Re: Defense in depth: LSM *modules*, not a static interface

Casey Schaufler
2007-11-07T03:35:45Z

--- Cliffe <cliffe@ii.net> wrote:

> As good an idea POSIX capabilities might be,

Now that's a refreshing comment. Thank you.

> not all security problems
> can be solved with a bitmap of on/off permissions.

There are people (I'm not one of them) who figure that you
can solve all the security problems by applying sufficiently
fine granularity of on/off permissions.

> Peter Dolding wrote:
> <lots o stuff>
>
> Ok but what happens to the principle of least privilege?
>
> What if we want AppArmor to confine that application to use a particular
> set of ports?
>
> Do you propose having a capability for each port? how about protocols?

While you're at it, how about a capability for each possible
directory entry name?

> So unless my understanding of capabilities is fundamentally flawed
> (which it may be - I have not spent time reviewing recent changes)
> obviously Linux capabilities does not provide a solution to every problem.

Of course they don't. The only problem they are intended
to solve, and I really mean this, is the association of uid 0
with privilege. That's it. You would be better off with a single
CAP_GODLIKE than with uid 0 having all privilege all the time.
Fine grained capabilities are a bonus, and there are lots of
people who think that it would be really nifty if there were a
separate capability for each "if" in the kernel. I personally
don't see need for more than about 20. That is a matter of taste.
DG/UX ended up with 330 and I say that's too many.

Casey Schaufler
casey@schaufler-ca.com