* [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-09 23:18 [PATCH 0/6] SELinux patches for 2.6.24 James Morris
@ 2007-10-09 23:19 ` James Morris
2007-10-09 23:28 ` Randy Dunlap
2007-10-09 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/6] SELinux: tune avtab to reduce memory usage James Morris
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2007-10-09 23:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds; +Cc: linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Changes the security/selinux/Kconfig to use select instead of depends
for most of the SELinux requirements. This allows the SELinux option to
show up when people do a make config without already knowing they had to
enable audit and other non-obvious choices. Added a depends on SECURITY
(which previously existed through SECURITY_NETWORK) so that SELinux
would not always show up, but would be easy and intuitive to find.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@e.namei>
---
security/selinux/Kconfig | 7 ++++++-
1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index b32a459..40b97e6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
config SECURITY_SELINUX
bool "NSA SELinux Support"
- depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
+ depends on SECURITY
+ select SECURITY_NETWORK
+ select AUDIT
+ select NET
+ select INET
select NETWORK_SECMARK
default n
help
@@ -9,6 +13,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
You can obtain the policy compiler (checkpolicy), the utility for
labeling filesystems (setfiles), and an example policy configuration
from <http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/>.
+
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
--
1.5.2.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-09 23:19 ` [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends James Morris
@ 2007-10-09 23:28 ` Randy Dunlap
2007-10-09 23:50 ` James Morris
2007-10-10 12:12 ` Stephen Smalley
0 siblings, 2 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Randy Dunlap @ 2007-10-09 23:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris; +Cc: Linus Torvalds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
On Wed, 10 Oct 2007 09:19:55 +1000 (EST) James Morris wrote:
> From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
>
> Changes the security/selinux/Kconfig to use select instead of depends
> for most of the SELinux requirements. This allows the SELinux option to
> show up when people do a make config without already knowing they had to
> enable audit and other non-obvious choices. Added a depends on SECURITY
> (which previously existed through SECURITY_NETWORK) so that SELinux
> would not always show up, but would be easy and intuitive to find.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@e.namei>
> ---
> security/selinux/Kconfig | 7 ++++++-
> 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> index b32a459..40b97e6 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
> config SECURITY_SELINUX
> bool "NSA SELinux Support"
> - depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
> + depends on SECURITY
> + select SECURITY_NETWORK
> + select AUDIT
> + select NET
> + select INET
> select NETWORK_SECMARK
> default n
> help
I doth protest. Enabling the entire NET subsystem thru a hidden
select is awful. Select should be used (sparingly) to enable
library code only. If someone wants NET enabled, they should
enable it overtly, not covertly.
> @@ -9,6 +13,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
> You can obtain the policy compiler (checkpolicy), the utility for
> labeling filesystems (setfiles), and an example policy configuration
> from <http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/>.
> +
> If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>
> config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
---
~Randy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-09 23:28 ` Randy Dunlap
@ 2007-10-09 23:50 ` James Morris
2007-10-10 0:16 ` Randy Dunlap
2007-10-10 12:12 ` Stephen Smalley
1 sibling, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2007-10-09 23:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Randy Dunlap, Linus Torvalds; +Cc: linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
On Tue, 9 Oct 2007, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> I doth protest. Enabling the entire NET subsystem thru a hidden
> select is awful. Select should be used (sparingly) to enable
> library code only. If someone wants NET enabled, they should
> enable it overtly, not covertly.
Ok, fair enough.
I've dropped the patch and rebased the branch. Please pull per:
The following changes since commit bbf25010f1a6b761914430f5fca081ec8c7accd1:
Linus Torvalds (1):
Linux 2.6.23
are available in the git repository at:
ssh://master.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6.git for-linus
Eric Paris (1):
SELinux: policy selectable handling of unknown classes and perms
KaiGai Kohei (2):
SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses.
SELinux: kills warnings in Improve SELinux performance when AVC misses
Yuichi Nakamura (2):
SELinux: tune avtab to reduce memory usage
SELinux: Improve read/write performance
fs/open.c | 4 +
include/linux/security.h | 18 +++
security/dummy.c | 6 +
security/selinux/avc.c | 5 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 53 +++++++-
security/selinux/include/avc.h | 2 +
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +
security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 26 ++++
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 91 ++++++++----
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 16 ++-
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 4 +
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 282 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 89 +++++++++---
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 156 +++++++++----------
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 11 +-
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 8 +
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 91 +++++++++---
18 files changed, 582 insertions(+), 284 deletions(-)
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-09 23:50 ` James Morris
@ 2007-10-10 0:16 ` Randy Dunlap
0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Randy Dunlap @ 2007-10-10 0:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Morris; +Cc: Linus Torvalds, linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
On Wed, 10 Oct 2007 09:50:49 +1000 (EST) James Morris wrote:
> On Tue, 9 Oct 2007, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>
> > I doth protest. Enabling the entire NET subsystem thru a hidden
> > select is awful. Select should be used (sparingly) to enable
> > library code only. If someone wants NET enabled, they should
> > enable it overtly, not covertly.
>
> Ok, fair enough.
>
> I've dropped the patch and rebased the branch. Please pull per:
Great, thanks.
---
~Randy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-09 23:28 ` Randy Dunlap
2007-10-09 23:50 ` James Morris
@ 2007-10-10 12:12 ` Stephen Smalley
2007-10-10 15:40 ` Randy Dunlap
1 sibling, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Stephen Smalley @ 2007-10-10 12:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Randy Dunlap; +Cc: James Morris, Linus Torvalds, linux-kernel
On Tue, 2007-10-09 at 16:28 -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Oct 2007 09:19:55 +1000 (EST) James Morris wrote:
>
> > From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> >
> > Changes the security/selinux/Kconfig to use select instead of depends
> > for most of the SELinux requirements. This allows the SELinux option to
> > show up when people do a make config without already knowing they had to
> > enable audit and other non-obvious choices. Added a depends on SECURITY
> > (which previously existed through SECURITY_NETWORK) so that SELinux
> > would not always show up, but would be easy and intuitive to find.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
> > Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> > Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@e.namei>
> > ---
> > security/selinux/Kconfig | 7 ++++++-
> > 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> > index b32a459..40b97e6 100644
> > --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
> > +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> > @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
> > config SECURITY_SELINUX
> > bool "NSA SELinux Support"
> > - depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
> > + depends on SECURITY
> > + select SECURITY_NETWORK
> > + select AUDIT
> > + select NET
> > + select INET
> > select NETWORK_SECMARK
> > default n
> > help
>
> I doth protest. Enabling the entire NET subsystem thru a hidden
> select is awful. Select should be used (sparingly) to enable
> library code only. If someone wants NET enabled, they should
> enable it overtly, not covertly.
