public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sripathi Kodi <sripathik@in.ibm.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2.6.13.1] Patch for invisible threads
Date: Fri, 16 Sep 2005 10:06:53 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <432ADF8D.8010503@in.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050916074606.GE19626@ftp.linux.org.uk>

Al Viro wrote:
> Ugh...  Considering that all of that is _only_ for /proc/<pid>/task and
> that proc_permission() is a couple of function calls, why bother with
> proc_task_check_root() instead of just adding proc_task_permission() with
> 
> {
> 	struct dentry *root;
> 	struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
> 
> 	if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0)
> 		return -EACCES;
> 
> 	/* or just open-code it here, for that matter */
> 	if (proc_task_root_link(inode, &root, &vfsmnt))
> 		return -ENOENT;
> 
> 	return proc_check_chroot(root, vfsmnt);
> }
> 
> for a body and leaving proc_permission() without any changes at all?

Al,
Done. Please find the patch below. I retained proc_task_root_link, because 
it has significant amount of code in it.

> Right.  The real question is whether the current behaviour makes any sense.
> I've no objections to your patch + modification above, but I really wonder
> if we should keep current rules in that area.

I don't know what would be the right behavior for this area. If you have any 
ideas for changes we could introduce here, I am ready to code and test it out.

Thanks and regards,
Sripathi.


Signed-off-by: Sripathi Kodi <sripathik@in.ibm.com>

--- linux-2.6.13.1-orig/fs/proc/base.c	2005-09-16 17:22:44.000000000 -0500
+++ linux-2.6.13.1/fs/proc/base.c	2005-09-16 17:08:18.000000000 -0500
@@ -291,6 +291,52 @@ static int proc_root_link(struct inode *
  	return result;
  }

+
+/* Same as proc_root_link, but this addionally tries to get fs from other
+ * threads in the group */
+static int proc_task_root_link(struct inode *inode, struct dentry **dentry, 
struct vfsmount **mnt)
+{
+	struct fs_struct *fs;
+	int result = -ENOENT;
+	struct task_struct *leader = proc_task(inode);
+
+	task_lock(leader);
+	fs = leader->fs;
+	if (fs) {
+		atomic_inc(&fs->count);
+		task_unlock(leader);
+	} else {
+		/* Try to get fs from other threads */
+		task_unlock(leader);
+		struct task_struct *task = leader;
+		read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+		if (pid_alive(task)) {
+			while ((task = next_thread(task)) != leader) {
+				task_lock(task);
+				fs = task->fs;
+				if (fs) {
+					atomic_inc(&fs->count);
+					task_unlock(task);
+					break;
+				}
+				task_unlock(task);
+			}
+		}
+		read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+	}
+
+	if (fs) {
+		read_lock(&fs->lock);
+		*mnt = mntget(fs->rootmnt);
+		*dentry = dget(fs->root);
+		read_unlock(&fs->lock);
+		result = 0;
+		put_fs_struct(fs);
+	}
+	return result;
+}
+
+
  #define MAY_PTRACE(task) \
  	(task == current || \
  	(task->parent == current && \
@@ -449,14 +495,14 @@ static int proc_oom_score(struct task_st

  /* permission checks */

-static int proc_check_root(struct inode *inode)
+/* If the process being read is separated by chroot from the reading process,
+ * don't let the reader access the threads.
+ */
+static int proc_check_chroot(struct dentry *root, struct vfsmount *vfsmnt)
  {
-	struct dentry *de, *base, *root;
-	struct vfsmount *our_vfsmnt, *vfsmnt, *mnt;
+	struct dentry *de, *base;
+	struct vfsmount *our_vfsmnt, *mnt;
  	int res = 0;
-
-	if (proc_root_link(inode, &root, &vfsmnt)) /* Ewww... */
-		return -ENOENT;
  	read_lock(&current->fs->lock);
  	our_vfsmnt = mntget(current->fs->rootmnt);
  	base = dget(current->fs->root);
@@ -489,6 +535,16 @@ out:
  	goto exit;
  }

+static int proc_check_root(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct dentry *root;
+	struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
+
+	if (proc_root_link(inode, &root, &vfsmnt)) /* Ewww... */
+		return -ENOENT;
+	return proc_check_chroot(root, vfsmnt);
+}
+
  static int proc_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct nameidata 
*nd)
  {
  	if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0)
@@ -496,6 +552,20 @@ static int proc_permission(struct inode
  	return proc_check_root(inode);
  }

+static int proc_task_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, struct 
nameidata *nd)
+{
+	struct dentry *root;
+	struct vfsmount *vfsmnt;
+
+	if (generic_permission(inode, mask, NULL) != 0)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (proc_task_root_link(inode, &root, &vfsmnt))
+		return -ENOENT;
+
+	return proc_check_chroot(root, vfsmnt);
+}
+
  extern struct seq_operations proc_pid_maps_op;
  static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
  {
@@ -1355,7 +1425,7 @@ static struct inode_operations proc_fd_i

  static struct inode_operations proc_task_inode_operations = {
  	.lookup		= proc_task_lookup,
-	.permission	= proc_permission,
+	.permission	= proc_task_permission,
  };

  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY

  reply	other threads:[~2005-09-16 15:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2005-09-12 17:46 [PATCH 2.6.13.1] Patch for invisible threads Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-12 20:49 ` Andrew Morton
2005-09-13 13:10   ` Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-13 14:53     ` Linus Torvalds
2005-09-13 16:51       ` Al Viro
2005-09-13 17:01         ` Linus Torvalds
2005-09-13 17:12           ` Al Viro
2005-09-13 21:30             ` Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-13 21:56               ` Roland McGrath
2005-09-13 21:57               ` Al Viro
2005-09-13 23:10               ` Linus Torvalds
2005-09-14  1:47                 ` Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-14  1:52                   ` Al Viro
2005-09-14 14:37                   ` Bill Davidsen
2005-09-15  0:30                     ` Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-14  1:50                 ` Al Viro
2005-09-15  0:31                   ` Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-15  0:55                     ` Roland McGrath
2005-09-15  1:38                       ` Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-15  2:12                         ` Al Viro
2005-09-15  7:29                           ` Roland McGrath
2005-09-15  1:18                     ` Al Viro
2005-09-16  0:54                       ` Sripathi Kodi
2005-09-16  7:46                         ` Al Viro
2005-09-16 15:06                           ` Sripathi Kodi [this message]
2005-09-16 18:05                           ` Daniel Jacobowitz
2005-09-16 18:14                             ` Al Viro

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=432ADF8D.8010503@in.ibm.com \
    --to=sripathik@in.ibm.com \
    --cc=akpm@osdl.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@elte.hu \
    --cc=roland@redhat.com \
    --cc=torvalds@osdl.org \
    --cc=viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk \
    --cc=viro@ftp.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox