From: "Yang, Weijiang" <weijiang.yang@intel.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
<rppt@kernel.org>, <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
<rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>, <john.allen@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable kernel IBT support for guest
Date: Mon, 26 Jun 2023 20:10:04 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3b546ed7-145e-6cd2-effe-e17e958cc226@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZJYyuBdh8Ob+zzT2@google.com>
On 6/24/2023 8:03 AM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, May 11, 2023, Yang Weijiang wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> index a2494156902d..1d0151f9e575 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>> @@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ static bool is_valid_passthrough_msr(u32 msr)
>> return true;
>> case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>> case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
>> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> return true;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -2097,14 +2098,18 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
>> case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
>> if (!kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible(vcpu, msr_info))
>> return 1;
>> - if (msr_info->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
>> + if (msr_info->index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP) {
> Unnecessary curly braces.
Something in my mind must be wrong :-), will remove them.
>
>> msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);
>> - else
>> + } else if (msr_info->index == MSR_IA32_S_CET) {
>> + msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);
>> + } else {
>> kvm_get_xsave_msr(msr_info);
>> + }
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
>> msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL);
>> @@ -2419,6 +2424,7 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_U_CET:
>> + case MSR_IA32_S_CET:
>> case MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP:
>> case MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP:
>> if (!kvm_cet_is_msr_accessible(vcpu, msr_info))
>> @@ -2430,10 +2436,13 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
>> if ((msr_index == MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP ||
>> msr_index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP) && (data & GENMASK(2, 0)))
>> return 1;
>> - if (msr_index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP)
>> + if (msr_index == MSR_KVM_GUEST_SSP) {
>> vmcs_writel(GUEST_SSP, data);
>> - else
>> + } else if (msr_index == MSR_IA32_S_CET) {
>> + vmcs_writel(GUEST_S_CET, data);
>> + } else {
> Same here.
>
>> kvm_set_xsave_msr(msr_info);
>> + }
>> break;
>> case MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES:
>> if (data && !vcpu_to_pmu(vcpu)->version)
>> @@ -7322,6 +7331,19 @@ static fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>
>> kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Save host MSR_IA32_S_CET so that it can be reloaded at vm_exit.
>> + * No need to save the other two vmcs fields as supervisor SHSTK
>> + * are not enabled on Intel platform now.
>> + */
>> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) &&
>> + (vm_exit_controls_get(vmx) & VM_EXIT_LOAD_CET_STATE)) {
>> + u64 msr;
>> +
>> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
> Reading the MSR on every VM-Enter can't possibly be necessary. At the absolute
> minimum, this could be moved outside of the fastpath; if the kernel modifies S_CET
> from NMI context, KVM is hosed. And *if* S_CET isn't static post-boot, this can
> be done in .prepare_switch_to_guest() so long as S_CET isn't modified from IRQ
> context.
Agree with you.
>
> But unless mine eyes deceive me, S_CET is only truly modified during setup_cet(),
> i.e. is static post boot, which means it can be read once at KVM load time, e.g.
> just like host_efer.
I think handling S_CET like host_efer from usage perspective is possible
given currently only
kernel IBT is enabled in kernel, I'll remove the code and initialize the
vmcs field once like host_efer.
>
> The kernel does save/restore IBT when making BIOS calls, but if KVM is running a
> vCPU across a BIOS call then we've got bigger issues.
What's the problem you're referring to?
>
>> + vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, msr);
>> + }
>> +
>> /* The actual VMENTER/EXIT is in the .noinstr.text section. */
>> vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(vcpu, __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(vmx));
>>
>> @@ -7735,6 +7757,13 @@ static void vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>>
>> incpt |= !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SHSTK);
>> vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_PL3_SSP, MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * If IBT is available to guest, then passthrough S_CET MSR too since
>> + * kernel IBT is already in mainline kernel tree.
