From: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
Linux Security Modules List
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] security: filesystem capabilities bugfix2
Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2008 01:48:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <486357EC.5060205@kernel.org> (raw)
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Bugfix for strace, and CAP_SETPCAP, in the case that filesystem
capabilities are supported.
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From f4419c78fff77c4fa3cdfa6b0a78edae92ddf467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2008 23:24:10 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] Blunt CAP_SETPCAP on strace with filesystem capability support
The filesystem capability support meaning for CAP_SETPCAP is less
powerful than the non-filesystem capability support. As such, when
filesystem capabilities are configured, we should not permit
CAP_SETPCAP to 'enhance' the current process through strace
manipulation of a child process.
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
---
security/commoncap.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 5edabc7..a9ea921 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -103,10 +103,16 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
return (cap_capable(current, CAP_SETPCAP) != 0);
}
+static inline int cap_limit_straced_target(void) { return 1; }
+
#else /* ie., ndef CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
static inline int cap_block_setpcap(struct task_struct *t) { return 0; }
static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { return 1; }
+static inline int cap_limit_straced_target(void)
+{
+ return !capable(CAP_SETPCAP);
+}
#endif /* def CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES */
@@ -342,9 +348,10 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
bprm->e_uid = current->uid;
bprm->e_gid = current->gid;
}
- if (!capable (CAP_SETPCAP)) {
- new_permitted = cap_intersect (new_permitted,
- current->cap_permitted);
+ if (cap_limit_straced_target()) {
+ new_permitted =
+ cap_intersect(new_permitted,
+ current->cap_permitted);
}
}
}
--
1.5.3.7
next reply other threads:[~2008-06-26 8:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2008-06-26 8:48 Andrew G. Morgan [this message]
2008-06-27 20:59 ` [PATCH 2/4] security: filesystem capabilities bugfix2 Serge E. Hallyn
2008-06-30 14:53 ` David Howells
2008-06-30 18:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-06-30 19:10 ` David Howells
2008-06-30 19:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2008-06-27 23:04 ` David Howells
2008-06-30 5:41 ` Andrew G. Morgan
2008-06-30 9:45 ` David Howells
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