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From: Crispin Cowan <crispin@novell.com>
To: David Wagner <daw-usenet@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	LSM ML <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: AppArmor FAQ
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2007 17:58:44 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <462D5644.2090103@novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f08kg5$c88$1@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu>

David Wagner wrote:
> James Morris  wrote:
>   
>> [...] you can change the behavior of the application and then bypass 
>> policy entirely by utilizing any mechanism other than direct filesystem 
>> access: IPC, shared memory, Unix domain sockets, local IP networking, 
>> remote networking etc.
>>     
> [...]
>   
>> Just look at their code and their own description of AppArmor.
>>     
> My gosh, you're right.  What the heck?  With all due respect to the
> developers of AppArmor, I can't help thinking that that's pretty lame.
> I think this raises substantial questions about the value of AppArmor.
> What is the point of having a jail if it leaves gaping holes that
> malicious code could use to escape?
>
> And why isn't this documented clearly, with the implications fully
> explained?
>
> I would like to hear the AppArmor developers defend this design decision.
>   
It was a simplicity trade off at the time, when AppArmor was mostly
aimed at servers, and there was no HAL or DBUS. Now it is definitely a
limitation that we are addressing. We are working on a mediation system
for what kind of IPC a confined process can do
http://forge.novell.com/pipermail/apparmor-dev/2007-April/000503.html

When our IPC mediation system is code instead of vapor, it will also
appear here for review. Meanwhile, AppArmor does not make IPC security
any worse, confined processes are still subject to the usual Linux IPC
restrictions. AppArmor actually makes the IPC situation somewhat more
secure than stock Linux, e.g. normal DBUS deployment can be controlled
through file access permissions. But we are not claiming AppArmor to be
an IPC security enhancement, yet.

The proposed set of patches is a self-contained access control system
for file system access, and we would like it reviewed as such. Current
AppArmor docs are quite explicit that AppArmor only mediates file access
and POSIX.1e capabilities.

Crispin

-- 
Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.               http://crispincowan.com/~crispin/
Director of Software Engineering   http://novell.com


  reply	other threads:[~2007-04-24  0:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 68+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-04-16 21:33 AppArmor FAQ John Johansen
2007-04-17  0:20 ` James Morris
2007-04-17 15:03   ` David Safford
2007-04-17 16:00     ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 18:05       ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 17:47         ` James Morris
2007-04-17 18:10           ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 20:19             ` Casey Schaufler
2007-04-17 20:50               ` James Morris
2007-04-17 21:16               ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 21:41                 ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 21:51                   ` David Wagner
2007-04-17 22:17                     ` Alan Cox
2007-04-18  1:34                     ` James Morris
2007-04-18  1:55                       ` David Wagner
2007-04-18  2:20                         ` James Morris
2007-04-18  2:31                           ` David Wagner
2007-04-17 22:12                   ` Andi Kleen
2007-04-17 22:29                     ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 21:58                 ` Alan Cox
2007-04-18 13:45                   ` James Morris
2007-04-18 14:33                     ` Shaya Potter
2007-04-18 19:41                     ` Crispin Cowan
2007-04-18 20:03                       ` Shaya Potter
2007-04-18 21:14                       ` James Morris
2007-04-19 16:35                         ` David Wagner
2007-04-19 17:39                           ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-19 20:47                             ` David Wagner
2007-04-24  0:58                               ` Crispin Cowan [this message]
2007-04-24  2:03                                 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-04-25  1:03                                 ` Joshua Brindle
2007-04-19 17:14                       ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-19 20:08                         ` David Wagner
2007-04-19 21:03                           ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-19 21:08                             ` James Morris
2007-06-09 21:01                       ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-09 21:28                         ` david
2007-06-09 23:02                           ` Pavel Machek
2007-06-10  0:06                             ` david
2007-04-18 20:15                     ` David Lang
2007-04-19 17:27                       ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-19 18:19                     ` Bernd Eckenfels
2007-04-19 20:19                       ` James Morris
2007-04-17 21:48               ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 23:12                 ` Casey Schaufler
2007-04-17 22:26             ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-19 17:46         ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-20 18:45           ` David Lang
2007-04-20 19:23             ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 23:09     ` Crispin Cowan
2007-04-17 23:20       ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 23:53         ` David Wagner
2007-04-18  1:56           ` James Morris
2007-04-18  2:08             ` David Wagner
2007-06-09 19:38               ` Pavel Machek
2007-04-19 17:56       ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-19 20:54         ` David Wagner
2007-04-19 21:17           ` Stephen Smalley
2007-04-17 21:55   ` Karl MacMillan
2007-04-17 22:55     ` Crispin Cowan
2007-04-17 23:13       ` Karl MacMillan
2007-06-09 14:11       ` Pavel Machek
2007-04-18  7:21     ` Rob Meijer
2007-04-18  7:08       ` David Lang
2007-04-18 13:33         ` James Morris
2007-04-18 12:15       ` Joshua Brindle
2007-04-18 13:31         ` Casey Schaufler
2007-04-18 14:05         ` Rob Meijer

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