Re: [PATCH v3 3/14] selinux: more strict policy parsing

[Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>]

On May 11, 2025 =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgoettsche@seltendoof.de> wrote:
> 
> Be more strict during parsing of policies and reject invalid values.
> 
> Add some error messages in the case of policy parse failures, to
> enhance debugging, either on a malformed policy or a too strict check.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
> ---
> v3:
>   - incorporate the overflow checks on security classes from the
>     previous patch, and permit U16_MAX as class ID
>   - minimize the usage of magic values, by using macros or trivial
>     helper functions
> v2:
>   accept unknown xperm specifiers to support backwards compatibility for
>   future ones, suggested by Thiébaud
> ---
>  security/selinux/include/security.h |   1 +
>  security/selinux/ss/avtab.c         |  35 ++++-
>  security/selinux/ss/avtab.h         |  13 ++
>  security/selinux/ss/conditional.c   |  18 +--
>  security/selinux/ss/constraint.h    |   1 +
>  security/selinux/ss/policydb.c      | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  security/selinux/ss/policydb.h      |  23 +++-
>  security/selinux/ss/services.c      |   6 +-
>  8 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)

I fixed the checkpatch.pl warning in pr_warn_once_policyload() but
otherwise this looks good to me, merged into selinux/dev.  Thanks!

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