Does that apply to all the options, or only to NET (e.g. is it ok to
select AUDIT)? I thought that this patch came out of earlier
discussions about proper use of select vs. depends. It may have gone
too far, but I'm not sure it should be discarded entirely.
>
>
> > @@ -9,6 +13,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
> > You can obtain the policy compiler (checkpolicy), the utility for
> > labeling filesystems (setfiles), and an example policy configuration
> > from <http://www.nsa.gov/selinux/>.
> > +
> > If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
> >
> > config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
>
>
>
> ---
> ~Randy
--
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-10 12:12 ` Stephen Smalley
@ 2007-10-10 15:40 ` Randy Dunlap
2007-10-10 19:53 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Randy Dunlap @ 2007-10-10 15:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stephen Smalley; +Cc: James Morris, Linus Torvalds, linux-kernel
Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Tue, 2007-10-09 at 16:28 -0700, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>> On Wed, 10 Oct 2007 09:19:55 +1000 (EST) James Morris wrote:
>>
>>> From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
>>>
>>> Changes the security/selinux/Kconfig to use select instead of depends
>>> for most of the SELinux requirements. This allows the SELinux option to
>>> show up when people do a make config without already knowing they had to
>>> enable audit and other non-obvious choices. Added a depends on SECURITY
>>> (which previously existed through SECURITY_NETWORK) so that SELinux
>>> would not always show up, but would be easy and intuitive to find.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
>>> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
>>> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@e.namei>
>>> ---
>>> security/selinux/Kconfig | 7 ++++++-
>>> 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
>>> index b32a459..40b97e6 100644
>>> --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
>>> @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
>>> config SECURITY_SELINUX
>>> bool "NSA SELinux Support"
>>> - depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
>>> + depends on SECURITY
>>> + select SECURITY_NETWORK
>>> + select AUDIT
>>> + select NET
>>> + select INET
>>> select NETWORK_SECMARK
>>> default n
>>> help
>> I doth protest. Enabling the entire NET subsystem thru a hidden
>> select is awful. Select should be used (sparingly) to enable
>> library code only. If someone wants NET enabled, they should
>> enable it overtly, not covertly.
>
> Does that apply to all the options, or only to NET (e.g. is it ok to
> select AUDIT)? I thought that this patch came out of earlier
> discussions about proper use of select vs. depends. It may have gone
> too far, but I'm not sure it should be discarded entirely.
AUDIT isn't quite library code, still I don't have a (big) problem with
selecting it or NETWORK_SECMARK. (other than select is evil :)
OTOH, NET and INET are large config options, not library-like code, and
should not be selected.
--
~Randy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-10 15:40 ` Randy Dunlap
@ 2007-10-10 19:53 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-10-10 19:57 ` Randy Dunlap
0 siblings, 1 reply; 14+ messages in thread
From: Valdis.Kletnieks @ 2007-10-10 19:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Randy Dunlap; +Cc: Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Linus Torvalds, linux-kernel
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 880 bytes --]
On Wed, 10 Oct 2007 08:40:31 PDT, Randy Dunlap said:
> >>> config SECURITY_SELINUX
> >>> bool "NSA SELinux Support"
> >>> - depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
> >>> + depends on SECURITY
> >>> + select SECURITY_NETWORK
> >>> + select AUDIT
> >>> + select NET
> >>> + select INET
> >>> select NETWORK_SECMARK
> AUDIT isn't quite library code, still I don't have a (big) problem with
> selecting it or NETWORK_SECMARK. (other than select is evil :)
>
> OTOH, NET and INET are large config options, not library-like code, and
> should not be selected.
If it does a 'select SECURITY_NETWORK' but NET=n, does the resulting kernel
actually build? The problem seems to be that select isn't transitive - if
you select something, it won't automagically select that something's pre-reqs
(modulo the recent patches I've seen posted, have those been mainlined?).
[-- Attachment #2: Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 226 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends
2007-10-10 19:53 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
@ 2007-10-10 19:57 ` Randy Dunlap
0 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: Randy Dunlap @ 2007-10-10 19:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Valdis.Kletnieks
Cc: Stephen Smalley, James Morris, Linus Torvalds, linux-kernel
Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Wed, 10 Oct 2007 08:40:31 PDT, Randy Dunlap said:
>
>>>>> config SECURITY_SELINUX
>>>>> bool "NSA SELinux Support"
>>>>> - depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
>>>>> + depends on SECURITY
>>>>> + select SECURITY_NETWORK
>>>>> + select AUDIT
>>>>> + select NET
>>>>> + select INET
>>>>> select NETWORK_SECMARK
>
>> AUDIT isn't quite library code, still I don't have a (big) problem with
>> selecting it or NETWORK_SECMARK. (other than select is evil :)
>>
>> OTOH, NET and INET are large config options, not library-like code, and
>> should not be selected.
>
> If it does a 'select SECURITY_NETWORK' but NET=n, does the resulting kernel
> actually build? The problem seems to be that select isn't transitive - if
> you select something, it won't automagically select that something's pre-reqs
> (modulo the recent patches I've seen posted, have those been mainlined?).
Good point.
I haven't tested that, but it's most likely still a problem.
"select" does not follow its dependency chain...
--
~Randy
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/6] SELinux: tune avtab to reduce memory usage
2007-10-09 23:18 [PATCH 0/6] SELinux patches for 2.6.24 James Morris
2007-10-09 23:19 ` [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends James Morris
@ 2007-10-09 23:20 ` James Morris
2007-10-09 23:21 ` [PATCH 3/6] SELinux: Improve read/write performance James Morris
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2007-10-09 23:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds; +Cc: linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
From: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
This patch reduces memory usage of SELinux by tuning avtab. Number of hash
slots in avtab was 32768. Unused slots used memory when number of rules is
fewer. This patch decides number of hash slots dynamically based on number
of rules. (chain length)^2 is also printed out in avtab_hash_eval to see
standard deviation of avtab hash table.
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@e.namei>
---
security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
security/selinux/ss/avtab.h | 16 +++++--
security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 4 ++
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 7 +--
4 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 85705eb..7551af1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -12,24 +12,25 @@
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
-
#include "avtab.h"
#include "policydb.h"
-#define AVTAB_HASH(keyp) \
-((keyp->target_class + \
- (keyp->target_type << 2) + \
- (keyp->source_type << 9)) & \
- AVTAB_HASH_MASK)
-
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
+static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u16 mask)
+{
+ return ((keyp->target_class + (keyp->target_type << 2) +
+ (keyp->source_type << 9)) & mask);
+}
+
static struct avtab_node*
avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
struct avtab_node * prev, struct avtab_node * cur,
@@ -59,10 +60,10 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_dat
struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if (!h)
+ if (!h || !h->htable)
return -EINVAL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
cur;
prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
@@ -100,9 +101,9 @@ avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab * h, struct avtab_key * key, struct avtab_da
struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if (!h)
+ if (!h || !h->htable)
return NULL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
cur;
prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
@@ -132,10 +133,10 @@ struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
struct avtab_node *cur;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if (!h)
+ if (!h || !h->htable)
return NULL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
@@ -167,10 +168,10 @@ avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
struct avtab_node *cur;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
- if (!h)
+ if (!h || !h->htable)
return NULL;
- hvalue = AVTAB_HASH(key);
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
@@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
if (!h || !h->htable)
return;
- for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
cur = h->htable[i];
while (cur != NULL) {
temp = cur;
@@ -237,32 +238,63 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
}
h->htable[i] = NULL;
}
- vfree(h->htable);
+ kfree(h->htable);
h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nslot = 0;
+ h->mask = 0;
}
-
int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
{
- int i;
+ h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nel = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+{
+ u16 mask = 0;
+ u32 shift = 0;
+ u32 work = nrules;
+ u32 nslot = 0;
+
+ if (nrules == 0)
+ goto avtab_alloc_out;
- h->htable = vmalloc(sizeof(*(h->htable)) * AVTAB_SIZE);
+ while (work) {
+ work = work >> 1;
+ shift++;
+ }
+ if (shift > 2)
+ shift = shift - 2;
+ nslot = 1 << shift;
+ if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_SIZE)
+ nslot = MAX_AVTAB_SIZE;
+ mask = nslot - 1;
+
+ h->htable = kcalloc(nslot, sizeof(*(h->htable)), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!h->htable)
return -ENOMEM;
- for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++)
- h->htable[i] = NULL;
+
+ avtab_alloc_out:
h->nel = 0;
+ h->nslot = nslot;
+ h->mask = mask;
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:%d avtab hash slots allocated."
+ "Num of rules:%d\n", h->nslot, nrules);
return 0;
}
void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
{
int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;
struct avtab_node *cur;
slots_used = 0;
max_chain_len = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < AVTAB_SIZE; i++) {
+ chain2_len_sum = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
cur = h->htable[i];
if (cur) {
slots_used++;
@@ -274,12 +306,14 @@ void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ chain2_len_sum += chain_len * chain_len;
}
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest "
- "chain length %d\n", tag, h->nel, slots_used, AVTAB_SIZE,
- max_chain_len);
+ "chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %Lu\n",
+ tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
+ chain2_len_sum);
}
static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
@@ -419,6 +453,11 @@ int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, u32 vers)
rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc(a, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = avtab_read_item(fp,vers, a, avtab_insertf, NULL);
if (rc) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 0a90d93..d8edf8c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
*/
#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
@@ -50,9 +53,13 @@ struct avtab_node {
struct avtab {
struct avtab_node **htable;
u32 nel; /* number of elements */
+ u32 nslot; /* number of hash slots */
+ u16 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
+
};
int avtab_init(struct avtab *);
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k);
void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
@@ -74,11 +81,10 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified
void avtab_cache_init(void);
void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
-#define AVTAB_HASH_BITS 15
-#define AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
-#define AVTAB_HASH_MASK (AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
-
-#define AVTAB_SIZE AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 13
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_MASK (MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS-1)
+#define MAX_AVTAB_SIZE MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS
#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index d2737ed..45b93a8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -456,6 +456,10 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!node)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index f05f97a..5ecbad7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -177,18 +177,15 @@ static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
rc = roles_init(p);
if (rc)
- goto out_free_avtab;
+ goto out_free_symtab;
rc = cond_policydb_init(p);
if (rc)
- goto out_free_avtab;
+ goto out_free_symtab;
out:
return rc;
-out_free_avtab:
- avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
-
out_free_symtab:
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
--
1.5.2.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/6] SELinux: Improve read/write performance
2007-10-09 23:18 [PATCH 0/6] SELinux patches for 2.6.24 James Morris
2007-10-09 23:19 ` [PATCH 1/6] SELinux: change Kconfig to use select instead of depends James Morris
2007-10-09 23:20 ` [PATCH 2/6] SELinux: tune avtab to reduce memory usage James Morris
@ 2007-10-09 23:21 ` James Morris
2007-10-09 23:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] SELinux: policy selectable handling of unknown classes and perms James Morris
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2007-10-09 23:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds; +Cc: linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
From: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating
permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have
changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM
hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open
time to allow this optimization.
(see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2)
Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@localhost.localdomain>
---
fs/open.c | 4 +++
include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++++++++++
security/dummy.c | 6 ++++
security/selinux/avc.c | 5 +++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
security/selinux/include/avc.h | 2 +
security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +
7 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
index 1d9e5e9..044bfa8 100644
--- a/fs/open.c
+++ b/fs/open.c
@@ -757,6 +757,10 @@ static struct file *__dentry_open(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt,
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
file_move(f, &inode->i_sb->s_files);
+ error = security_dentry_open(f);
+ if (error)
+ goto cleanup_all;
+
if (!open && f->f_op)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 1a15526..928d479 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -504,6 +504,13 @@ struct request_sock;
* @file contains the file structure being received.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*
+ * Security hook for dentry
+ *
+ * @dentry_open
+ * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
+ * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
+ * since inode_permission.
+ *
* Security hooks for task operations.
*
* @task_create:
@@ -1256,6 +1263,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct * tsk,
struct fown_struct * fown, int sig);
int (*file_receive) (struct file * file);
+ int (*dentry_open) (struct file *file);
int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
int (*task_alloc_security) (struct task_struct * p);
@@ -1864,6 +1872,11 @@ static inline int security_file_receive (struct file *file)
return security_ops->file_receive (file);
}
+static inline int security_dentry_open (struct file *file)
+{
+ return security_ops->dentry_open (file);
+}
+
static inline int security_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return security_ops->task_create (clone_flags);
@@ -2546,6 +2559,11 @@ static inline int security_file_receive (struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static inline int security_dentry_open (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline int security_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 853ec22..64b647a 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -463,6 +463,11 @@ static int dummy_file_receive (struct file *file)
return 0;
}
+static int dummy_dentry_open (struct file *file)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int dummy_task_create (unsigned long clone_flags)
{
return 0;
@@ -1033,6 +1038,7 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, file_receive);
+ set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, dentry_open);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_create);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_free_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 0e69adf..81b3dff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -916,3 +916,8 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata);
return rc;
}
+
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
+{
+ return avc_cache.latest_notif;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 0753b20..e842308 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
* <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
* Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
+ * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -2464,7 +2466,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t
/* file security operations */
-static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int rc;
struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
@@ -2486,6 +2488,25 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
}
+static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+
+ if (!mask) {
+ /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
+ && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+ return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
+
+ return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
+}
+
static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
{
return file_alloc_security(file);
@@ -2725,6 +2746,34 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
}
+static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct file_security_struct *fsec;
+ struct inode *inode;
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ fsec = file->f_security;
+ isec = inode->i_security;
+ /*
+ * Save inode label and policy sequence number
+ * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
+ * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
+ * Task label is already saved in the file security
+ * struct as its SID.
+ */
+ fsec->isid = isec->sid;
+ fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+ /*
+ * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
+ * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
+ * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
+ * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
+ * new inode label or new policy.
+ * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
+ */
+ return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
+}
+
/* task security operations */
static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
@@ -4790,6 +4839,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
+ .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
+
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
.task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
.task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index e145f6e..553607a 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
struct avc_audit_data *auditdata);
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
+
#define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT 1
#define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE 2
#define AVC_CALLBACK_REVOKE 4
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 91b88f0..642a9fd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ struct file_security_struct {
struct file *file; /* back pointer to file object */
u32 sid; /* SID of open file description */
u32 fown_sid; /* SID of file owner (for SIGIO) */
+ u32 isid; /* SID of inode at the time of file open */
+ u32 pseqno; /* Policy seqno at the time of file open */
};
struct superblock_security_struct {
--
1.5.2.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4/6] SELinux: policy selectable handling of unknown classes and perms
2007-10-09 23:18 [PATCH 0/6] SELinux patches for 2.6.24 James Morris
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2007-10-09 23:21 ` [PATCH 3/6] SELinux: Improve read/write performance James Morris
@ 2007-10-09 23:22 ` James Morris
2007-10-09 23:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses James Morris
2007-10-09 23:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] SELinux: kills warnings in Improve SELinux " James Morris
5 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2007-10-09 23:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds; +Cc: linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Allow policy to select, in much the same way as it selects MLS support, how
the kernel should handle access decisions which contain either unknown
classes or unknown permissions in known classes. The three choices for the
policy flags are
0 - Deny unknown security access. (default)
2 - reject loading policy if it does not contain all definitions
4 - allow unknown security access
The policy's choice is exported through 2 booleans in
selinuxfs. /selinux/deny_unknown and /selinux/reject_unknown.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
security/selinux/include/security.h | 2 +
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 26 ++++++++++++
security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 4 ++
security/selinux/ss/policydb.h | 8 ++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
5 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 83bdd4d..39337af 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -90,6 +90,8 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR 1 /* use xattr */
#define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS 2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index c9e92da..f5f3e6d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -103,6 +103,8 @@ enum sel_inos {
SEL_MEMBER, /* compute polyinstantiation membership decision */
SEL_CHECKREQPROT, /* check requested protection, not kernel-applied one */
SEL_COMPAT_NET, /* whether to use old compat network packet controls */
+ SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown reject handling to userspace */
+ SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN, /* export unknown deny handling to userspace */
SEL_INO_NEXT, /* The next inode number to use */
};
@@ -177,6 +179,23 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
.write = sel_write_enforce,
};
+static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t length;
+ ino_t ino = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
+ security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
+
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
+ .read = sel_read_handle_unknown,
+};
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -309,6 +328,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file * file, const char __user * buf,
length = count;
out1:
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: policy loaded with handle_unknown=%s\n",
+ (security_get_reject_unknown() ? "reject" :
+ (security_get_allow_unknown() ? "allow" : "deny")));
+
audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD,
"policy loaded auid=%u",
audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context));
@@ -1575,6 +1599,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block * sb, void * data, int silent)
[SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
[SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
[SEL_COMPAT_NET] = {"compat_net", &sel_compat_net_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
+ [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
/* last one */ {""}
};
ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 5ecbad7..539828b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -674,6 +674,8 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
}
kfree(p->type_attr_map);
+ kfree(p->undefined_perms);
+
return;
}
@@ -1527,6 +1529,8 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto bad;
}
}
+ p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
+ p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
if (!info) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 8319d5f..844d310 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -242,6 +242,10 @@ struct policydb {
struct ebitmap *type_attr_map;
unsigned int policyvers;
+
+ unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
+ unsigned int allow_unknown : 1;
+ u32 *undefined_perms;
};
extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
@@ -253,6 +257,10 @@ extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
+/* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
+#define REJECT_UNKNOWN 0x00000002
+#define ALLOW_UNKNOWN 0x00000004
+
#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 6100fc0..03140ed 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ const struct selinux_class_perm *kdefs = &selinux_class_perm;
unsigned int i, j;
/*
@@ -305,13 +306,6 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
tclass <= SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET)
tclass = SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
- if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security_compute_av: unrecognized class %d\n",
- tclass);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
-
/*
* Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
*/
@@ -322,6 +316,36 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
/*
+ * Check for all the invalid cases.
+ * - tclass 0
+ * - tclass > policy and > kernel
+ * - tclass > policy but is a userspace class
+ * - tclass > policy but we do not allow unknowns
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!tclass))
+ goto inval_class;
+ if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim))
+ if (tclass > kdefs->cts_len ||
+ !kdefs->class_to_string[tclass - 1] ||
+ !policydb.allow_unknown)
+ goto inval_class;
+
+ /*
+ * Kernel class and we allow unknown so pad the allow decision
+ * the pad will be all 1 for unknown classes.
+ */
+ if (tclass <= kdefs->cts_len && policydb.allow_unknown)
+ avd->allowed = policydb.undefined_perms[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * Not in policy. Since decision is completed (all 1 or all 0) return.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim))
+ return 0;
+
+ tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
* If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
* this permission check, then use it.
*/
@@ -387,6 +411,10 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
}
return 0;
+
+inval_class:
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s: unrecognized class %d\n", __FUNCTION__, tclass);
+ return -EINVAL;
}
static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
@@ -1054,6 +1082,13 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
const char *def_class, *def_perm, *pol_class;
struct symtab *perms;
+ if (p->allow_unknown) {
+ u32 num_classes = kdefs->cts_len;
+ p->undefined_perms = kcalloc(num_classes, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->undefined_perms)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
for (i = 1; i < kdefs->cts_len; i++) {
def_class = kdefs->class_to_string[i];
if (!def_class)
@@ -1062,6 +1097,10 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
printk(KERN_INFO
"security: class %s not defined in policy\n",
def_class);
+ if (p->reject_unknown)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (p->allow_unknown)
+ p->undefined_perms[i-1] = ~0U;
continue;
}
pol_class = p->p_class_val_to_name[i-1];
@@ -1087,12 +1126,16 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
printk(KERN_INFO
"security: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
def_perm, pol_class);
+ if (p->reject_unknown)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (p->allow_unknown)
+ p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= perm_val;
continue;
}
perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
if (perdatum == NULL) {
printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
+ "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
def_perm, pol_class);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1130,12 +1173,16 @@ static int validate_classes(struct policydb *p)
printk(KERN_INFO
"security: permission %s in class %s not defined in policy\n",
def_perm, pol_class);
+ if (p->reject_unknown)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (p->allow_unknown)
+ p->undefined_perms[class_val-1] |= (1 << j);
continue;
}
perdatum = hashtab_search(perms->table, def_perm);
if (perdatum == NULL) {
printk(KERN_ERR
- "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy\n",
+ "security: permission %s in class %s not found in policy, bad policy\n",
def_perm, pol_class);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2102,6 +2149,16 @@ err:
return rc;
}
+int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+{
+ return policydb.reject_unknown;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+{
+ return policydb.allow_unknown;
+}
+
struct selinux_audit_rule {
u32 au_seqno;
struct context au_ctxt;
--
1.5.2.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 5/6] SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses
2007-10-09 23:18 [PATCH 0/6] SELinux patches for 2.6.24 James Morris
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2007-10-09 23:22 ` [PATCH 4/6] SELinux: policy selectable handling of unknown classes and perms James Morris
@ 2007-10-09 23:23 ` James Morris
2007-10-09 23:23 ` [PATCH 6/6] SELinux: kills warnings in Improve SELinux " James Morris
5 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2007-10-09 23:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds; +Cc: linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
From: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
* We add ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit() which enables to walk on
any positive bit on the given ebitmap, to improve its performance
using common bit-operations defined in linux/bitops.h.
In the previous version, this logic was implemented using a combination
of ebitmap_for_each_bit() and ebitmap_node_get_bit(), but is was worse
in performance aspect.
This logic is most frequestly used to compute a new AVC entry,
so this patch can improve SELinux performance when AVC misses are happen.
* struct ebitmap_node is redefined as an array of "unsigned long", to get
suitable for using find_next_bit() which is fasted than iteration of
shift and logical operation, and to maximize memory usage allocated
from general purpose slab.
* Any ebitmap_for_each_bit() are repleced by the new implementation
in ss/service.c and ss/mls.c. Some of related implementation are
changed, however, there is no incompatibility with the previous
version.
* The width of any new line are less or equal than 80-chars.
