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From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@myrealbox.com>
To: Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@mac.com>
Cc: Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: In-kernel Authentication Tokens (PAGs)
Date: Sat, 12 Jun 2004 08:37:32 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <40CB233C.6050505@myrealbox.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3131BE9C-BC6F-11D8-888F-000393ACC76E@mac.com>

Kyle Moffett wrote:

> On Jun 12, 2004, at 01:34, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> 
>> Right.  But I think it would be desirable to do other things -- for 
>> example, a program might want to forward one token over to a daemon to 
>> do some work.  It doesn't make much sense here to have a hierarchial 
>> structure.
> 
> 
> So you disagree with the hierarchical structure because you believe that 
> there are other things that are more important that conflict with it.  I 
> see no reason why both cannot be accommodated.  For me, I would really 
> desire a hierarchical structure because it would make it very simple to 
> have a token set for the entire session and one for each instance 
> (shell), and ones for subshells where convenient.

OK.

> 
> You want to sent a token to some daemon over a UNIX socket?  Just copy 
> the token data and write it out to the socket, the same as if you had 
> some external token store (Like in MIT Kerberos) and wanted to send the 
> token to somewhere without the environment variables.  This system would 
> allow several existing token cache mechanisms to be converted to this 
> alternative store without much work at all.

Except I'd like non-root users to have tokens that they _cannot_ read, but 
that they can still pass over unix sockets.  I have no objection to also 
allowing user-readable tokens.

This way I could have a server with, say, a Kerberos service token such 
that a compromise of the server process does not compromise the service 
token.  (You still have a gotcha in that the kerberosd this would require 
would, for performance reasons, want to handle only ticket-granting 
traffic.  Still, you just mark the TGT unreadable and the individual 
session tickets readable, so that the damage of a compromise is limited to 
a few hours until the sessions expire.)

Yes, this would be a _lot_ more work than just blindly porting Kerberos' 
ticket cache, but it has security benefits.

And I really want a good token system in Linux -- that way the OpenAFS 
people will stop bitching and I might be able to use it again.

--Andy

  reply	other threads:[~2004-06-12 15:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-06-12  2:37 In-kernel Authentication Tokens (PAGs) Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12  3:13 ` Andy Lutomirski
2004-06-12  4:57   ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12  5:34     ` Andy Lutomirski
2004-06-12 12:51       ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12 15:37         ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2004-06-12 17:15           ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12  3:15 ` Chris Wright
2004-06-12  4:48   ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12 20:53     ` Chris Wright
2004-06-12 21:15       ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12 21:44         ` Chris Wright
2004-06-12 21:58           ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12 22:51             ` Chris Wright
2004-06-12 23:40               ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12 22:51 ` Trond Myklebust
2004-06-12 23:33   ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-12 23:58     ` Trond Myklebust
2004-06-13  0:23       ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-15  6:38         ` Blair Strang
2004-06-15  7:03           ` Trond Myklebust
2004-06-15  9:36             ` David Howells
2004-06-15 19:00               ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-15 22:07                 ` Chris Wright
2004-06-15 23:48                   ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-16  0:01                     ` Chris Wright
2004-06-16  0:06                       ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-16 14:22                 ` David Howells
2004-06-15 22:29               ` Chris Wright
2004-06-16 14:37                 ` David Howells
2004-06-15 23:59               ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-16 14:49                 ` David Howells
2004-06-17  1:13                   ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-17 11:48                     ` David Howells
2004-06-17 19:06                       ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-23 12:29                         ` David Howells
2004-06-23 21:03                           ` Kyle Moffett
2004-06-29 17:07                           ` Kyle Moffett
2004-07-07 18:54                             ` John Bucy
2004-07-08  1:29                               ` Kyle Moffett

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