Re: O_NOLINK for open()

Brent Casavant
2007-09-13T16:05:46Z

On Thu, 13 Sep 2007, Gabor Gombas wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 12, 2007 at 03:37:44PM -0500, Brent Casavant wrote:
>
> > System V shmem is right out because the IPC key is publicly
> > visible and there is no combination of permissions which
> > will allow sharing the segment with just one other process
> > (or at least just one other user). To my knowledge Linux's
> > implementation doesn't provide ACLs for SysV shmem. SGI's
> > proposed XPMEM suffers from the same problems for my purposes.
>
> SYSV shared memory has the concept of separate creator and owner ID's,
> so you can share the shmem segment between exactly two users. Just use
> IPC_SET and set shm_perm.uid to the user ID of the peer process.

Hmm. This will work as long as the peer process is running setuid
to it's own unique user. Excellent idea! Since I need to make the
program setuid to avoid non-priveleged ptrace attacks, this is a
terrific solution.

> I think your worries about permissions has been cleared by the other
> posts, but there is still a problem: the client may call ftruncate() on
> the file descriptor, and then your daemon will get a nice SIGBUS when it
> tries to access the shared memory. Handling that gracefully may not be
> trivial esp. if your daemon is multi-threaded. SYSV shmem is _much_
> nicer when you want shared memory between unrelated/untrusted processes.

I'm actually not so concerned about the client -- that code will be
trusted as well. The problem I'm trying to solve is preventing any
non-priveleged code except the server and client from gaining access
to their shared memory area. With the feedback I've received from
this thread I think a solid design is emerging, some of which will
need to be solved by system configuration by the sysadmin.

Thanks,
Brent

--
Brent Casavant All music is folk music. I ain't
bcasavan@sgi.com never heard a horse sing a song.
Silicon Graphics, Inc. -- Louis Armstrong