public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
	Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/6] KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit()
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 11:22:58 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2eaca3cd-ab33-412e-9603-ce7a5b09f5f2@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241128004344.4072099-2-seanjc@google.com>

On 11/28/2024 8:43 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> Use is_64_bit_hypercall() instead of is_64_bit_mode() to detect a 64-bit
> hypercall when completing said hypercall.  For guests with protected state,
> e.g. SEV-ES and SEV-SNP, KVM must assume the hypercall was made in 64-bit
> mode as the vCPU state needed to detect 64-bit mode is unavailable.
> 
> Hacking the sev_smoke_test selftest to generate a KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE
> hypercall via VMGEXIT trips the WARN:
> 
>    ------------[ cut here ]------------
>    WARNING: CPU: 273 PID: 326626 at arch/x86/kvm/x86.h:180 complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
>    Modules linked in: kvm_amd kvm ... [last unloaded: kvm]
>    CPU: 273 UID: 0 PID: 326626 Comm: sev_smoke_test Not tainted 6.12.0-smp--392e932fa0f3-feat #470
>    Hardware name: Google Astoria/astoria, BIOS 0.20240617.0-0 06/17/2024
>    RIP: 0010:complete_hypercall_exit+0x44/0xe0 [kvm]
>    Call Trace:
>     <TASK>
>     kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x2400/0x2720 [kvm]
>     kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x54f/0x630 [kvm]
>     __se_sys_ioctl+0x6b/0xc0
>     do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
>     entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
>     </TASK>
>    ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>

> Fixes: b5aead0064f3 ("KVM: x86: Assume a 64-bit hypercall for guests with protected state")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> ---
>   arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 +-
>   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index 2e713480933a..0b2fe4aa04a2 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -9976,7 +9976,7 @@ static int complete_hypercall_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>   {
>   	u64 ret = vcpu->run->hypercall.ret;
>   
> -	if (!is_64_bit_mode(vcpu))
> +	if (!is_64_bit_hypercall(vcpu))
>   		ret = (u32)ret;
>   	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
>   	++vcpu->stat.hypercalls;


  reply	other threads:[~2024-11-28  3:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-11-28  0:43 [PATCH v4 0/6] KVM: x86: Prep KVM hypercall handling for TDX Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  0:43 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] KVM: x86: Play nice with protected guests in complete_hypercall_exit() Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  3:22   ` Xiaoyao Li [this message]
2024-11-29  9:01   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-02 18:54   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03  7:29   ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-28  0:43 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] KVM: x86: Add a helper to check for user interception of KVM hypercalls Sean Christopherson
2024-12-02 18:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-11-28  0:43 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] KVM: x86: Move "emulate hypercall" function declarations to x86.h Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  3:23   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-02 20:05   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03  7:33   ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-28  0:43 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] KVM: x86: Bump hypercall stat prior to fully completing hypercall Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  3:24   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-02 20:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-02 20:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03  7:37   ` Binbin Wu
2024-11-28  0:43 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] KVM: x86: Always complete hypercall via function callback Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  3:08   ` Xiaoyao Li
2024-12-02 18:44     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-02 20:57   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-02 20:59     ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03  0:14       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  0:43 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] KVM: x86: Refactor __kvm_emulate_hypercall() into a macro Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  8:38   ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-10 16:20     ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-10 20:03       ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-12  7:32         ` Adrian Hunter
2024-12-12 15:42           ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-12 18:40           ` Sean Christopherson
2024-12-03  8:01   ` Binbin Wu
2024-12-10 16:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2024-12-10 20:10     ` Sean Christopherson
2024-11-28  1:06 ` [PATCH v4 0/6] KVM: x86: Prep KVM hypercall handling for TDX Huang, Kai
2024-12-19  2:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-15  9:40   ` Binbin Wu
2025-01-17 19:31     ` Sean Christopherson
2025-01-20  0:37       ` Binbin Wu
2025-01-21 18:04         ` Sean Christopherson

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=2eaca3cd-ab33-412e-9603-ce7a5b09f5f2@intel.com \
    --to=xiaoyao.li@intel.com \
    --cc=binbin.wu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
    --cc=kai.huang@intel.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox