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From: Hans Reiser <reiser@namesys.com>
To: Mike Waychison <Michael.Waychison@Sun.COM>
Cc: Kyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@mac.com>,
	Tim Hockin <thockin@hockin.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>,
	ReiserFS List <reiserfs-list@namesys.com>,
	George Beshers <gbeshers@comcast.net>
Subject: Re: Using fs views to isolate untrusted processes: I need an assistant architect in the USA for Phase I of a DARPA funded linux kernel project
Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2004 00:52:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <412D96C4.3030302@namesys.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <412D2BD2.2090408@sun.com>

Mike Waychison wrote:

>
>
> If I understand what Hans is looking to get done, he's asking for
> someone to architect a system where any given process can be restricted
> to seeing/accessing a subset of the namespace (in the sense of "a tree
> of directories/files").  Eg: process Foo is allowed access to write to
> /etc/group, but _not_ allowed access to /etc/shadow, under any
> circumstances && Foo will be run as root.  Hell, maybe Foo is never able
> to even _see_ /etc/shadow (making it a true shadow file :).

You are correct, you cannot even see /etc/shadow.

The term mask may be more communicative than view.  We are starting to 
use the term mask.

>
> Hans, correct me if I misunderstood.
>
> [*] Somebody really should s/struct namespace/struct mounttable/g (or
> even mounttree) on the kernel sources.  'Namespace' isn't very
> descriptive and it leads to confusion :(
>
> --
> Mike Waychison
> Sun Microsystems, Inc.
> 1 (650) 352-5299 voice
> 1 (416) 202-8336 voice
> http://www.sun.com
>
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> NOTICE:  The opinions expressed in this email are held by me,
> and may not represent the views of Sun Microsystems, Inc.
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


  parent reply	other threads:[~2004-08-26  7:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-08-02  1:20 Using fs views to isolate untrusted processes: I need an assistant architect in the USA for Phase I of a DARPA funded linux kernel project Hans Reiser
2004-08-25 20:25 ` Rik van Riel
2004-08-25 20:56   ` Tim Hockin
2004-08-25 21:23     ` Mike Waychison
2004-08-26  6:31       ` Hans Reiser
2004-08-26 13:59         ` Stephen Smalley
2004-08-25 23:19     ` Kyle Moffett
2004-08-26  0:16       ` Mike Waychison
2004-08-26  0:50         ` Kyle Moffett
2004-08-26  1:06           ` Chris Wright
2004-08-26  4:16             ` Kyle Moffett
2004-08-26  4:29               ` viro
2004-08-26  4:52                 ` Kyle Moffett
2004-08-26  5:01                   ` viro
2004-08-26  0:56         ` Chris Wright
2004-08-26  7:52         ` Hans Reiser [this message]
2004-08-26  8:48   ` Hans Reiser

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