Re: ECC and DMA to/from disk controllers

Re: ECC and DMA to/from disk controllers

[Robert Hancock]

Bruce Allen wrote:
> Dear LKML,
> 
> Apologies in advance for potential mis-use of LKML, but I don't know 
> where else to ask.
> 
> An ongoing study on datasets of several Petabytes have shown that there 
> can be 'silent data corruption' at rates much larger than one might 
> naively expect from the expected error rates in RAID arrays and the 
> expected probability of single bit uncorrected errors in hard disks.
> 
> The origin of this data corruption is still unknown.  See for example 
> http://cern.ch/Peter.Kelemen/talk/2007/kelemen-2007-C5-Silent_Corruptions.pdf 
> 
> 
> In thinking about this, I began to wonder about the following.  Suppose 
> that a (possibly RAID) disk controller correctly reads data from disk 
> and has correct data in the controller memory and buffers.  However when 
> that data is DMA'd into system memory some errors occur (cosmic rays, 
> electrical noise, etc).  Am I correct that these errors would NOT be 
> detected, even on a 'reliable' server with ECC memory?  In other words 
> the ECC bits would be calculated in server memory based on incorrect 
> data from the disk.

It depends where the data got corrupted. Normally transfers over the PCI 
or PCI Express bus are protected by parity (or CRC or something, I 
assume on PCI-E) so errors there would get detected. This is quite rare 
unless the motherboard or expansion card is faulty or badly designed 
with timing problems.

However, it's conceivable that data could get corrupted inside the 
controller, or inside the chipset. This seems quite rare however, except 
in the presence of design flaws (like some VIA southbridges that had 
nasty problems with losing data if PCI bus masters kept the CPU off the 
PCI bus too long, which we have to work around).

> 
> The alternative is that disk controllers (or at least ones that are 
> meant to be reliable) DMA both the data AND the ECC byte into system 
> memory. So that if an error occurs in this transfer, then it would most 
> likely be picked up and corrected by the ECC mechanism.  But I don't 
> think that 'this is how it works'.  Could someone knowledgable please 
> confirm or contradict?

I don't know any controller that works in this way. This would greatly 
increase CPU overhead since the CPU would need to perform this CRC 
calculation.

-- 
Robert Hancock      Saskatoon, SK, Canada
To email, remove "nospam" from hancockr@nospamshaw.ca
Home Page: http://www.roberthancock.com/

Re: ECC and DMA to/from disk controllers

[Bruce Allen]

Alan, Robert, Dick,

Thank you all for the informed and helpful response!

Alan, I'll pass your comments on to Peter Kelemen.  Not sure if he follows 
LKML.  I think he'll be interested in your characterization of the error 
types.  I'll point him to the thread.  (I think Peter and his 
collaborators are fairly aware of the undetected error rates in standard 
ethernet TCP/IP traffic which as I recall is about one undetected 
single-bit error per 4TB transfered.  I am pretty sure they have ruled 
this out since they have checksums computed after any network transfers.)

Robert, Dick, if I have understood correctly, in response to my specific 
question, RAID controllers on PCI cards will DMA data into memory over a 
PCI bus using one parity bit per 32 data bits for protection.  This does 
provide some protection against errors in the data transfer, but much less 
protection than typical RAM ECC which has one ECC byte for each eight data 
bytes. As I recall, many older motherboards disabled parity on the PCI 
bus, so even this protection may be inactive in many cases. From a few 
minutes of on-line research, I have the impression that PCI-e has better 
ECC protection against address/data errors than PCI but I am not certain.

Thanks again!

Cheers,
 	Bruce

ECC and DMA to/from disk controllers

[Bruce Allen]

Dear LKML,

Apologies in advance for potential mis-use of LKML, but I don't know where 
else to ask.

An ongoing study on datasets of several Petabytes have shown that there 
can be 'silent data corruption' at rates much larger than one might 
naively expect from the expected error rates in RAID arrays and the 
expected probability of single bit uncorrected errors in hard disks.

The origin of this data corruption is still unknown.  See for example 
http://cern.ch/Peter.Kelemen/talk/2007/kelemen-2007-C5-Silent_Corruptions.pdf

In thinking about this, I began to wonder about the following.  Suppose 
that a (possibly RAID) disk controller correctly reads data from disk and 
has correct data in the controller memory and buffers.  However when that 
data is DMA'd into system memory some errors occur (cosmic rays, 
electrical noise, etc).  Am I correct that these errors would NOT be 
detected, even on a 'reliable' server with ECC memory?  In other words the 
ECC bits would be calculated in server memory based on incorrect data from 
the disk.

