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From: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Subject: [PATCH] Fix user struct leakage with locked IPC shem segment
Date: Mon, 16 Jul 2007 16:24:12 +0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <469B636C.3060007@openvz.org> (raw)

When user locks an ipc shmem segmant with SHM_LOCK ctl and the
segment is already locked the shmem_lock() function returns 0. 
After this the subsequent code leaks the existing user struct:

== ipc/shm.c: sys_shmctl() ==
     ...
     err = shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 1, user);
     if (!err) {
          shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_LOCKED;
          shp->mlock_user = user;
     }
     ...
==

Other results of this are:
1. the new shp->mlock_user is not get-ed and will point to freed
   memory when the task dies.
2. the RLIMIT_MEMLOCK is screwed on both user structs.

The exploit looks like this:

==
    id = shmget(...);
    setresuid(uid, 0, 0);
    shmctl(id, SHM_LOCK, NULL);
    setresuid(uid + 1, 0, 0);
    shmctl(id, SHM_LOCK, NULL);
==

My solution is to return 0 to the userspace and do not change the
segment's user.

Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelianov <xemul@openvz.org>

---

--- ./ipc/shm.c.shlfix	2007-07-06 10:58:57.000000000 +0400
+++ ./ipc/shm.c	2007-07-16 16:12:34.000000000 +0400
@@ -715,7 +715,7 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, i
 			struct user_struct * user = current->user;
 			if (!is_file_hugepages(shp->shm_file)) {
 				err = shmem_lock(shp->shm_file, 1, user);
-				if (!err) {
+				if (!err && !(shp->shm_perm.mode & SHM_LOCKED)){
 					shp->shm_perm.mode |= SHM_LOCKED;
 					shp->mlock_user = user;
 				}


             reply	other threads:[~2007-07-16 12:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-07-16 12:24 Pavel Emelianov [this message]
2007-07-16 22:17 ` [PATCH] Fix user struct leakage with locked IPC shem segment Andrew Morton
2007-07-17  9:07   ` [Devel] " Kirill Korotaev
2007-07-17  9:15     ` Andrew Morton

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