From: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
To: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Chang S . Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>, Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>,
Yosry Ahmed <yosry@kernel.org>,
Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>,
David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>,
Bala-Vignesh-Reddy <reddybalavignesh9979@gmail.com>,
Kishen Maloor <kishen.maloor@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/7] KVM: x86: Use linear_read_system() to read the TSS I/O bitmap
Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 11:19:48 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <41a327bd-cbbd-4530-9f30-9175c5840014@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260806011536.4172258-3-sohil.mehta@intel.com>
On 8/6/2026 9:15 AM, Sohil Mehta wrote:
> TSS I/O permission bitmap reads are implicit supervisor accesses which
> are subject to Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) enforcement.
I am not sure about it.
According to SDM vol 3a (253668-089US), Chapter "LINEAR-ADDRESS PRE-PROCESSING",
section "MODE-BASED ACCESSES AND LINEAR-ADDRESS-SPACE PARTITIONING", it defines
and limits "implicit supervisor-mode accesses" to the following operations:
- accesses to the global descriptor table (GDT) or local descriptor table (LDT)
to load a segment descriptor
- accesses to the interrupt descriptor table (IDT) when delivering an interrupt
or exception
- accesses to the task-state segment (TSS) as part of a task switch or change of
CPL
- accesses to a user posted-interrupt descriptor (UPID) during user-interrupt
notification processing
IIUC, the TSS I/O bitmap read during ordinary instruction execution
(under CPL = 3) rather than during a task switch or CPL transition, I don't
think they fall under the classification of implicit supervisor-mode accesses.
> Though highly unlikely, if a guest configures a TSS base in the
> user half, hardware would raise a #GP on access when LASS is enabled.
>
> Currently, the emulator reads the I/O permission bitmap from the TSS by
> calling read_std() directly which is inconsistent with other implicit
> accesses in the emulator such as IDT reads, GDT/LDT reads and TSS reads
> during task switch.
>
> An upcoming change will add a check to linear_read_system() to catch
> LASS violations. For consistency as well as to keep LASS enforcement
> centralized, switch both I/O bitmap reads to linear_read_system().
>
> Note, emulator_io_port_access_allowed() doesn't propagate faults, so
> even though linear_read_system() will set the exception details they
> will be ignored.
>
> While at it, fix an off-by-one in the I/O bitmap bounds check to account
> for the 2-byte read and ensure both bytes are within the TSS limit. The
> SDM mandates a trailing 0xFF byte after the bitmap so any out-of-bounds
> access would be all 1s (denying access). Make the change primarily to
> ensure hardware fidelity. A correctly configured OS will not run into
> this issue.
>
> Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
> ---
> v4:
> - New patch
>
> There could be a pre-existing issue here. It is unlikely that any OS
> demand-pages the I/O bitmap portion of the TSS. But if it does, the #PF
> details could get lost and the guest would get a #GP instead of a
> restartable #PF. Propagating the #PF to the callers is a larger change
> that is beyond the scope of this series.
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 6 +++---
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
> index 8ff28643b2e3..7f04544cfee5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
> @@ -2573,12 +2573,12 @@ static bool emulator_io_port_access_allowed(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
> #endif
> - r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL, true);
> + r = linear_read_system(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2);
> if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
> return false;
> - if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
> + if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 + 1 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
> return false;
> - r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL, true);
> + r = linear_read_system(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2);
> if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
> return false;
> if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-19 3:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-06 1:15 [PATCH v4 0/7] KVM: x86: Add LASS virtualization support Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 1/7] KVM: x86: Add an emulator flag to differentiate branch targets from fetches Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 2/7] KVM: x86: Use linear_read_system() to read the TSS I/O bitmap Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 3:19 ` Binbin Wu [this message]
2026-08-19 5:03 ` Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 5:21 ` H. Peter Anvin
2026-08-19 5:26 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 3/7] KVM: x86: Add LASS violation checks during instruction emulation Sohil Mehta
2026-08-19 5:58 ` Binbin Wu
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 4/7] KVM: VMX: Implement LASS violation check Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 5/7] KVM: x86: Virtualize LASS and advertise support to userspace Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 6/7] KVM: selftests: Add coverage for LASS CPUID and CR4 handling Sohil Mehta
2026-08-06 1:15 ` [PATCH v4 7/7] selftests/x86: Add a userspace test for LASS enforcement Sohil Mehta
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