The alternative is that disk controllers (or at least ones that are meant 
to be reliable) DMA both the data AND the ECC byte into system memory. 
So that if an error occurs in this transfer, then it would most likely be 
picked up and corrected by the ECC mechanism.  But I don't think that 
'this is how it works'.  Could someone knowledgable please confirm or 
contradict?

Cheers,
 	Bruce

Re: ECC and DMA to/from disk controllers

[Alan Cox]

> In thinking about this, I began to wonder about the following.  Suppose 
> that a (possibly RAID) disk controller correctly reads data from disk and 
> has correct data in the controller memory and buffers.  However when that 
> data is DMA'd into system memory some errors occur (cosmic rays, 
> electrical noise, etc).  Am I correct that these errors would NOT be 
> detected, even on a 'reliable' server with ECC memory?  In other words the 
> ECC bits would be calculated in server memory based on incorrect data from 
> the disk.

Architecture specific.

> The alternative is that disk controllers (or at least ones that are meant 
> to be reliable) DMA both the data AND the ECC byte into system memory. 
> So that if an error occurs in this transfer, then it would most likely be 
> picked up and corrected by the ECC mechanism.  But I don't think that 
> 'this is how it works'.  Could someone knowledgable please confirm or 
> contradict?

Its almost entirely device specific at every level. Some general
information and comment however

- Drives normally do error correction and shouldn't be fooled very often
by bad bits. 
- The ECC level on the drive processors and memory cache vary by vendor.
Good luck getting any information on this although maybe if you are Cern
sized they will talk

After the drive we cross the cable. For SATA this is pretty good, and
UDMA data transfer is CRC protected. For PATA the data is but not the
command block so on PATA there is a minute chance you send the CRC
protected block to the wrong place

Once its crossing the PCI bus and main memory and CPU cache its entirely
down to the system you are running what is protected and how much. Note
that a lot of systems won't report ECC errors unless you ask.

If you have hardware RAID controllers its all vendor specific including
CPU cache etc on the card etc.

The next usual mess is network transfers. The TCP checksum strength is
questionable for such workloads but the ethernet one is pretty good.
Unfortunately lots of high performance people use checksum offload which
removes much of the end to end protection and leads to problems with iffy
cards and the like. This is well studied and known to be very problematic
but in the market speed sells not correctness. 

>From the paper type II sounds like slab might be a candidate kernel side
but also CPU bugs as near OOM we will be paging hard and any L2 cache page
out/page table race from software or hardware would fit what it describes,
especially the transient nature

Type III wrong block on PATA fits with the fact the block number isn't
protected and also the limits on the cache quality of drives/drive
firmware bugs. 

For drivers/ide there are *lots* of problems with error handling so that
might be implicated (would want to do old v new ide tests on the same h/w
which would be very intriguing).

Stale data from disk cache I've seen reported, also offsets from FIFO
hardware bugs (The LOTR render farm hit the latter and had to avoid UDMA
to avoid a hardware bug)

Chunks of zero sounds like caches again, would be interesting to know
what hardware changes occurred at the point they began to pop up and what
software.

We also see chipset bugs under high contention some of which are
explained and worked around (VIA ones in the past), others we see are
clear correlations - eg between Nvidia chipsets and Silicon Image SATA
controllers.

Re: ECC and DMA to/from disk controllers

[KELEMEN Peter]

* Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk) [20070910 14:54]:

Alan,

Thanks for your interest (and Bruce, for posting).

> - The ECC level on the drive processors and memory cache vary
> by vendor.  Good luck getting any information on this although
> maybe if you are Cern sized they will talk

Do you have any contacts?  We're in contact directly with the
system integrators only, not the drive manufacturers.

> The next usual mess is network transfers. [...]

All our data is based on system-local probes (i.e. no network
involved).

> Type III wrong block on PATA fits with the fact the block number
> isn't protected and also the limits on the cache quality of
> drives/drive firmware bugs.

Thanks, it's new information.  I was planning to extend fsprobe
with locality information inside the buffers so that we can catch
this as it is happening.

