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From: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Cc: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [patch] i386: remove IOPL check on task switch
Date: Sat, 04 Nov 2006 12:09:44 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <454CF388.509@vmware.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.64.0611041152060.25218@g5.osdl.org>

Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Sat, 4 Nov 2006, Zachary Amsden wrote:
>   
>> Ok, checking shows Linus put it back to stop NT leakage.  This is correct, but
>> unlikely.  Would be nice to avoid it unless absolutely necessary.  Perhaps xor
>> eflags old and new and only set_system_eflags() if non-ALU bits have changed.
>>     
>
> Not just NT. AC also leaked, and caused crashes in other programs (Wine) 
> that didn't expect AC to be set and did unaligned accesses.

Yes, AC, NT, IOPL, ID are bad to leak.  DF / TF / RF are impossible to 
leak by privilege contract.  SF, ZF, PF, OF, CF can be clobbered.

VM / VIF / VIP are dealt with in separate switch paths (although I have 
witnessed a VIF leak once from a userspace process that managed to get 
VIF set).  These can't even be set with popf, and require iret to fix.

But 99% of the time, only SF / ZF / PF / OF / CF will be different, so 
you can avoid the popf.

Zach

  reply	other threads:[~2006-11-04 20:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2006-11-03 23:57 [patch] i386: remove IOPL check on task switch Chuck Ebbert
2006-11-04 19:19 ` Zachary Amsden
2006-11-04 19:39   ` Zachary Amsden
2006-11-04 19:52     ` Linus Torvalds
2006-11-04 20:09       ` Zachary Amsden [this message]
2006-11-04 20:02     ` Andi Kleen
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-11-04  0:00 Chuck Ebbert
2006-11-03  6:27 Chuck Ebbert
2006-11-03 18:06 ` Zachary Amsden
2006-11-03 18:41   ` Andi Kleen

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