The following benchmark shows the effect of this patch, when we
access many files which have different security context one after
another. The number is more than /selinux/avc/cache_threshold, so
any access always causes AVC misses.
selinux-2.6 selinux-2.6-ebitmap
AVG: 22.763 [s] 8.750 [s]
STD: 0.265 0.019
------------------------------------------
1st: 22.558 [s] 8.786 [s]
2nd: 22.458 [s] 8.750 [s]
3rd: 22.478 [s] 8.754 [s]
4th: 22.724 [s] 8.745 [s]
5th: 22.918 [s] 8.748 [s]
6th: 22.905 [s] 8.764 [s]
7th: 23.238 [s] 8.726 [s]
8th: 22.822 [s] 8.729 [s]
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 281 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 87 ++++++++++---
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 156 +++++++++++------------
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 16 +--
4 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 237 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index ce492a6..ae44c0c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
*
* (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
*/
+/*
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ * Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
+ */
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -29,7 +33,7 @@ int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
n2 = e2->node;
while (n1 && n2 &&
(n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
- (n1->map == n2->map)) {
+ !memcmp(n1->maps, n2->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8)) {
n1 = n1->next;
n2 = n2->next;
}
@@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
return -ENOMEM;
}
new->startbit = n->startbit;
- new->map = n->map;
+ memcpy(new->maps, n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8);
new->next = NULL;
if (prev)
prev->next = new;
@@ -84,13 +88,15 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
{
struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = ebmap->node;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *c_iter;
- u32 cmap_idx;
+ u32 cmap_idx, cmap_sft;
+ int i;
- /* This function is a much simpler because SELinux's MAPTYPE happens
- * to be the same as NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE, if MAPTYPE is
- * changed from a u64 this function will most likely need to be changed
- * as well. It's not ideal but I think the tradeoff in terms of
- * neatness and speed is worth it. */
+ /* NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE is defined as an array of u64,
+ * however, it is not always compatible with an array of unsigned long
+ * in ebitmap_node.
+ * In addition, you should pay attention the following implementation
+ * assumes unsigned long has a width equal with or less than 64-bit.
+ */
if (e_iter == NULL) {
*catmap = NULL;
@@ -104,19 +110,27 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
c_iter->startbit = e_iter->startbit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
while (e_iter != NULL) {
- if (e_iter->startbit >=
- (c_iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE)) {
- c_iter->next = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (c_iter->next == NULL)
- goto netlbl_export_failure;
- c_iter = c_iter->next;
- c_iter->startbit = e_iter->startbit &
- ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
+ for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) {
+ unsigned int delta, e_startbit, c_endbit;
+
+ e_startbit = e_iter->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ c_endbit = c_iter->startbit + NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE;
+ if (e_startbit >= c_endbit) {
+ c_iter->next
+ = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (c_iter->next == NULL)
+ goto netlbl_export_failure;
+ c_iter = c_iter->next;
+ c_iter->startbit
+ = e_startbit & ~(NETLBL_CATMAP_SIZE - 1);
+ }
+ delta = e_startbit - c_iter->startbit;
+ cmap_idx = delta / NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ cmap_sft = delta % NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ c_iter->bitmap[cmap_idx]
+ |= e_iter->maps[cmap_idx] << cmap_sft;
+ e_iter = e_iter->next;
}
- cmap_idx = (e_iter->startbit - c_iter->startbit) /
- NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
- c_iter->bitmap[cmap_idx] = e_iter->map;
- e_iter = e_iter->next;
}
return 0;
@@ -128,7 +142,7 @@ netlbl_export_failure:
/**
* ebitmap_netlbl_import - Import a NetLabel category bitmap into an ebitmap
- * @ebmap: the ebitmap to export
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to import
* @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
*
* Description:
@@ -142,36 +156,50 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = NULL;
struct ebitmap_node *emap_prev = NULL;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr_catmap *c_iter = catmap;
- u32 c_idx;
+ u32 c_idx, c_pos, e_idx, e_sft;
- /* This function is a much simpler because SELinux's MAPTYPE happens
- * to be the same as NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE, if MAPTYPE is
- * changed from a u64 this function will most likely need to be changed
- * as well. It's not ideal but I think the tradeoff in terms of
- * neatness and speed is worth it. */
+ /* NetLabel's NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPTYPE is defined as an array of u64,
+ * however, it is not always compatible with an array of unsigned long
+ * in ebitmap_node.
+ * In addition, you should pay attention the following implementation
+ * assumes unsigned long has a width equal with or less than 64-bit.
+ */
do {
for (c_idx = 0; c_idx < NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPCNT; c_idx++) {
- if (c_iter->bitmap[c_idx] == 0)
+ unsigned int delta;
+ u64 map = c_iter->bitmap[c_idx];
+
+ if (!map)
continue;
- e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (e_iter == NULL)
- goto netlbl_import_failure;
- if (emap_prev == NULL)
- ebmap->node = e_iter;
- else
- emap_prev->next = e_iter;
- emap_prev = e_iter;
-
- e_iter->startbit = c_iter->startbit +
- NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE * c_idx;
- e_iter->map = c_iter->bitmap[c_idx];
+ c_pos = c_iter->startbit
+ + c_idx * NETLBL_CATMAP_MAPSIZE;
+ if (!e_iter
+ || c_pos >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+ e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!e_iter)
+ goto netlbl_import_failure;
+ e_iter->startbit
+ = c_pos - (c_pos % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (emap_prev == NULL)
+ ebmap->node = e_iter;
+ else
+ emap_prev->next = e_iter;
+ emap_prev = e_iter;
+ }
+ delta = c_pos - e_iter->startbit;
+ e_idx = delta / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ e_sft = delta % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ while (map) {
+ e_iter->maps[e_idx++] |= map & (-1UL);
+ map >>= EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ }
}
c_iter = c_iter->next;
} while (c_iter != NULL);
if (e_iter != NULL)
- ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+ ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
else
ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
@@ -186,6 +214,7 @@ netlbl_import_failure:
int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
{
struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+ int i;
if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
return 0;
@@ -197,8 +226,10 @@ int ebitmap_contains(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
n1 = n1->next;
continue;
}
- if ((n1->map & n2->map) != n2->map)
- return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; i++) {
+ if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i])
+ return 0;
+ }
n1 = n1->next;
n2 = n2->next;
@@ -219,12 +250,8 @@ int ebitmap_get_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit)
n = e->node;
while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
- if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
- if (n->map & (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit)))
- return 1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
+ if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit)
+ return ebitmap_node_get_bit(n, bit);
n = n->next;
}
@@ -238,31 +265,35 @@ int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
prev = NULL;
n = e->node;
while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
- if ((n->startbit + MAPSIZE) > bit) {
+ if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit) {
if (value) {
- n->map |= (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(n, bit);
} else {
- n->map &= ~(MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit));
- if (!n->map) {
- /* drop this node from the bitmap */
-
- if (!n->next) {
- /*
- * this was the highest map
- * within the bitmap
- */
- if (prev)
- e->highbit = prev->startbit + MAPSIZE;
- else
- e->highbit = 0;
- }
+ unsigned int s;
+
+ ebitmap_node_clr_bit(n, bit);
+
+ s = find_first_bit(n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (s < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* drop this node from the bitmap */
+ if (!n->next) {
+ /*
+ * this was the highest map
+ * within the bitmap
+ */
if (prev)
- prev->next = n->next;
+ e->highbit = prev->startbit
+ + EBITMAP_SIZE;
else
- e->node = n->next;
-
- kfree(n);
+ e->highbit = 0;
}
+ if (prev)
+ prev->next = n->next;
+ else
+ e->node = n->next;
+ kfree(n);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -277,12 +308,12 @@ int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
- new->startbit = bit & ~(MAPSIZE - 1);
- new->map = (MAPBIT << (bit - new->startbit));
+ new->startbit = bit - (bit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(new, bit);
if (!n)
/* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
- e->highbit = new->startbit + MAPSIZE;
+ e->highbit = new->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
if (prev) {
new->next = prev->next;
@@ -316,11 +347,11 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
{
- int rc;
- struct ebitmap_node *n, *l;
+ struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
+ u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index;
+ u64 map;
__le32 buf[3];
- u32 mapsize, count, i;
- __le64 map;
+ int rc, i;
ebitmap_init(e);
@@ -328,85 +359,89 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
if (rc < 0)
goto out;
- mapsize = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ mapunit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- if (mapsize != MAPSIZE) {
+ if (mapunit != sizeof(u64) * 8) {
printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
- "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n", mapsize,
- MAPSIZE, e->highbit);
+ "match my size %Zd (high bit was %d)\n",
+ mapunit, sizeof(u64) * 8, e->highbit);
goto bad;
}
+
+ /* round up e->highbit */
+ e->highbit += EBITMAP_SIZE - 1;
+ e->highbit -= (e->highbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+
if (!e->highbit) {
e->node = NULL;
goto ok;
}
- if (e->highbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: high bit (%d) is not a "
- "multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n", e->highbit, MAPSIZE);
- goto bad;
- }
- l = NULL;
+
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ rc = next_entry(&startbit, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
goto bad;
}
- n = kzalloc(sizeof(*n), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!n) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto bad;
- }
-
- n->startbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ startbit = le32_to_cpu(startbit);
- if (n->startbit & (MAPSIZE - 1)) {
+ if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
- "not a multiple of the map size (%Zd)\n",
- n->startbit, MAPSIZE);
- goto bad_free;
+ "not a multiple of the map unit size (%Zd)\n",
+ startbit, mapunit);
+ goto bad;
}
- if (n->startbit > (e->highbit - MAPSIZE)) {
+ if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
"beyond the end of the bitmap (%Zd)\n",
- n->startbit, (e->highbit - MAPSIZE));
- goto bad_free;
+ startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (!n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+ struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
+ tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR
+ "security: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* round down */
+ tmp->startbit = startbit - (startbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (n) {
+ n->next = tmp;
+ } else {
+ e->node = tmp;
+ }
+ n = tmp;
+ } else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: start bit %d"
+ " comes after start bit %d\n",
+ startbit, n->startbit);
+ goto bad;
}
+
rc = next_entry(&map, fp, sizeof(u64));
if (rc < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
- goto bad_free;
+ goto bad;
}
- n->map = le64_to_cpu(map);
+ map = le64_to_cpu(map);
- if (!n->map) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: null map in "
- "ebitmap (startbit %d)\n", n->startbit);
- goto bad_free;
+ index = (startbit - n->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ while (map) {
+ n->maps[index] = map & (-1UL);
+ map = map >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ index++;
}
- if (l) {
- if (n->startbit <= l->startbit) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap: start "
- "bit %d comes after start bit %d\n",
- n->startbit, l->startbit);
- goto bad_free;
- }
- l->next = n;
- } else
- e->node = n;
-
- l = n;
}
-
ok:
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
-bad_free:
- kfree(n);
bad:
if (!rc)
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 1270e34..e38a327 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -16,14 +16,16 @@
#include <net/netlabel.h>
-#define MAPTYPE u64 /* portion of bitmap in each node */
-#define MAPSIZE (sizeof(MAPTYPE) * 8) /* number of bits in node bitmap */
-#define MAPBIT 1ULL /* a bit in the node bitmap */
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((32 - sizeof(void *) - sizeof(u32)) \
+ / sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG
+#define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_BIT 1ULL
struct ebitmap_node {
- u32 startbit; /* starting position in the total bitmap */
- MAPTYPE map; /* this node's portion of the bitmap */
struct ebitmap_node *next;
+ unsigned long maps[EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS];
+ u32 startbit;
};
struct ebitmap {
@@ -34,11 +36,17 @@ struct ebitmap {
#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
#define ebitmap_startbit(e) ((e)->node ? (e)->node->startbit : 0)
-static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start(struct ebitmap *e,
- struct ebitmap_node **n)
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n)
{
- *n = e->node;
- return ebitmap_startbit(e);
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ for (*n = e->node; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return (*n)->startbit + ofs;
+ }
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
}
static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
@@ -46,28 +54,65 @@ static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
}
-static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next(struct ebitmap_node **n,
- unsigned int bit)
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next_positive(struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n,
+ unsigned int bit)
{
- if ((bit == ((*n)->startbit + MAPSIZE - 1)) &&
- (*n)->next) {
- *n = (*n)->next;
- return (*n)->startbit;
- }
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ ofs = find_next_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE, bit - (*n)->startbit + 1);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
- return (bit+1);
+ for (*n = (*n)->next; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+ }
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
}
-static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node * n,
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+
+static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
unsigned int bit)
{
- if (n->map & (MAPBIT << (bit - n->startbit)))
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ if ((n->maps[index] & (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs)))
return 1;
return 0;
}
-#define ebitmap_for_each_bit(e, n, bit) \
- for (bit = ebitmap_start(e, &n); bit < ebitmap_length(e); bit = ebitmap_next(&n, bit)) \
+static inline void ebitmap_node_set_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ n->maps[index] |= (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) \
+ for (bit = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &n); \
+ bit < ebitmap_length(e); \
+ bit = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &n, bit)) \
int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2);
int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 4a8bab2..9a11dea 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@
*/
int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
{
- int i, l, len, range;
+ int i, l, len, head, prev;
+ char *nm;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
@@ -42,31 +44,33 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
- range = 0;
- len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
-
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
- if (ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i)) {
- if (range) {
- range++;
- continue;
- }
+ int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
+ len += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[index_sens - 1]);
- len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i]) + 1;
- range++;
- } else {
- if (range > 1)
- len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]) + 1;
- range = 0;
+ /* categories */
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+ if (i - prev > 1) {
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if (head != prev) {
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ }
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ head = i;
}
+ prev = i;
+ }
+ if (prev != head) {
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
}
- /* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
- if (range > 1)
- len += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]) + 1;
-
if (l == 0) {
if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
- &context->range.level[1]))
+ &context->range.level[1]))
break;
else
len++;
@@ -84,8 +88,9 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context * context)
void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
char **scontext)
{
- char *scontextp;
- int i, l, range, wrote_sep;
+ char *scontextp, *nm;
+ int i, l, head, prev;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
struct ebitmap_node *node;
if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
@@ -97,61 +102,54 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
scontextp++;
for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
- range = 0;
- wrote_sep = 0;
strcpy(scontextp,
policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_sens_val_to_name[context->range.level[l].sens - 1]);
+ scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
/* categories */
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
- if (ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i)) {
- if (range) {
- range++;
- continue;
- }
-
- if (!wrote_sep) {
- *scontextp++ = ':';
- wrote_sep = 1;
- } else
- *scontextp++ = ',';
- strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
- range++;
- } else {
- if (range > 1) {
- if (range > 2)
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+ if (i - prev > 1) {
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if (prev != head) {
+ if (prev - head > 1)
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
-
- strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
- range = 0;
+ if (prev < 0)
+ *scontextp++ = ':';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i];
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ head = i;
}
+ prev = i;
}
- /* Handle case where last category is the end of range */
- if (range > 1) {
- if (range > 2)
+ if (prev != head) {
+ if (prev - head > 1)
*scontextp++ = '.';
else
*scontextp++ = ',';
-
- strcpy(scontextp, policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
- scontextp += strlen(policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[i - 1]);
+ nm = policydb.p_cat_val_to_name[prev];
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
}
if (l == 0) {
if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
&context->range.level[1]))
break;
- else {
- *scontextp = '-';
- scontextp++;
- }
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = '-';
}
}
@@ -190,17 +188,15 @@ int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
if (!levdatum)
return 0;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
- if (ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i)) {
- if (i > p->p_cats.nprim)
- return 0;
- if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i))
- /*
- * Category may not be associated with
- * sensitivity in low level.
- */
- return 0;
- }
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
+ if (i > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&levdatum->level->cat, i))
+ /*
+ * Category may not be associated with
+ * sensitivity in low level.
+ */
+ return 0;
}
}
@@ -485,18 +481,16 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
c->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
ebitmap_init(&bitmap);
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
- if (ebitmap_node_get_bit(node, i)) {
- int rc;
-
- catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
- oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
- if (!catdatum)
- return -EINVAL;
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
- }
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&c->range.level[l].cat, node, i) {
+ int rc;
+
+ catdatum = hashtab_search(newp->p_cats.table,
+ oldp->p_cat_val_to_name[i]);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&bitmap, catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
}
ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[l].cat);
c->range.level[l].cat = bitmap;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 03140ed..d572dc9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -353,12 +353,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
sattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[scontext->type - 1];
tattr = &policydb.type_attr_map[tcontext->type - 1];
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(snode, i))
- continue;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
- continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
avkey.source_type = i + 1;
avkey.target_type = j + 1;
for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
@@ -1668,14 +1664,10 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
goto out_unlock;
}
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(rnode, i))
- continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
usercon.role = i+1;
- ebitmap_for_each_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
- if (!ebitmap_node_get_bit(tnode, j))
- continue;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
usercon.type = j+1;
if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
--
1.5.2.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread* [PATCH 6/6] SELinux: kills warnings in Improve SELinux performance when AVC misses
2007-10-09 23:18 [PATCH 0/6] SELinux patches for 2.6.24 James Morris
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2007-10-09 23:23 ` [PATCH 5/6] SELinux: improve performance when AVC misses James Morris
@ 2007-10-09 23:23 ` James Morris
5 siblings, 0 replies; 14+ messages in thread
From: James Morris @ 2007-10-09 23:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linus Torvalds; +Cc: linux-kernel, Stephen Smalley
From: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>
This patch kills ugly warnings when the "Improve SELinux performance when
AVC misses" patch.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 11 +++++------
security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index ae44c0c..c1a6b22 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
e_sft = delta % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
while (map) {
e_iter->maps[e_idx++] |= map & (-1UL);
- map >>= EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
}
}
c_iter = c_iter->next;
@@ -389,13 +389,13 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
- "not a multiple of the map unit size (%Zd)\n",
+ "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
startbit, mapunit);
goto bad;
}
if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
printk(KERN_ERR "security: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
- "beyond the end of the bitmap (%Zd)\n",
+ "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
goto bad;
}
@@ -433,9 +433,8 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
index = (startbit - n->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
while (map) {
- n->maps[index] = map & (-1UL);
- map = map >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
- index++;
+ n->maps[index++] = map & (-1UL);
+ map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
}
}
ok:
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index e38a327..f283b43 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@
#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG
#define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
#define EBITMAP_BIT 1ULL
+#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x) \
+ (((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2)
struct ebitmap_node {
struct ebitmap_node *next;
--
1.5.2.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 14+ messages in thread