From: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, menage@google.com,
sukadev@us.ibm.com, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup
Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2008 16:36:51 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <47D7DC73.5020103@openvz.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080312130904.GB8308@sergelap.austin.ibm.com>
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Pavel Emelyanov (xemul@openvz.org):
>> Greg KH wrote:
>>> On Tue, Mar 11, 2008 at 12:57:55PM +0300, Pavel Emelyanov wrote:
>>>> Besides, I've measured some things - the lat_syscall test for open from
>>>> lmbench test suite and the nptl perf test. Here are the results:
>>>>
>>>> sec nosec
>>>> open 3.0980s 3.0709s
>>>> nptl 2.7746s 2.7710s
>>>>
>>>> So we have 0.88% loss in open and ~0.15% with nptl. I know, this is not that
>>>> much, but it is noticeable. Besides, this is only two tests, digging deeper
>>>> may reveal more.
>>> I think that is in the noise of sampling if you run that test many more
>>> times.
>> These numbers are average values of 20 runs of each test. I didn't
>> provide the measurement accuracy, but the abs(open.sec - open.nosec)
>> is greater than it.
>>
>>>> Let alone the fact that simply turning the CONFIG_SECURITY to 'y' puts +8Kb
>>>> to the vmlinux...
>>>>
>>>> I think, I finally agree with you and Al Viro, that the kobj mapper is
>>>> not the right place to put the filtering, but taking the above numbers
>>>> into account, can we put the "hooks" into the #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
>>>> versions of security_inode_permission/security_file_permission/etc?
>>> Ask the security module interface maintainers about this, not me :)
>> OK :) Thanks for your time, Greg.
>>
>> So, Serge, since you already have a LSM-based version, maybe you can
>> change it with the proposed "fix" and send it to LSM maintainers for
>> review?
>
> To take the point of view of someone who neither wants containers nor
> LSM but just a fast box,
>
> you're asking me to introduce LSM hooks for the !SECURITY case? :)
No exactly. Look at security_ptrace, security_task_kill or
security_vm_enough_memory for !SECURITY cases. I wanted to see similar
for device access list not to replace selinux with this small "security
module" and not to carry this huge LSM for our modest purposes.
> I can give it a shot, but I expect some complaints. Now at least the
> _mknod hook shouldn't be a hotpath, and I suppose I can add yet
> an #ifdef inside the !SECURITY version of security_inode_permission().
> I still expect some complaints though. I'll send something soon.
>
> thanks,
> -serge
>
>>> good luck,
>>>
>>> greg k-h
>>>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2008-03-12 13:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-03-05 17:23 [PATCH 0/9] Devices accessibility control group (v4) Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:25 ` [PATCH 1/9] Avoid magic constants in drivers/base/map.c Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:28 ` [PATCH 2/9] Cleanup the get_gendisk() a bit Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:32 ` [PATCH 3/9] Add a mode on the struct probe Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:34 ` [PATCH 4/9] Make kobj_lookup() return the mapping's permissions Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:37 ` [PATCH 5/9] Make use of permissions, returned by kobj_lookup Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-06 1:13 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-06 8:48 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-07 9:22 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-07 9:35 ` Andrew Morton
2008-03-07 9:52 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-07 15:59 ` Greg KH
2008-03-07 16:38 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-07 17:01 ` Greg KH
2008-03-07 17:08 ` Al Viro
2008-03-07 17:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-07 17:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-07 18:30 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-07 19:46 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-07 20:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-07 21:32 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-07 18:14 ` Greg KH
2008-03-07 18:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-08 6:04 ` Greg KH
2008-03-08 21:47 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-09 3:15 ` Greg KH
2008-03-10 20:35 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-11 9:57 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-11 17:36 ` Greg KH
2008-03-12 8:26 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-12 13:09 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-12 13:18 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-12 13:27 ` Stephen Smalley
2008-03-12 14:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-12 14:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-12 16:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2008-03-12 13:36 ` Pavel Emelyanov [this message]
2008-03-05 17:40 ` [PATCH 6/9] Extend the drivers/base/map.c functionality Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:43 ` [PATCH 7/9] Provide functions to manipulate char device mappings Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:46 ` [PATCH 8/9] Provide functions to manipulate block " Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-05 17:47 ` [PATCH 9/9] Devices accessibility control group itself Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-06 2:02 ` Greg KH
2008-03-06 1:55 ` [PATCH 0/9] Devices accessibility control group (v4) Greg KH
2008-03-06 3:15 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-03-06 4:34 ` Greg KH
2008-03-06 8:36 ` Pavel Emelyanov
2008-03-07 4:58 ` Greg KH
2008-03-07 8:42 ` Pavel Machek
2008-03-07 8:54 ` Pavel Emelyanov
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