Re: hard links create local DoS vulnerability and security problems

[Andy Lutomirski <luto@myrealbox.com>]

Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:

> 
> In any case, if a user is *MAKING* a program set-UID, it's probably because
> he *wants* it to run as himself even if others invoke it (otherwise, he
> could just leave it in ~/bin and be happy).  So this is really a red herring,
> as it's only a problem if (a) he decides to get rid of the binary, and fails
> to do so because of hard links he doesn't know about, or (b) he's an idiot
> programmer and it malfunctions if invoked with an odd argv[0]....

Right... but non-privileged users _can't_ delete these extra links, even 
if they notice them from the link count.  And non-idiots do make 
security errors -- they just fix them.  But in this case, fixing the 
error after the fact may be impossible without root's help.

And how many package managers / install scripts check for hard links of 
files they're about to overwrite?

--Andy