From: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
To: "pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn" <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>,
"idryomov@gmail.com" <idryomov@gmail.com>,
Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Cc: "ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org" <ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org>,
"slava@dubeyko.com" <slava@dubeyko.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] ceph: bound encrypted snapshot suffix formatting
Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 19:42:09 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3d6bf2442f2df5748c6d030e202c50a1eb42469a.camel@ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260407120003.3-ceph-v2-pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
On Tue, 2026-04-07 at 09:57 +0800, Pengpeng Hou wrote:
> ceph_encode_encrypted_dname() base64-encodes the encrypted snapshot
> name into the caller buffer and then, for long snapshot names, appends
> _<ino> with sprintf(p + elen, ...).
>
> Some callers only provide NAME_MAX bytes. For long snapshot names, a
> large inode suffix can push the final encoded name past NAME_MAX even
> though the encrypted prefix stayed within the documented 240-byte
> budget.
>
> Format the suffix into a small local buffer first and reject names
> whose suffix would exceed the caller's NAME_MAX output buffer.
>
> Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou <pengpeng@iscas.ac.cn>
> ---
> Changes since v1:
> - replace the raw suffix-size constants with a named maximum
> - drop the impossible negative snprintf() check
> - keep the NAME_MAX bound check local to the formatted suffix length
>
> fs/ceph/crypto.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/crypto.c b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> index f3de43ccb470..7712557660c3 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> +++ b/fs/ceph/crypto.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
> #include "mds_client.h"
> #include "crypto.h"
>
> +#define CEPH_ENCRYPTED_SNAP_INO_SUFFIX_MAX sizeof("_18446744073709551615")
These define is much better. But I am still thinking could we have a more
elegant solution here? :) Do you have any ideas? Maybe, do we need to introduce
some macro DECIMAL_DIGITS_MAX()? At minimum, we need to have a comment here.
> +
> static int ceph_crypt_get_context(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, size_t len)
> {
> struct ceph_inode_info *ci = ceph_inode(inode);
> @@ -271,8 +273,19 @@ int ceph_encode_encrypted_dname(struct inode *parent, char *buf, int elen)
>
> /* To understand the 240 limit, see CEPH_NOHASH_NAME_MAX comments */
> WARN_ON(elen > 240);
> - if (dir != parent) // leading _ is already there; append _<inum>
> - elen += 1 + sprintf(p + elen, "_%ld", dir->i_ino);
> + if (dir != parent) {
> + /* leading '_' is already there; append _<inum> */
> + char suffix[CEPH_ENCRYPTED_SNAP_INO_SUFFIX_MAX];
> +
> + ret = snprintf(suffix, sizeof(suffix), "_%lu", dir->i_ino);
> + if (ret >= sizeof(suffix) || ret >= NAME_MAX - elen) {
It looks like that ret >= sizeof(suffix) is dead code. The sizeof(suffix) = 22.
The maximum possible suffix is _18446744073709551615 = 21 chars → snprintf
returns 21, never ≥ 22.
> + elen = -ENAMETOOLONG;
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + memcpy(p + elen, suffix, ret);
> + elen += ret + 1;
I believe we need to have a comment here. The +1 is not for the NUL — it
accounts for the leading _ at buf[0]. Without a comment it could be confusing.
Thanks,
Slava.
> + }
>
> out:
> kfree(cryptbuf);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-07 19:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-03 8:56 [PATCH] ceph: bound encrypted snapshot suffix formatting Pengpeng Hou
2026-04-06 18:52 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-07 1:57 ` [PATCH v2] " Pengpeng Hou
2026-04-07 19:42 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko [this message]
2026-04-08 0:57 ` [PATCH v3] " Pengpeng Hou
2026-04-08 18:34 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-09 2:39 ` [PATCH v4] " Pengpeng Hou
2026-04-09 18:09 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-10 20:40 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-10 20:46 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-22 9:53 ` Ilya Dryomov
2026-04-23 18:04 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-24 9:27 ` Ilya Dryomov
2026-04-24 18:31 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-24 19:20 ` Ilya Dryomov
2026-04-27 8:12 ` Luis Henriques
2026-04-28 11:40 ` Ilya Dryomov
2026-04-28 18:17 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-04-24 8:15 ` Luis Henriques
2026-04-07 3:30 ` [PATCH] " Pengpeng Hou
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