[PATCH 3.16 28/47] x86/tls: Fix possible spectre-v1 in do_get_thread_area()

Ben Hutchings
2019-10-25T18:10:48Z

From: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>

commit 993773d11d45c90cb1c6481c2638c3d9f092ea5b upstream.

The index to access the threads tls array is controlled by userspace
via syscall: sys_ptrace(), hence leading to a potential exploitation
of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

The index can be controlled from:
ptrace -> arch_ptrace -> do_get_thread_area.

Fix this by sanitizing the user supplied index before using it to access
the p->thread.tls_array.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@alien8.de
Cc: hpa@zytor.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1561524630-3642-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/kernel/tls.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/tls.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
#include <linux/user.h>
#include <linux/regset.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>

#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/desc.h>
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struc
struct user_desc __user *u_info)
{
struct user_desc info;
+ int index;

if (idx == -1 && get_user(idx, &u_info->entry_number))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -184,8 +186,11 @@ int do_get_thread_area(struct task_struc
if (idx < GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN || idx > GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX)
return -EINVAL;

- fill_user_desc(&info, idx,
- &p->thread.tls_array[idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN]);
+ index = idx - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN;
+ index = array_index_nospec(index,
+ GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MAX - GDT_ENTRY_TLS_MIN + 1);
+
+ fill_user_desc(&info, idx, &p->thread.tls_array[index]);

if (copy_to_user(u_info, &info, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;