From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@osdl.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>,
keyrings@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [Keyrings] [PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management
Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2005 11:54:08 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <23333.1128596048@warthog.cambridge.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.63.0510060346140.25593@excalibur.intercode>
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> wrote:
> > What case causes context != current?
>
> Indeed, this is critical: we always need to know which task initiated the
> current action. If it's not current, then we need the calling task struct
> passed into the security hook.
Surely you know the calling task struct: it's current, but I can pass it in
anyway if you wish.
As I outlined in a previous email, this has to do with the way request_key()
works, and the need for the process actually instantiating the key to gain
access to the keyrings, ownership, group membership, etc. of the process that
created the key.
> > > + /* do a final security check before publishing the key */
> > > + ret = security_key_alloc(key);
> >
> > This may simply be allocating space for the label (and possibly labelling)
> > not necessarily a security check.
>
> Agree, in fact, I think we should always aim to keep housekeeping hooks
> separate from access control hooks.
What do you mean by separate? And this provides a chance for the LSM to deny
the creation of a key before it's published.
> Access checks seem to be usually done before this point via
> lookup_user_key(), which is ideal.
Eh? lookup_user_key()? That's not necessarily called before, not if you're
creating a key.
> > This is odd, esp since nothing could have failed between alloc and
> > publish. Only state change is serial number. Would you expect the
> > security module to update a label based on serial number?
>
> I don't think SELinux would care about this yet. If so, the hook can be
> added later.
Auditing?
> > Are you sure this is right? Normally I'd expect users can _not_ set the
> > security labels of their own keys. But perhaps I've missed the point
> > of this one, could you give a use case?
>
> I think this is like xattrs on files, where the user can set and view
> security attributes.
That's what I was thinking of.
> David, admit it, this key stuff is all really a filesystem :-)
Grrrr. Next time I see you I might have to toss you in the nearest river:-)
No, it isn't, except in that all filesystems are databases anyway, and the VFS
should be ripped out and replaced with Reiser4.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-10-06 10:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-10-05 16:28 [PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management David Howells
2005-10-05 16:44 ` [Keyrings] " James Morris
2005-10-05 16:48 ` David Howells
2005-10-05 19:31 ` James Morris
2005-10-05 18:40 ` serue
2005-10-05 21:10 ` [Keyrings] " Chris Wright
2005-10-06 8:03 ` James Morris
2005-10-06 10:54 ` David Howells [this message]
2005-10-06 15:04 ` James Morris
2005-10-06 15:18 ` David Howells
2005-10-06 16:02 ` James Morris
2005-10-07 8:50 ` David Howells
2005-10-07 18:36 ` Chris Wright
2005-10-06 17:58 ` Chris Wright
2005-10-07 9:10 ` David Howells
2005-10-07 12:59 ` Stephen Smalley
2005-10-07 18:51 ` Chris Wright
2005-10-06 10:30 ` David Howells
2005-10-06 23:10 ` Chris Wright
2005-10-07 9:57 ` David Howells
2005-10-07 19:36 ` Chris Wright
2005-10-06 8:38 ` James Morris
2005-10-06 11:06 ` David Howells
2005-10-06 14:25 ` James Morris
2005-10-06 15:11 ` David Howells
2005-10-06 16:14 ` James Morris
2005-10-07 9:03 ` David Howells
2005-10-07 14:05 ` James Morris
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