From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, lukas@wunner.de, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #2]
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 14:13:28 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <31974.1479910408@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20161123134219.GH24624@leverpostej>
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> wrote:
> > > if (secure_boot < 0)
> > > pr_efi_err(sys_table,
> > > "could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
> >
> > In which case, should this be moved into efi_get_secureboot() and it return a
> > bool?
>
> That would make sense to me, provided we're only likely to call that
> once (and only log once).
>
> I guess it would also make sense to change the latter case to soemthing
> like:
>
> Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status. Assuming enabled.
>
> ... so as to make it clear what the effect is.
Actually, the two arches have a different interpretation on how to deal with
an error. Matthew Garrett's original x86 patch assumes that if we get an
error when trying to read SecureBoot and SetupMode that we're *not* in secure
mode, but ARM assumes the opposite.
David
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-23 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-11-23 0:22 [PATCH 0/6] efi: Pass secure boot mode to kernel [ver #2] David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/efi: Allow invocation of arbitrary runtime services " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 2/6] arm/efi: " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:34 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:35 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2016-11-23 11:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:27 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:46 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 3/6] efi: Add SHIM and image security database GUID definitions " David Howells
2016-11-23 0:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] efi: Get the secure boot status " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:31 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 9:53 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:10 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:47 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 11:25 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 13:42 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:13 ` David Howells [this message]
2016-11-23 14:24 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 14:55 ` David Howells
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Matthew Garrett
2016-11-30 16:51 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] efi: Disable secure boot if shim is in insecure mode " David Howells
2016-11-23 13:38 ` Mark Rutland
2016-11-23 0:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit " David Howells
2016-11-23 9:27 ` Lukas Wunner
2016-11-23 10:07 ` David Howells
2016-11-23 10:09 ` David Howells
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