>> + */
>> + incpt = !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBT);
>> + vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_IA32_S_CET, MSR_TYPE_RW, incpt);
>> }
>>
>> static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> @@ -7805,7 +7834,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> /* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
>> vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
>>
>> - if (kvm_cet_user_supported())
>> + if (kvm_cet_user_supported() || kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
> Yeah, kvm_cet_user_supported() simply looks wrong.
These are preconditions to set up CET MSRs for guest, in
vmx_update_intercept_for_cet_msr(),
the actual MSR control is based on guest_cpuid_has() results.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-26 12:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 99+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-05-11 4:08 [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 01/21] x86/shstk: Add Kconfig option for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 02/21] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPU feature flags for shadow stacks Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 03/21] x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 04/21] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR and XSAVES supervisor states Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 05/21] x86/fpu: Add helper for modifying xstate Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 06/21] KVM:x86: Report XSS as to-be-saved if there are supported features Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24 7:06 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-24 8:19 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 07/21] KVM:x86: Refresh CPUID on write to guest MSR_IA32_XSS Yang Weijiang
2023-05-25 6:10 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-30 3:51 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-30 12:08 ` Chao Gao
2023-05-31 1:11 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:21 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 9:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 08/21] KVM:x86: Init kvm_caps.supported_xss with supported feature bits Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 8:38 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 5:42 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 09/21] KVM:x86: Load guest FPU state when accessing xsaves-managed MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 2:02 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 10/21] KVM:x86: Add #CP support in guest exception classification Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 9:08 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 6:01 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 6:56 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 18:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19 9:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 9:34 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 10:27 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-30 12:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:05 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-06-30 15:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-01 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-01 1:54 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-30 15:07 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-30 15:21 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-01 1:57 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 11/21] KVM:VMX: Introduce CET VMCS fields and control bits Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 12/21] KVM:x86: Add fault checks for guest CR4.CET setting Yang Weijiang
2023-06-06 11:03 ` Chao Gao
2023-06-08 6:06 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 13/21] KVM:VMX: Emulate reads and writes to CET MSRs Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23 8:21 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24 2:49 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 23:53 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 14:05 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 3:32 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-27 14:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-28 1:42 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 9:10 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-07 15:28 ` Neiger, Gil
2023-07-12 16:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 14/21] KVM:VMX: Add a synthetic MSR to allow userspace to access GUEST_SSP Yang Weijiang
2023-05-23 8:57 ` Binbin Wu
2023-05-24 2:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 15/21] KVM:x86: Report CET MSRs as to-be-saved if CET is supported Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 16/21] KVM:x86: Save/Restore GUEST_SSP to/from SMM state save area Yang Weijiang
2023-06-23 22:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 8:59 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-26 21:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 3:50 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 17/21] KVM:VMX: Pass through user CET MSRs to the guest Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 18/21] KVM:x86: Enable CET virtualization for VMX and advertise to userspace Yang Weijiang
2023-05-24 6:35 ` Chenyi Qiang
2023-05-24 8:07 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 19/21] KVM:nVMX: Enable user CET support for nested VMX Yang Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 20/21] KVM:x86: Enable kernel IBT support for guest Yang Weijiang
2023-06-24 0:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 12:10 ` Yang, Weijiang [this message]
2023-06-26 20:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-27 1:53 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-05-11 4:08 ` [PATCH v3 21/21] KVM:x86: Support CET supervisor shadow stack MSR access Yang Weijiang
2023-06-15 23:30 ` [PATCH v3 00/21] Enable CET Virtualization Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 0:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-16 1:00 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 8:25 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-16 17:56 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-19 6:41 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-06-23 20:51 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-06-26 6:46 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-17 7:44 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-19 20:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-20 1:58 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-19 20:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 5:26 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 8:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 8:09 ` Peter Zijlstra
2023-07-20 9:14 ` Pankaj Gupta
2023-07-20 10:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-07-20 1:55 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 0:28 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-07-10 22:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-07-11 1:24 ` Yang, Weijiang
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