> For drivers/ide there are *lots* of problems with error handling
> so that might be implicated (would want to do old v new ide
> tests on the same h/w which would be very intriguing).

We tried to “force” these corruptions out from their hiding
places on targeted systems, but we failed miserably.  Currently we
can't reproduce the issue at will, even on the affected systems.

> Stale data from disk cache I've seen reported, also offsets from
> FIFO hardware bugs (The LOTR render farm hit the latter and had
> to avoid UDMA to avoid a hardware bug)

That's interesting, I'll think about how to expose this.
Currently a single pass writes data only once, so I don't think
any chunk can live hours long in the drives' cache.

> Chunks of zero sounds like caches again, would be interesting to
> know what hardware changes occurred at the point they began to
> pop up and what software.

They seem to be popping more frequently on ARECA-based boxes.  The
“software” is a running target as we gradually upgrade the
computer center.

> We also see chipset bugs under high contention some of which
> are explained and worked around (VIA ones in the past), others
> we see are clear correlations - eg between Nvidia chipsets and
> Silicon Image SATA controllers.

Most of our workhorses are 3ware controllers, the CPU nodes
usually have Intel SATA chips.

The fsprobe utility we run in the background on practically all
our boxes is available at http://cern.ch/Peter.Kelemen/fsprobe/ .
We have it deployed on several thousand machines to gather data.
I know that some other HEP institutes looked at it, but I have no
information on who's running it on how many boxes, let alone what
it found.  I would be very much interested in whatever findings
people have.

Peter

-- 
    .+'''+.         .+'''+.         .+'''+.         .+'''+.         .+''
 Kelemen Péter     /       \       /       \     Peter.Kelemen@cern.ch
.+'         `+...+'         `+...+'         `+...+'         `+...+'

Re: ECC and DMA to/from disk controllers

[linux-os (Dick Johnson)]

On Mon, 10 Sep 2007, Bruce Allen wrote:

> Dear LKML,
>
> Apologies in advance for potential mis-use of LKML, but I don't know where
> else to ask.
>
> An ongoing study on datasets of several Petabytes have shown that there
> can be 'silent data corruption' at rates much larger than one might
> naively expect from the expected error rates in RAID arrays and the
> expected probability of single bit uncorrected errors in hard disks.
>
> The origin of this data corruption is still unknown.  See for example
> http://cern.ch/Peter.Kelemen/talk/2007/kelemen-2007-C5-Silent_Corruptions.pdf
>
> In thinking about this, I began to wonder about the following.  Suppose
> that a (possibly RAID) disk controller correctly reads data from disk and
> has correct data in the controller memory and buffers.  However when that
> data is DMA'd into system memory some errors occur (cosmic rays,
> electrical noise, etc).  Am I correct that these errors would NOT be
> detected, even on a 'reliable' server with ECC memory?  In other words the
> ECC bits would be calculated in server memory based on incorrect data from
> the disk.
>
> The alternative is that disk controllers (or at least ones that are meant
> to be reliable) DMA both the data AND the ECC byte into system memory.
> So that if an error occurs in this transfer, then it would most likely be
> picked up and corrected by the ECC mechanism.  But I don't think that
> 'this is how it works'.  Could someone knowledgable please confirm or
> contradict?
>
> Cheers,
> 	Bruce
> -

In a typical system, there are usually hardware data transfer
paths that are not under the protection of any ECC mechanism.
One example is "bus mastering" DMA itself. If the bus-interface
state-machine is improperly designed (read timing problems), data
transfer may be unreliable. Of course serial-ATA, SCSI, and
other external buses have a modicum of protection, but early
IDE did not. There are many file-systems that have been corrupted
by incorrect cables, bad motherboard or chip designs, or using
UDMA when the hardware won't reliably work.

That said, the reliability of data transfer buses is pretty
good because they don't need to store data for long periods
of time, like RAM. The probability of a bit upset due to
a nuclear event is highly unlikely in a bus where something
is driving the bus, keeping the data valid, during the time
that something else is reading the bus. Nuclear events
generally upset RAM because the data are stored in very
small charges and femtoamperes of spurious current can
alter logic states.

Cheers,
Dick Johnson
Penguin : Linux version 2.6.22.1 on an i686 machine (5588.30 BogoMips).
My book : http://www.AbominableFirebug.com/
_


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