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From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Richard Hughes <hughsient@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Gutson <daniel@eclypsium.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	Rahul Tanwar <rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com>,
	Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 07:23:40 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3d454068-fd4e-4399-4bf5-2d010bb2ba7d@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD2FfiHCi2MfShGWaYWk_GcXW4xVr6chsLPZs78OJE+2_GErVg@mail.gmail.com>

On 6/19/20 7:09 AM, Richard Hughes wrote:
> On Fri, 19 Jun 2020 at 14:58, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>>> Right, but for the most part you'd agree that a machine with
>>> functioning TME and encrypted swap partition is more secure than a
>>> machine without TME?
>>
>> Nope.  There might be zero memory connected to the memory controller
>> that supports TME.
> 
> So you're saying that a machine with TME available and enabled is not
> considered more secure than a machine without TME?

Yes, it is not necessarily more secure.

> What I want to do is have a sliding scale of TME not available < TME
> available but disabled < TME available and enabled < TME available,
> enabled and being used. The extra nugget of data gets me from state 2
> to state 3.

I'd assert that availability tells you nothing if you don't pair it with
use.

Last night, I asked my kids if they brushed their teeth.  They said:
"Dad, my toothbrush was available."  They argued that mere availability
was a better situation than not *having* a toothbrush.  They were
logically right, of course, but they still got cavities.

>>> Can I use TME if the CPU supports it, but the platform has disabled
>>> it? How do I know that my system is actually *using* the benefits the
>>> TME feature provides?
>>
>> You must have a system with UEFI 2.8, ensure TME is enabled, then make
>> sure the OS parses EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO, then ensure you request that
>> you data be placed in a region marked with EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO, and
>> that it be *kept* there (hint: NUMA APIs don't do this).
> 
> So my take-away from that is that it's currently impossible to
> actually say if your system is *actually* using TME.

Not in a generic way, and it can't be derived from cpuid or MSRs alone.

Let's say I'm buying a fleet of servers.  I know I'm buying some fancy
Xeon with TME, I know I'm only using DRAM for storing user data, and I
don't have any accelerators around.  I control and enforce my BIOS
settings.  I'm pretty sure I'm using TME, but I didn't become sure from
poking at sysfs.

  reply	other threads:[~2020-06-19 14:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-18 21:02 [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace Daniel Gutson
2020-06-18 21:08 ` Dave Hansen
     [not found]   ` <CAFmMkTHNxSN_uWtm63TdkGxj44NXQQKEOmATXhjA=4DSCS92kQ@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-18 22:01     ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]       ` <CAFmMkTGMAu-huTnP1aeMb_W4NddbTD_b2jhbDVKBDrkwgB97wg@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19  7:40         ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]           ` <CAFmMkTGV0ZR6C=EBGQAiz1vw1vrUXSLTnH5ZbBUvfhPLg_tF6g@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 13:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:31               ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:44                 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:50                   ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 15:48                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 16:17                       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 16:28                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 16:31                         ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 16:10                     ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 16:33                       ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 16:40                         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-19 16:47                           ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 19:41                             ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 19:58                               ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 20:20                                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 20:24                                   ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-22  9:34                                     ` Boris Petkov
2020-06-18 23:52     ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19  7:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:25       ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:33         ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 13:37           ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:58             ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 14:09               ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 14:23                 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2020-06-19 14:36                   ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 14:48                     ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 15:02                       ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 15:36                         ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19  7:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
     [not found]   ` <CAFmMkTF7QBJQdKxhsPiUPifsxykyCVv=NYandpB0z8EccAxMXw@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 14:02     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman

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