public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sai Prakash Ranjan <saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org>
To: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: acme@kernel.org, al.grant@arm.com,
	alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com, coresight@lists.linaro.org,
	denik@chromium.org, dianders@chromium.org, jolsa@redhat.com,
	leo.yan@linaro.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	mark.rutland@arm.com, mathieu.poirier@linaro.org,
	mike.leach@linaro.org, mingo@redhat.com, mnissler@chromium.org,
	namhyung@kernel.org, peterz@infradead.org,
	suzuki.poulose@arm.com, swboyd@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv2 0/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode PMU tracing
Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2021 20:47:01 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <24e0d604750babd3461768897bb2ae82@codeaurora.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210309144423.GD203350@tassilo.jf.intel.com>

Hi Andi,

On 2021-03-09 20:14, Andi Kleen wrote:
>> The disk encryption is just one example and there might be others 
>> which
>> we might not be aware of yet and we are not suspecting there is 
>> something
>> wrong with the crypto code that needs to be fixed.
> 
> Then you don't have any leaks relating to branch tracing.
> 
>> restrict an external(in the sense that its not related to crypto or 
>> any
>> other security related component) entity such as hardware assisted 
>> tracing
>> like ARM coresight and so on. I don't see why or how the crypto code 
>> needs
>> to be fixed for something that is not related to it although it is 
>> affected.
> 
> It's just a general property that if some code that is handling secrets
> is data dependent it already leaks.
> 
> 
>> The analogy would be like of the victims and a perpetrator. Lets take 
>> coresight
>> as an example for perpetrator and crypto as the victim here. Now we 
>> can try
> 
> There's no victim with branch tracing, unless it is already leaky.
> 
>> If we just know one victim (lets say crypto code here), what happens 
>> to the
>> others which we haven't identified yet? Do we just wait for someone to 
>> write
>> an exploit based on this and then scramble to fix it?
> 
> For a useful security mitigation you need a threat model first I would 
> say.
> 
> So you need to have at least some idea how an attack with branch
> tracing would work.
> 
> 
>> Initial change was to restrict this only to HW assisted instruction 
>> tracing [1]
> 
> I don't think it's needed for instruction tracing.
> 

 From what I know, newer ARM A-profile cores doesn't allow data tracing. 
And you
are saying that just the instruction tracing cannot be used to infer any
important data.

There are few security folks in CC who probably can give us more details 
on how
branch tracing can be used for an exploit. @mnissler?

Thanks,
Sai

-- 
QUALCOMM INDIA, on behalf of Qualcomm Innovation Center, Inc. is a 
member
of Code Aurora Forum, hosted by The Linux Foundation

  reply	other threads:[~2021-03-10 15:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-03-01 19:04 [PATCHv2 0/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode PMU tracing Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-01 19:04 ` [PATCHv2 1/4] " Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-01 22:42   ` Doug Anderson
2021-03-01 19:04 ` [PATCHv2 2/4] perf evsel: Print warning for excluding kernel mode instruction tracing Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-01 22:43   ` Doug Anderson
2021-03-02  6:45     ` Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-01 19:04 ` [PATCHv2 3/4] coresight: etm4x: Add support to exclude kernel mode tracing Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-01 22:43   ` Doug Anderson
2021-03-02  6:41     ` Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-01 19:04 ` [PATCHv2 4/4] coresight: etm3x: " Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-01 22:43   ` Doug Anderson
2021-03-02  6:46     ` Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-04 19:59 ` [PATCHv2 0/4] perf/core: Add support to exclude kernel mode PMU tracing Andi Kleen
2021-03-04 20:17   ` Andi Kleen
2021-03-09  6:38     ` Sai Prakash Ranjan
2021-03-09 14:44       ` Andi Kleen
2021-03-10 15:17         ` Sai Prakash Ranjan [this message]
2021-06-10 13:28           ` Mattias Nissler

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=24e0d604750babd3461768897bb2ae82@codeaurora.org \
    --to=saiprakash.ranjan@codeaurora.org \
    --cc=acme@kernel.org \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=al.grant@arm.com \
    --cc=alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=coresight@lists.linaro.org \
    --cc=denik@chromium.org \
    --cc=dianders@chromium.org \
    --cc=jolsa@redhat.com \
    --cc=leo.yan@linaro.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    --cc=linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mark.rutland@arm.com \
    --cc=mathieu.poirier@linaro.org \
    --cc=mike.leach@linaro.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=mnissler@chromium.org \
    --cc=namhyung@kernel.org \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=suzuki.poulose@arm.com \
    --cc=swboyd@chromium.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox