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smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=G6Ihx2Fp; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C1F6A606A320; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 22:19:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=G6Ihx2Fp Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B74DA1F000C6; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 22:19:43 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795126787; bh=AiPQ4wl6tF2e90uhD0HmkSpXHz6ccxWLOtHHkF4KxNg=; h=Date:Subject:To:Cc:References:From:In-Reply-To; b=G6Ihx2Fpp/Dy57CCYAyiaqVtXntjB8VAYpH4cw8ydBW5EOTje8iTEujXpMSO/JcqO oEg06AcBjBNeRcUg1pBPJhTGDsJsWaR0MnDSzOoJtORkODc15tx1kfIg9Fd1ocaE1v A7e/EIS3osWR/oylCwh8Lwf1iwaQDv7lNmhN8XD6ZFW4bqsdi+YbX4Gagm7UUpRvsT wWN16VGpxmQw2+0jLej738gnehufQqV/tYQ7JEz5nTmvZ5RBn2oE9A7bYQQjOYtuHs RcLa92YrubfjxIB6banH0SIBL1dj8Ms/SiFK8Asi+PsLtyiI51mmztQnQwwdpqpKPs L37pGn5IuqoKQ== Message-ID: <421ee488-e2a1-4deb-9ffb-7fc712c811de@kernel.org> Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 23:19:40 +0100 X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH] mm/hmm: reject shadow-stack mappings To: "Edgecombe, Rick P" , "jgg@nvidia.com" , "Hansen, Dave" , "akpm@linux-foundation.org" Cc: "ljs@kernel.org" , "dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" , "linux-mm@kvack.org" , "kernel-team@meta.com" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "rppt@kernel.org" , "bp@alien8.de" , "kas@kernel.org" , "leon@kernel.org" , "stable@vger.kernel.org" , "gourry@gourry.net" References: <20261113195536.2660763-1-gourry@gourry.net> <20261113200303.GA395967@nvidia.com> <179460249376.482102.14669935557901467762.b4-reply@b4> <20261114002027.GE3706007@nvidia.com> <20261113181025.6e8b9475b29c13d29f59e02e@linux-foundation.org> <20261115000005.GG3706007@nvidia.com> <20261114170127.3d29199864eb352d9045eaba@linux-foundation.org> <55034934-8aab-4e8a-a74a-b30c977670ed@intel.com> <0c6fcb3daeab0ab3df0593cf389124e38e1d7f3f.camel@intel.com> From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" Content-Language: en-US Autocrypt: addr=david@kernel.org; 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charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 11/19/26 21:40, Edgecombe, Rick P wrote: > On Thu, 2026-11-19 at 12:05 -0800, Dave Hansen wrote: >> On 11/14/26 17:01, Andrew Morton wrote: >>> On x86, a shadow-stack PTE has its ordinary write bit clear.  The CPU >>> rejects ordinary stores, but pte_write() reports it writable because >>> shadow-stack instructions can write it.  HMM consequently sets >>> HMM_PFN_WRITE.  Nouveau uses that flag for GPU write permission, and >>> RDMA on-demand paging can use it to grant device write permission to a >>> registered memory region.  A device, or an RDMA peer with write access >>> to that region, can then overwrite the process's shadow stack, >>> potentially corrupting return addresses or bypassing that protection. >>> >>> Reject shadow-stack VMAs in hmm_vma_walk_test(), including read access. >>> A requested fault returns -EFAULT; a snapshot records HMM_PFN_ERROR. >> >> This is a fun one. >> >> I almost wonder if we want to go one step further and disallow GUPs with >> FOLL_WRITE on these PTEs. There should be precious few reasons for >> devices to be writing to shadow stack pages. >> >> Isn't this a bigger issue than HMM? Should the fix be in HMM? > > We do reject GUPs to shadow stack PTEs with FOLL_WRITE, unless FOLL_FORCE is > passed. The tricky thing as mentioned my others in this thread is that shadow > stack memory *is* writable by userspace. But also the kernel should not treat it > as such > > A false negative for pte_write() is dangerous when the kernel needs to decide > when to revoke access. (i.e. fork) I think a mistake there is somewhat worse > then missing an exotic way to cajole the kernel into writing to a user's shadow > stack like this. So I think pte_write() being true for shadow stacks is the > correct implementation. > > But, maybe the problem is that pte_write() is doing the job of two separate > concepts. What if there was a pte_userspace_could_write() and a > pte_kernel_should_not_write()? Names would need some work... Gah, nak, pte_write() just says "something might be able to write to it". If that's actually true depends on other factors. Like the access+dirty on HW that manages that in software. I repeat: *no code* in Linux besides core-mm should ever interpret "pte_write()" as "cool, I can write to it". The exception is GUP and unfortunately HMM. -- Cheers, David