From: "Pavel V. Emelianov" <xemul@sw.ru>
To: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Cc: Kirill Korotaev <dev@sw.ru>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
hch@infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] unserialized task->files changing (v2)
Date: Tue, 08 Aug 2006 17:18:09 +0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <44D88F11.1010603@sw.ru> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <200608081451.58305.dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Tuesday 08 August 2006 13:31, Kirill Korotaev wrote:
>> Fixed race on put_files_struct on exec with proc.
>> Restoring files on current on error path may lead
>> to proc having a pointer to already kfree-d files_struct.
>>
>> ->files changing at exit.c and khtread.c are safe as
>> exit_files() makes all things under lock.
>>
>> v2 patch changes:
>> - introduced reset_files_struct() as Christoph Hellwig suggested
>>
>> Found during OpenVZ stress testing.
>
> Sorry but there is something I dont understand. You ignored my point.
>
> +void reset_files_struct(struct task_struct *tsk, struct files_struct
> *files)
> +{
> + struct files_struct *old;
> +
> + old = tsk->files;
> + task_lock(tsk);
> + tsk->files = files;
> + task_unlock(tsk);
> + put_files_struct(old);
> +}
>
> Its seems very strange to protect tsk->files = files with a
> task_lock()/task_unlock(). What is it supposed to guard against ???
>
> If this patch corrects the 'bug', then a simpler fix would be to use a
> memory
> barrier between "tsk->files = files" and "put_files_struct(old);"
>
> No need to perform 2 atomics ops on the task lock.
>
> old = tsk->files;
> tsk->files = files;
> smp_mb();
> put_files_struct(old);
No. The race being discussed is:
proc code: resetting code:
=============================================================================
task_lock(tsk);
files = tsk->files;
old = tsk->files;
tsk->files = files;
put_files_struct(old); /* dec to 0 */
`- kmem_cache_free(files);
get_files_struct(file); /* already free */
task_unlock(tsk);
So having smp_mb() before put_files_struct() does not fix the problem.
>
> That would be enough to guard against proc code (because this code
> only needs
> to read tsk->files of course)
>
> The same remark can be said for __exit_files() from kernel/exit.c
>
> If this task_lock()/task_unlock() patch is really needed, then a
> comment in
> the source would be very fair.
>
> Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2006-08-08 13:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-08-08 11:31 [PATCH] unserialized task->files changing (v2) Kirill Korotaev
2006-08-08 12:51 ` Eric Dumazet
2006-08-08 13:18 ` Pavel V. Emelianov [this message]
2006-08-08 15:53 ` Kirill Korotaev
2006-08-08 15:59 ` Eric Dumazet
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