public inbox for linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Atsushi Tsuji <a-tsuji@bk.jp.nec.com>
To: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2008 11:19:50 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47E07846.9050707@bk.jp.nec.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20080318144431.GA3384@tv-sign.ru>

Oleg Nesterov wrote:
> (on top of signals-cleanup-security_task_kill-usage-implementation.patch)
> 
> This wasn't documented, but as Atsushi Tsuji <a-tsuji@bk.jp.nec.com> pointed
> out check_kill_permission() needs tasklist_lock for task_session_nr().
> I missed this fact when removed tasklist from the callers.
> 
> Change check_kill_permission() to take tasklist_lock for the SIGCONT case.
> Re-order security checks so that we take tasklist_lock only if/when it is
> actually needed. This is a minimal fix for now, tasklist will be removed
> later.

Thanks, I confirmed the problem is fixed by this patch.

> 
> Also change the code to use task_session() instead of task_session_nr().
> 
> Also, remove the SIGCONT check from cap_task_kill(), it is bogus (and the
> whole function is bogus. Serge, Eric, why it is still alive?).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>

Acked-by: Atsushi Tsuji <a-tsuji@bk.jp.nec.com>

> 
> --- 25/kernel/signal.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST	2008-03-18 14:47:00.000000000 +0300
> +++ 25/kernel/signal.c	2008-03-18 17:25:19.000000000 +0300
> @@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int rm_from_queue(unsigned long m
>  static int check_kill_permission(int sig, struct siginfo *info,
>  				 struct task_struct *t)
>  {
> +	struct pid *sid;
>  	int error;
>  
>  	if (!valid_signal(sig))
> @@ -545,11 +546,24 @@ static int check_kill_permission(int sig
>  	if (error)
>  		return error;
>  
> -	if (((sig != SIGCONT) || (task_session_nr(current) != task_session_nr(t)))
> -	    && (current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid)
> -	    && (current->uid ^ t->suid) && (current->uid ^ t->uid)
> -	    && !capable(CAP_KILL))
> -		return -EPERM;
> +	if ((current->euid ^ t->suid) && (current->euid ^ t->uid) &&
> +	    (current->uid  ^ t->suid) && (current->uid  ^ t->uid) &&
> +	    !capable(CAP_KILL)) {
> +		switch (sig) {
> +		case SIGCONT:
> +			read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> +			sid = task_session(t);
> +			read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> +			/*
> +			 * We don't return the error if sid == NULL. The
> +			 * task was unhashed, the caller must notice this.
> +			 */
> +			if (!sid || sid == task_session(current))
> +				break;
> +		default:
> +			return -EPERM;
> +		}
> +	}
>  
>  	return security_task_kill(t, info, sig, 0);
>  }
> --- 25/security/commoncap.c~CKP_TAKE_TASKLIST	2008-03-18 17:07:02.000000000 +0300
> +++ 25/security/commoncap.c	2008-03-18 17:21:10.000000000 +0300
> @@ -552,10 +552,6 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p,
>  	if (p->uid == current->uid)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	/* sigcont is permitted within same session */
> -	if (sig == SIGCONT && (task_session_nr(current) == task_session_nr(p)))
> -		return 0;
> -
>  	if (secid)
>  		/*
>  		 * Signal sent as a particular user.

      parent reply	other threads:[~2008-03-19 21:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2008-03-04 18:57 [RFC,PATCH 2/2] kill_pid_info: don't take now unneeded tasklist_lock Oleg Nesterov
2008-03-06 10:56 ` Roland McGrath
2008-03-17 11:30 ` Atsushi Tsuji
2008-03-17 17:01   ` Oleg Nesterov
2008-03-18 14:44     ` [PATCH] signals: check_kill_permission: check session under tasklist_lock Oleg Nesterov
2008-03-18 20:03       ` serge
2008-03-18 20:17         ` Oleg Nesterov
2008-03-18 23:14           ` serge
2008-03-19  2:19       ` Atsushi Tsuji [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=47E07846.9050707@bk.jp.nec.com \
    --to=a-tsuji@bk.jp.nec.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=davidel@xmailserver.org \
    --cc=ebiederm@xmission.com \
    --cc=jkosina@suse.cz \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@elte.hu \
    --cc=oleg@tv-sign.ru \
    --cc=roland@redhat.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=xemul@openvz.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox