From: "KONDO KAZUMA(近藤 和真)" <kazuma-kondo@nec.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: "brauner@kernel.org" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"jack@suse.cz" <jack@suse.cz>,
"mike@mbaynton.com" <mike@mbaynton.com>,
"miklos@szeredi.hu" <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
"amir73il@gmail.com" <amir73il@gmail.com>,
"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org" <linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] fs: allow clone_private_mount() for a path on real rootfs
Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 12:12:47 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <46dc7517-75dd-48d7-ae01-1574b49040fd@nec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250514190252.GQ2023217@ZenIV>
On 2025/05/15 4:02, Al Viro wrote:
> On Wed, May 14, 2025 at 08:37:54AM +0000, KONDO KAZUMA(近藤 和真) wrote:
>> On 2025/05/14 11:43, Al Viro wrote:
>>> On Wed, May 14, 2025 at 12:25:58AM +0000, KONDO KAZUMA(近藤 和真) wrote:
>>>
>>>> @@ -2482,17 +2482,13 @@ struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(const struct path *path)
>>>> if (IS_MNT_UNBINDABLE(old_mnt))
>>>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>>
>>>> - if (mnt_has_parent(old_mnt)) {
>>>> + if (!is_mounted(&old_mnt->mnt))
>>>> + return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>> +
>>>> + if (mnt_has_parent(old_mnt) || !is_anon_ns(old_mnt->mnt_ns)) {
>>>> if (!check_mnt(old_mnt))
>>>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>> } else {
>>>> - if (!is_mounted(&old_mnt->mnt))
>>>> - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>> -
>>>> - /* Make sure this isn't something purely kernel internal. */
>>>> - if (!is_anon_ns(old_mnt->mnt_ns))
>>>> - return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>> -
>>>> /* Make sure we don't create mount namespace loops. */
>>>> if (!check_for_nsfs_mounts(old_mnt))
>>>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>>
>>> Not the right way to do that. What we want is
>>>
>>> /* ours are always fine */
>>> if (!check_mnt(old_mnt)) {
>>> /* they'd better be mounted _somewhere */
>>> if (!is_mounted(old_mnt))
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> /* no other real namespaces; only anon */
>>> if (!is_anon_ns(old_mnt->mnt_ns))
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> /* ... and root of that anon */
>>> if (mnt_has_parent(old_mnt))
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> /* Make sure we don't create mount namespace loops. */
>>> if (!check_for_nsfs_mounts(old_mnt))
>>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>>> }
>>
>> Hello Al Viro,
>>
>> Thank you for your comment.
>> That code can solve my problem, and it seems to be better!
>
> BTW, see https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250506194849.GT2023217@ZenIV/ for
> discussion about a week ago when that got noticed:
>
> || In case of clone_private_mount(), though, there's nothing wrong
> || with "clone me a subtree of absolute root", so it has to be
> || done other way round - check if it's ours first, then in "not
> || ours" case check that it's a root of anon namespace.
> ||
> || Failing btrfs mount has ended up with upper layer pathname
> || pointing to initramfs directory where btrfs would've been
> || mounted, which had walked into that corner case. In your
> || case the problem has already happened by that point, but on
> || a setup a-la X Terminal it would cause trouble...
>
> Looks like such setups are less theoretical than I thought.
>
>> So, I will revise my patch and resend it.
>
> Probably worth gathering the comments in one place. Something like
> /*
> * Check if the source is acceptable; anything mounted in
> * our namespace is fine, otherwise it must be the root of
> * some anon namespace and we need to make sure no namespace
> * loops get created.
> */
> if (!check_mnt(old_mnt)) {
> if (!is_mounted(&old_mnt->mnt) ||
> !is_anon_ns(old_mnt->mnt_ns) ||
> mnt_has_parent(old_mnt))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> if (!check_for_nsfs_mounts(old_mnt))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> }
> might be easier to follow.
I think it's good idea.
I will send a patch with that comment.
Thanks
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-15 12:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-14 0:25 [PATCH] fs: allow clone_private_mount() for a path on real rootfs KONDO KAZUMA(近藤 和真)
2025-05-14 2:43 ` Al Viro
2025-05-14 8:37 ` KONDO KAZUMA(近藤 和真)
2025-05-14 19:02 ` Al Viro
2025-05-15 12:12 ` KONDO KAZUMA(近藤 和真) [this message]
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