From: Wiktor <victorjan@poczta.onet.pl>
To: "Måns Rullgård" <mru@inprovide.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFD] 'nice' attribute for executable files
Date: Wed, 30 Mar 2005 22:16:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <424B090F.3090508@poczta.onet.pl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <yw1xll85vtva.fsf@ford.inprovide.com>
Måns Rullgård wrote:
>
> You could wrap /lib/ld-linux.so, and get all dynamically linked
> programs done in one sweep.
>
That's mad idea - keep similar things in one place! starting programs is
done in kernel and nice-value-support is also done in kernel!!
>
> Using a shell to run external programs is quite common. The system()
> and popen() functions both invoke the shell.
>
Yes, but compexity of 'sh -c /some/command' is uncomparable to one of
shell-level-program-renicing system. such system should keep database of
reniced processes, parse it (using awk or sed, i'm afraid...) and then
renice process (what also takes two files[!, they are in fact
one-liners, but it is needed to gain root privileges to renice
process]). sorry, but linux works smoothly on 386, and such mess would
surely change it.
>
> I'm not so sure it belongs at all. The can of worms it opens up is a
> bit too big, IMHO.
>
What can? the only account that have access to renicing field is root.
if some-malicious-person can gain access to root account, he does not
need renicing field, because he can renice processes by snice tool! for
normal user, this field is unchangeable. of course, if root is so <....>
to set inpropertly nice field, he is propably also about to set setuid
to /bin/[ba]sh and set root's password to '123'... I really do not see
any dangers of providing such feature in kernel (b[u]y the way -
renicing in user space requires root privileges, so [from security point
of view] it doesn't really matter where renicing is done - both in
kernel and userland it has full-access to the system)
thx for replies
--
wixor
May the Source be with you.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-03-30 20:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <fa.ed33rit.1e148rh@ifi.uio.no>
2005-03-29 20:45 ` [RFD] 'nice' attribute for executable files Bodo Eggert
2005-03-30 16:07 ` Wiktor
2005-03-30 16:55 ` Måns Rullgård
2005-03-30 17:27 ` Wiktor
2005-03-30 19:03 ` Måns Rullgård
2005-03-30 20:16 ` Wiktor [this message]
2005-03-30 20:43 ` Måns Rullgård
2005-04-01 15:26 ` Wiktor
2005-04-01 16:07 ` Måns Rullgård
2005-03-31 5:46 ` Jan Engelhardt
2005-03-31 15:56 ` Horst von Brand
2005-03-31 16:05 ` Måns Rullgård
2005-04-01 15:40 ` Wiktor
2005-04-01 16:12 ` Måns Rullgård
2005-04-01 17:27 ` Horst von Brand
2005-03-30 19:40 ` Bodo Eggert
2005-03-30 21:03 ` Lee Revell
2005-03-29 19:55 Wiktor
2005-03-29 21:02 ` Lee Revell
2005-03-30 19:55 ` Bill Davidsen
2005-03-31 5:51 ` Matt Mackall
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