From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
To: Richard Hughes <hughsient@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Gutson <daniel@eclypsium.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>, Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
Rahul Tanwar <rahul.tanwar@linux.intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace
Date: Fri, 19 Jun 2020 07:23:40 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3d454068-fd4e-4399-4bf5-2d010bb2ba7d@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAD2FfiHCi2MfShGWaYWk_GcXW4xVr6chsLPZs78OJE+2_GErVg@mail.gmail.com>
On 6/19/20 7:09 AM, Richard Hughes wrote:
> On Fri, 19 Jun 2020 at 14:58, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> wrote:
>>> Right, but for the most part you'd agree that a machine with
>>> functioning TME and encrypted swap partition is more secure than a
>>> machine without TME?
>>
>> Nope. There might be zero memory connected to the memory controller
>> that supports TME.
>
> So you're saying that a machine with TME available and enabled is not
> considered more secure than a machine without TME?
Yes, it is not necessarily more secure.
> What I want to do is have a sliding scale of TME not available < TME
> available but disabled < TME available and enabled < TME available,
> enabled and being used. The extra nugget of data gets me from state 2
> to state 3.
I'd assert that availability tells you nothing if you don't pair it with
use.
Last night, I asked my kids if they brushed their teeth. They said:
"Dad, my toothbrush was available." They argued that mere availability
was a better situation than not *having* a toothbrush. They were
logically right, of course, but they still got cavities.
>>> Can I use TME if the CPU supports it, but the platform has disabled
>>> it? How do I know that my system is actually *using* the benefits the
>>> TME feature provides?
>>
>> You must have a system with UEFI 2.8, ensure TME is enabled, then make
>> sure the OS parses EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO, then ensure you request that
>> you data be placed in a region marked with EFI_MEMORY_CPU_CRYPTO, and
>> that it be *kept* there (hint: NUMA APIs don't do this).
>
> So my take-away from that is that it's currently impossible to
> actually say if your system is *actually* using TME.
Not in a generic way, and it can't be derived from cpuid or MSRs alone.
Let's say I'm buying a fleet of servers. I know I'm buying some fancy
Xeon with TME, I know I'm only using DRAM for storing user data, and I
don't have any accelerators around. I control and enforce my BIOS
settings. I'm pretty sure I'm using TME, but I didn't become sure from
poking at sysfs.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-06-19 14:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-18 21:02 [PATCH] Ability to read the MKTME status from userspace Daniel Gutson
2020-06-18 21:08 ` Dave Hansen
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTHNxSN_uWtm63TdkGxj44NXQQKEOmATXhjA=4DSCS92kQ@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-18 22:01 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTGMAu-huTnP1aeMb_W4NddbTD_b2jhbDVKBDrkwgB97wg@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 7:40 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTGV0ZR6C=EBGQAiz1vw1vrUXSLTnH5ZbBUvfhPLg_tF6g@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 13:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:31 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:50 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 15:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 16:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 16:28 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 16:31 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 16:10 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 16:33 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 16:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-06-19 16:47 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 19:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 19:58 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 20:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-19 20:24 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-22 9:34 ` Boris Petkov
2020-06-18 23:52 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 7:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-06-19 13:25 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:33 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 13:37 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 13:58 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 14:09 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 14:23 ` Dave Hansen [this message]
2020-06-19 14:36 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 14:48 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 15:02 ` Richard Hughes
2020-06-19 15:36 ` Dave Hansen
2020-06-19 7:20 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
[not found] ` <CAFmMkTF7QBJQdKxhsPiUPifsxykyCVv=NYandpB0z8EccAxMXw@mail.gmail.com>
2020-06-19 14:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
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