baolu Lu [this message]

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