public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Kawai, Hidehiro" <hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com>
To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Cc: kernel list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	sugita <yumiko.sugita.yf@hitachi.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>,
	Satoshi OSHIMA <soshima@redhat.com>,
	"Hideo AOKI@redhat" <haoki@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/4] coredump: documentation for proc and sysctl]
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2007 16:40:25 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <45BEF669.1060600@hitachi.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20070126165847.GB1269@elf.ucw.cz>

Hi Pavel and Andrew,

Pavel Machek wrote:
>>This patch adds the documentation for the following parameters:
>>  /proc/<pid>/core_flags
>>  /proc/sys/kernel/core_flags_enable
> 
> Sysctl seems really strange to me. Either the feature is safe to use,
> or it is not. Users can already ulimit -c 0, and we do not have
> "/proc/sys/kernel/allow_users_to_disable_their_core_dumps".

Oh, I had forgotten that.  Thank you for pointing out.  The purpose of
this sysctl is to prevent a bad process from hiding its memory.
But as you say, this sysctl isn't enough for the purpose.

Andrew wrote:
> Does this feature have any security implications?  For example, there might
> be system administration programs which force a coredump on a "bad"
> process, and leave the core somewhere for the administrator to look at. 

I have never heard of the story that ulimit -c 0 bothered an
administrator who wanted to force a coredump.  So even without this
sysctl, the administrator wouldn't bother about security concerns.
I'll drop it from the next version.

Thanks,
-- 
Hidehiro Kawai
Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory



      reply	other threads:[~2007-01-30  7:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <45BA0E41.2080204@hitachi.com>
2007-01-26 16:58 ` [Fwd: [PATCH 4/4] coredump: documentation for proc and sysctl] Pavel Machek
2007-01-30  7:40   ` Kawai, Hidehiro [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=45BEF669.1060600@hitachi.com \
    --to=hidehiro.kawai.ez@hitachi.com \
    --cc=akpm@osdl.org \
    --cc=haoki@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com \
    --cc=pavel@ucw.cz \
    --cc=soshima@redhat.com \
    --cc=yumiko.sugita.yf@hitachi.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox