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From: "D. Stimits" <stimits@idcomm.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)@localhost.localdomain
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: encrypted swap
Date: Tue, 07 Aug 2001 15:56:45 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3B70641D.CF5F48B9@idcomm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <D52B19A7284D32459CF20D579C4B0C0211C9A8@mail0.myrio.com> <Pine.LNX.4.33L2.0108072212590.18776-100000@spiral.extreme.ro> <9kpl82$iao$1@abraham.cs.berkeley.edu>

David Wagner wrote:
> 
> Dan Podeanu  wrote:
> >If its going to be stolen while its offline, you
> >can have your shutdown scripts blank the swap partition [...]
> 
> Erasing data, once written, is deceptively difficult.
> See Peter Gutmann's excellent paper on the subject at
> http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec96/gutmann.html
> 
> It turns out that the easiest way to solve this problem is to make sure
> you only ever write to the swap partition in encrypted form, and then when
> you want to erase it securely, just throw away the key used to encrypt it.
> (You have to securely erase this key, but it is much easier to erase
> this key securely, because it is shorter and because you can arrange
> that it only resides in RAM.)
> 
> It is critical that you choose a new encryption key each time you boot.
> (Requiring users to enter in passphrases manually is unlikely to work well.)

You could easily create a pass phrase that is a combination of a user
defined pass, and a random device generation. During suspend of the
laptop, you could force it to forget only the user defined portion, and
ask that it get re-entered on resume. Keyboard snooping would only
provide a small part of the key; though it would aid attacks to know
part of the key, each reboot would invalidate the per-session key, and
each suspend or boot would also invalidate the user key (the user could
choose a different user key each boot, but that key would remain in
effect for the remainder of the boot; one could be so devious as to also
force the user key portion to pass a one-way hash, like MD5, against a
permanent pass file, if the permanent pass file was not itself on an
encrypted partition).

D. Stimits, stimits@idcomm.com

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  reply	other threads:[~2001-08-07 21:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 104+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2001-08-07 18:53 encrypted swap Torrey Hoffman
2001-08-07 19:15 ` Thomas Pornin
2001-08-07 19:23 ` Dan Podeanu
2001-08-07 19:48   ` Andreas Dilger
2001-08-07 20:04   ` Marty Poulin
2001-08-07 21:06   ` David Wagner
2001-08-07 21:56     ` D. Stimits [this message]
2001-08-07 21:44   ` Pavel Machek
2001-08-07 19:48 ` Justin Guyett
2001-08-07 20:05   ` Alan Cox
2001-08-07 20:17   ` Bill Rugolsky Jr.
     [not found] <fa.kmbqblv.v3uvig@ifi.uio.no>
2001-08-18 14:53 ` Encrypted Swap Ted Unangst
2001-08-18 15:17   ` Mr. James W. Laferriere
2001-08-20 11:03   ` Helge Hafting
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2001-08-17 17:10 David Christensen
2001-08-17 17:21 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 18:41   ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-17 19:05     ` Dan Hollis
2001-08-18  9:52       ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-18 10:24         ` Nicholas Knight
2001-08-18 12:32           ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-17 19:20     ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-18 10:34       ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-07 21:40 encrypted swap David Spreen
2001-08-07 17:30 Encrypted Swap David Maynor
2001-08-07 17:27 ` Rik van Riel
2001-08-07 15:28 encrypted swap David Maynor
2001-08-07 15:51 ` Florian Weimer
2001-08-07 15:06 David Maynor
2001-08-07 15:11 ` Florian Weimer
2001-08-07 15:43   ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07 15:30 ` Garett Spencley
2001-08-07 16:21 ` David Spreen
2001-08-08  8:11 ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-07 14:37 David Maynor
2001-08-07 14:48 ` Billy Harvey
2001-08-07 16:03 ` Chris Wedgwood
     [not found] <no.id>
2001-08-07 14:17 ` Encrypted Swap Alan Cox
2001-08-07 15:16   ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07 16:01     ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07  2:28 David Spreen
2001-08-07  3:56 ` Justin Guyett
2001-08-07  4:01   ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07  4:12   ` Steve VanDevender
2001-08-07  4:23     ` John Polyakov
2001-08-07  4:36       ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07  5:12       ` Garett Spencley
2001-08-07  5:55         ` Ryan Mack
2001-08-07  6:27           ` John Polyakov
2001-08-06 23:28             ` Rob Landley
2001-08-07 10:10               ` Christopher E. Brown
2001-08-07 14:05                 ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07  6:41             ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07  6:57               ` Evgeny Polyakov
2001-08-07  6:45             ` Ryan Mack
2001-08-07  7:08               ` Evgeny Polyakov
2001-08-07  7:23                 ` Sean Hunter
2001-08-07  8:39                   ` Ben Ford
2001-08-07 12:28                   ` Kevin Krieser
2001-08-07 12:39                     ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-07 14:21                     ` Ignacio Vazquez-Abrams
2001-08-07  7:26                 ` Ryan Mack
2001-08-07  7:34                 ` Jeffrey Considine
2001-08-07  7:49                 ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07  9:01                 ` Peter Wächtler
2001-08-07 12:37           ` Michael Bacarella
2001-08-17 14:50           ` Holger Lubitz
2001-08-17 15:39             ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 15:57               ` Holger Lubitz
2001-08-17 16:34                 ` Gerhard Mack
2001-08-17 16:50                 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 17:06               ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-17 17:16                 ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-17 17:22                   ` Jacob Alifrangis
2001-08-17 17:36                   ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-17 18:51                     ` Nicholas Knight
2001-08-17 19:30                       ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-18  8:51                         ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-18 11:02                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2001-08-19  8:51                             ` Adrian Cox
2001-08-20  1:27                           ` Richard B. Johnson
2001-08-20 11:08                             ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-20 11:50                             ` Ian Stirling
2001-08-21 13:55                         ` Andreas Bombe
2001-08-17 20:00                       ` Andreas Dilger
2001-08-07 20:09         ` Maciej Zenczykowski
2001-08-07  7:34       ` Steve VanDevender
2001-08-07  7:55         ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07 15:17         ` Garett Spencley
2001-08-07  7:49     ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-07  7:58       ` Crutcher Dunnavant
2001-08-07  9:23         ` Helge Hafting
2001-08-07 13:29           ` Wichert Akkerman
2001-08-07 15:56           ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 16:54             ` Alan Cox
2001-08-07 17:10               ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07  9:52     ` Brian May
2001-08-07 14:48       ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07 15:59         ` Chris Wedgwood
2001-08-07 16:18           ` Joel Jaeggli
2001-08-07 16:24             ` Florian Weimer
2001-08-08  2:13       ` Dr. Kelsey Hudson
2001-08-07 20:30   ` Ian Stirling
2001-08-07 10:33 ` Andrea Arcangeli

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