public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Kristian Sørensen" <ks@cs.aau.dk>
To: umbrella-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [Umbrella-devel] Re: Getting full path from dentry in LSM hooks
Date: Fri, 03 Sep 2004 22:05:03 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4138CE6F.10501@cs.aau.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1094220870.7975.19.camel@localhost.localdomain>

Alan Cox wrote:
> On Gwe, 2004-09-03 at 13:12, Kristian Sørensen wrote:
> 
>>I have a short question, concerning how to get the full path of a file 
>>from a LSM hook.
> 
> 
> The full path or a full path. It may have several. They may also have
> changed under you. 
> 
> 
>>Can some one reveal the trick to get the full path nomater if the 
>>filesystem is root or mounted elsewhere in the filesystem?
> 
> 
> You can get the namespace and the name within that namespace that
> represents at least one of the names of the file within the vfs layer
> (this is what the VFS itself uses for the struct nameidata).
> 
> There may be multiple links to a file, it may be mounted in multiple
> places and someone on a seperate NFS server may have moved it while you
> are thinking about it.
Umbrella is mostly designed for embedded systems (where selinux is 
overkill) and also it is very easy to understand. Most restrictions will 
be made to e.g. stop viruses from spreading, and it is quite easy, yet 
very effective:

If an email client receives an malformed email (like the countless 
attacks on outlook), a simple restriction could be for the process 
handeling the mail would be "$HOME/.addressbook", furthermore, you could 
specify that attachments executed _from_ the emailprogram would not have 
access to the network. Thus the virus cannot find mail addresses to send 
itself to - and it cannot even get network access. Simple and effective.

Also simple bufferoverflows in suid-root programs may be avoided. The 
simple way would to set the restriction "no fork", and thus if an 
attacker tries to fork a (root) shell, this would be denied. Another way 
could be to heavily restrict access to the filesystem. If the program is 
restricted from /var, the root shell spawned by the attack would not 
have access either. (restrictions are enherited from parent to children).


Best regards, Kristian.

  reply	other threads:[~2004-09-03 20:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2004-09-03 12:12 Getting full path from dentry in LSM hooks Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-03 12:32 ` Christoph Hellwig
2004-09-03 12:38   ` [Umbrella-devel] " Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-03 13:04     ` Christoph Hellwig
2004-09-03 13:20       ` Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-03 14:01         ` Christoph Hellwig
2004-09-03 19:54           ` Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-04 11:09             ` Christoph Hellwig
2004-09-04 18:52               ` Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-03 15:38         ` Stephen Smalley
2004-09-03 12:43 ` Andrea Arcangeli
2004-09-03 14:14 ` Alan Cox
2004-09-03 20:05   ` Kristian Sørensen [this message]
2004-09-03 20:39     ` [Umbrella-devel] " Valdis.Kletnieks
2004-09-04  9:06       ` Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-04 10:50       ` Emmanuel Fleury
2004-09-07 14:19       ` Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-04  2:41     ` Horst von Brand
2004-09-04 19:01       ` Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-04 19:06       ` Kristian Sørensen
2004-09-04 16:56     ` Alan Cox
2004-09-04 18:47       ` Kristian Sørensen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=4138CE6F.10501@cs.aau.dk \
    --to=ks@cs.aau.dk \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=umbrella-devel@lists.sourceforge.net \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox