From: Bill Davidsen <davidsen@tmr.com>
To: David Newall <david@davidnewall.com>
Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@myrealbox.com>,
John Reiser <jreiser@BitWagon.com>,
Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>,
Linux Kernel mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data
Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2007 17:40:45 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <47699DED.1020201@tmr.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <476747DC.4040309@davidnewall.com>
David Newall wrote:
> Theodore Tso wrote:
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2007 at 01:43:28PM +1030, David Newall wrote:
>>
>>> On a server, keyboard and mouse are rarely used. As you've described
>>> it, that leaves only the disk, and during the boot process, disk
>>> accesses and timing are somewhat predictable. Whether this is
>>> sufficient to break the RNG is (clearly) a matter of debate.
>>>
>>
>> In normal operaiton, entropy is accumlated on the system, extracted
>> via /dev/urandom at shutdown, and then loaded back into the system
>> when it boots up.
>
> Thus, the entropy saved at shutdown can be known at boot-time. (You can
> examine the saved entropy on disk.)
>
>
>> If you have a server, the best thing you can do is use a hardware
>> random number generator, if it exists. Fortunately a number of
>> hardware platforms, such as IBM blades and Thinkpads, come with TPM
>> modules that include hardware RNG's. That's ultimately the best way
>> to solve these issues.
>
> Just how random are they? Do they turn out to be quite predictable if
> you're IBM?
The typical RNG is a noise diode or other similar hardware using thermal
noise, so it's unlikely that anyone but God could predict it. There are
some USB devices which supposedly use radioactive decay, I'm unsure if
that's better but I don't want to carry the dongle in my pants pocket.
The hotbits network site uses radioactive decay to generate it's numbers.
--
Bill Davidsen <davidsen@tmr.com>
"We have more to fear from the bungling of the incompetent than from
the machinations of the wicked." - from Slashdot
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2007-12-19 22:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2007-12-14 19:34 /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data John Reiser
2007-12-14 20:13 ` Matt Mackall
2007-12-14 20:45 ` John Reiser
2007-12-14 23:23 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-15 0:30 ` John Reiser
2007-12-15 4:32 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-17 16:30 ` John Reiser
2007-12-17 17:36 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-18 0:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2007-12-18 3:05 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-18 3:13 ` David Newall
2007-12-18 3:46 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-18 4:09 ` David Newall
2007-12-18 4:23 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-19 22:43 ` Bill Davidsen
2007-12-19 22:40 ` Bill Davidsen [this message]
2007-12-20 4:18 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2007-12-20 20:17 ` Phillip Susi
2007-12-21 16:10 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2007-12-22 1:14 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-26 18:30 ` Phillip Susi
2007-12-20 20:36 ` Theodore Tso
2007-12-27 10:44 ` Pavel Machek
2007-12-18 5:12 ` David Schwartz
2007-12-17 20:59 ` David Schwartz
2007-12-15 7:13 ` Herbert Xu
2007-12-15 16:30 ` Matt Mackall
2007-12-17 17:28 ` Signed divides vs shifts (Re: [Security] /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data) Linus Torvalds
2007-12-17 17:48 ` Al Viro
2007-12-17 17:55 ` Eric Dumazet
2007-12-17 18:05 ` Ray Lee
2007-12-17 18:10 ` Eric Dumazet
2007-12-17 18:12 ` Ray Lee
2007-12-17 18:23 ` Al Viro
2007-12-17 18:28 ` [Security] Signed divides vs shifts (Re: " Linus Torvalds
2007-12-17 19:08 ` Al Viro
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2007-12-15 7:20 /dev/urandom uses uninit bytes, leaks user data Matti Linnanvuori
2007-12-15 7:54 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2007-12-15 22:44 linux
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