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From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
To: Nix <nix@esperi.org.uk>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Patch 5 of 8] Add the __stack_chk_fail() function
Date: Sun, 19 Mar 2006 19:06:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <441D9DA8.90807@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <878xr62u70.fsf@hades.wkstn.nix>

Nix wrote:
> On 17 Mar 2006, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
>> GCC emits a call to a __stack_chk_fail() function when the cookie is not 
>> matching the expected value. Since this is a bad security issue; lets panic
>> the kernel
> 
> This turns even minor buffer overflows into complete denials of service.

only those who otherwise would get to the return address. So it turns a "own the machine" into a panic.
Not a "no side effects" thing....


> If we're running in process context and the process is currently
> killable it might make more sense to printk() a message and zap the
> process; that way we only halt whatever service it is the attacker
> hit us through.

maybe. The big question is if you can still trust the machine. That is highly questionable...
(and to kill the process you again need to trust bits of the stack, to get to current for example;
and you just found that the stack was compromised)

  reply	other threads:[~2006-03-19 18:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-03-17 16:10 [Patch 0/8] Port of -fstack-protector to the kernel Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:11 ` [Patch 1 of 8] Pack the x86-64 PDA structure Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:13 ` [Patch 3 of 8] Introduce a config option for stack-protector Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:13 ` [Patch 2 of 8] annotate the PDA structure with offsets Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-18  9:38   ` Ingo Molnar
2006-03-18  9:46     ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:14 ` [Patch 4 of 8] Add the cookie field Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:14 ` [Patch 5 of 8] Add the __stack_chk_fail() function Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-19 17:57   ` Nix
2006-03-19 18:06     ` Arjan van de Ven [this message]
2006-03-19 19:06       ` Nix
2006-03-17 16:15 ` [Patch 6 of 8] Implement the CFLAGs side Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:16 ` [Patch 7 of 8] Finish PDA offset annotations Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:17 ` [Patch 8 of 8] GCC 4.1 patch for kernel stack-protector Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-17 16:50 ` [Patch 0/8] Port of -fstack-protector to the kernel Michal Piotrowski
2006-03-17 16:53   ` Arjan van de Ven
2006-03-18  9:41 ` Ingo Molnar

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