From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com, chuck.lever@oracle.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com
Cc: nfsv4@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2008 20:47:11 -0800 (PST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <307968.59354.qm@web36615.mail.mud.yahoo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080220160630.4715.28518.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>
--- David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote:
> Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the
> security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers
> pointing to it.
> ...
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> index f6b5f6e..722752f 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
> @@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int smk_curacc(char *obj_label, u32 mode)
> {
> int rc;
>
> - rc = smk_access(current->security, obj_label, mode);
> + rc = smk_access(current->act_as->security, obj_label, mode);
> if (rc == 0)
> return 0;
>
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index 25cbfa3..a49d94f 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct
> task_struct *ctp)
> if (rc != 0)
> return rc;
>
> - rc = smk_access(ptp->security, ctp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
> + rc = smk_access(ptp->act_as->security, ctp->sec->security,
> + MAY_READWRITE);
> if (rc != 0 && __capable(ptp, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
> return 0;
>
> @@ -120,7 +121,7 @@ static int smack_ptrace(struct task_struct *ptp, struct
> task_struct *ctp)
> static int smack_syslog(int type)
> {
> int rc;
> - char *sp = current->security;
> + char *sp = current->act_as->security;
>
> rc = cap_syslog(type);
> if (rc != 0)
> @@ -359,7 +360,7 @@ static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int
> flags)
> */
> static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
> {
> - inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->security);
> + inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(current->act_as->security);
> if (inode->i_security == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;
> return 0;
> @@ -777,7 +778,7 @@ static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int
> mask)
> */
> static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
> {
> - file->f_security = current->security;
> + file->f_security = current->act_as->security;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -875,7 +876,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned
> int cmd,
> */
> static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
> {
> - file->f_security = current->security;
> + file->f_security = current->act_as->security;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -900,7 +901,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct
> *tsk,
> * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
> */
> file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
> - rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsk->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> if (rc != 0 && __capable(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
> return 0;
> return rc;
> @@ -943,7 +944,7 @@ static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
> */
> static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
> {
> - tsk->security = current->security;
> + tsk->sec->security = current->act_as->security;
>
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -958,7 +959,7 @@ static int smack_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct
> *tsk)
> */
> static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
> {
> - task->security = NULL;
> + task->sec->security = NULL;
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -970,7 +971,7 @@ static void smack_task_free_security(struct task_struct
> *task)
> */
> static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -981,7 +982,7 @@ static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p,
> pid_t pgid)
> */
> static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -992,7 +993,7 @@ static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
> */
> static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1004,7 +1005,7 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
> */
> static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
> {
> - *secid = smack_to_secid(p->security);
> + *secid = smack_to_secid(p->sec->security);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1016,7 +1017,7 @@ static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p,
> u32 *secid)
> */
> static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1028,7 +1029,7 @@ static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p,
> int nice)
> */
> static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1039,7 +1040,7 @@ static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p,
> int ioprio)
> */
> static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1053,7 +1054,7 @@ static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
> static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy,
> struct sched_param *lp)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1064,7 +1065,7 @@ static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct
> *p, int policy,
> */
> static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_READ);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_READ);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1075,7 +1076,7 @@ static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct
> *p)
> */
> static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
> {
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + return smk_curacc(p->act_as->security, MAY_WRITE);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1107,13 +1108,13 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
> struct siginfo *info,
> * can write the receiver.
> */
> if (secid == 0)
> - return smk_curacc(p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + return smk_curacc(p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> /*
> * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
> * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
> * we can't take privilege into account.
> */
> - return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid), p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -1126,7 +1127,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> {
> int rc;
>
> - rc = smk_access(current->security, p->security, MAY_WRITE);
> + rc = smk_access(current->act_as->security, p->sec->security, MAY_WRITE);
> if (rc == 0)
> return 0;
>
> @@ -1157,7 +1158,7 @@ static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
> static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
> {
> struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
> - isp->smk_inode = p->security;
> + isp->smk_inode = p->act_as->security;
> }
>
> /*
> @@ -1176,7 +1177,7 @@ static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
> struct inode *inode)
> */
> static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t
> gfp_flags)
> {
> - char *csp = current->security;
> + char *csp = current->act_as->security;
> struct socket_smack *ssp;
>
> ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
> @@ -1401,7 +1402,7 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
> */
> static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
> {
> - msg->security = current->security;
> + msg->security = current->act_as->security;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1437,7 +1438,7 @@ static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel
> *shp)
> {
> struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
>
> - isp->security = current->security;
> + isp->security = current->act_as->security;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1545,7 +1546,7 @@ static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array
> *sma)
> {
> struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
>
> - isp->security = current->security;
> + isp->security = current->act_as->security;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1648,7 +1649,7 @@ static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct
> msg_queue *msq)
> {
> struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
>
> - kisp->security = current->security;
> + kisp->security = current->act_as->security;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -1790,7 +1791,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry
> *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
> struct super_block *sbp;
> struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
> struct inode_smack *isp;
> - char *csp = current->security;
> + char *csp = current->act_as->security;
> char *fetched;
> char *final;
> struct dentry *dp;
> @@ -1935,7 +1936,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
> char *name, char **value)
> if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - cp = kstrdup(p->security, GFP_KERNEL);
> + cp = kstrdup(p->sec->security, GFP_KERNEL);
> if (cp == NULL)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> @@ -1981,7 +1982,7 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
> char *name,
> if (newsmack == NULL)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - p->security = newsmack;
> + p->sec->security = newsmack;
> return size;
> }
>
> @@ -2211,8 +2212,8 @@ static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct
> socket *parent)
> return;
>
> ssp = sk->sk_security;
> - ssp->smk_in = current->security;
> - ssp->smk_out = current->security;
> + ssp->smk_in = current->act_as->security;
> + ssp->smk_out = current->act_as->security;
> ssp->smk_packet[0] = '\0';
>
> rc = smack_netlabel(sk);
> @@ -2285,7 +2286,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
> struct sk_buff *skb,
> static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, struct task_struct *tsk,
> unsigned long flags)
> {
> - key->security = tsk->security;
> + key->security = tsk->act_as->security;
> return 0;
> }
>
> @@ -2326,10 +2327,11 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
> /*
> * This should not occur
> */
> - if (context->security == NULL)
> + if (context->act_as->security == NULL)
> return -EACCES;
>
> - return smk_access(context->security, keyp->security, MAY_READWRITE);
> + return smk_access(context->act_as->security, keyp->security,
> + MAY_READWRITE);
> }
> #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
>
> @@ -2510,7 +2512,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)
> /*
> * Set the security state for the initial task.
> */
> - current->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
> + current->sec->security = &smack_known_floor.smk_known;
>
> /*
> * Initialize locks
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index 358c92c..2cb3a5e 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ void smk_cipso_doi(void)
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
> - audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
> + audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->sec->security);
>
> rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, &audit_info);
> if (rc != 0)
> @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
> struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
>
> audit_info.loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
> - audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->security);
> + audit_info.secid = smack_to_secid(current->sec->security);
>
> if (oldambient != NULL) {
> rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, &audit_info);
The Smack portions look fine.
Thank you.
Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-02-22 4:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-02-20 16:05 [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 01/37] KEYS: Increase the payload size when instantiating a key David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 02/37] KEYS: Check starting keyring as part of search David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 03/37] KEYS: Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 04/37] KEYS: Add keyctl function to get a security label David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 05/37] Security: Change current->fs[ug]id to current_fs[ug]id() David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct David Howells
2008-02-22 4:47 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 07/37] Security: De-embed task security record from task and use refcounting David Howells
2008-02-22 4:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 08/37] Security: Add a kernel_service object class to SELinux David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 09/37] Security: Allow kernel services to override LSM settings for task actions David Howells
2008-02-22 5:06 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-02-22 13:06 ` David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 10/37] Security: Make NFSD work with detached security David Howells
2008-02-20 16:06 ` [PATCH 11/37] FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readahead David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 12/37] FS-Cache: Recruit a couple of page flags for cache management David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 13/37] FS-Cache: Provide an add_wait_queue_tail() function David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 14/37] FS-Cache: Generic filesystem caching facility David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 15/37] CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ia64 David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 16/37] CacheFiles: Be consistent about the use of mapping vs file->f_mapping in Ext3 David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 17/37] CacheFiles: Add a hook to write a single page of data to an inode David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 18/37] CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitored David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 19/37] CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFiles David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 20/37] CacheFiles: A cache that backs onto a mounted filesystem David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 21/37] NFS: Add comment banners to some NFS functions David Howells
2008-02-20 16:07 ` [PATCH 22/37] NFS: Add FS-Cache option bit and debug bit David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 23/37] NFS: Permit local filesystem caching to be enabled for NFS David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 24/37] NFS: Register NFS for caching and retrieve the top-level index David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 25/37] NFS: Define and create server-level objects David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 26/37] NFS: Define and create superblock-level objects David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 27/37] NFS: Define and create inode-level cache objects David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 28/37] NFS: Use local disk inode cache David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 29/37] NFS: Invalidate FsCache page flags when cache removed David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 30/37] NFS: Add some new I/O event counters for FS-Cache events David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 31/37] NFS: FS-Cache page management David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 32/37] NFS: Add read context retention for FS-Cache to call back with David Howells
2008-02-20 16:08 ` [PATCH 33/37] NFS: nfs_readpage_async() needs to be accessible as a fallback for local caching David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 34/37] NFS: Read pages from FS-Cache into an NFS inode David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 35/37] NFS: Store pages from an NFS inode into a local cache David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 36/37] NFS: Display local caching state David Howells
2008-02-20 16:09 ` [PATCH 37/37] NFS: Add mount options to enable local caching on NFS David Howells
2008-02-20 19:58 ` [PATCH 00/37] Permit filesystem local caching Serge E. Hallyn
2008-02-20 20:11 ` David Howells
2008-02-21 3:07 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-21 12:31 ` David Howells
2008-02-21 14:55 ` David Howells
2008-02-21 15:17 ` Kevin Coffman
2008-02-21 22:44 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-21 22:52 ` Muntz, Daniel
2008-02-22 0:07 ` David Howells
2008-02-22 0:57 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-22 12:48 ` David Howells
2008-02-22 22:25 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-23 1:22 ` David Howells
2008-02-21 23:33 ` David Howells
2008-02-22 13:52 ` Chris Mason
2008-02-22 16:12 ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:47 ` David Howells
2008-02-22 16:14 ` David Howells
[not found] ` <200802251401.16413.phillips@phunq.net>
2008-02-25 23:19 ` David Howells
2008-02-26 0:43 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26 2:00 ` David Howells
2008-02-26 10:26 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26 14:33 ` David Howells
2008-02-26 19:43 ` Daniel Phillips
2008-02-26 21:09 ` David Howells
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2008-02-08 16:51 David Howells
2008-02-08 16:52 ` [PATCH 06/37] Security: Separate task security context from task_struct David Howells
2008-02-11 10:43 ` James Morris
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