Re: IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM question...

[Jeff Garzik <jeff@garzik.org>]

Robin Getz wrote:
> Although there was some discussion  
> http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/680723
> 
> about removing IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM from the remaining network drivers in May of 
> 2008, but they still appears to be there in 2.6.29.
> 
> drivers/net/ibmlana.c
> drivers/net/macb.c
> drivers/net/3c523.c
> drivers/net/3c527.c
> drivers/net/netxen/netxen_nic_main.c
> drivers/net/cris/eth_v10.c
> drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
> drivers/net/atlx/atl1.c
> drivers/net/qla3xxx.c
> drivers/net/tg3.c
> drivers/net/niu.c
> 
> So what is the plan? If I send a patch to add IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM to others 
> (like the Blackfin) networking drivers - will it get rejected?
> 
> We have lots of embedded headless systems (no keyboard/mouse, no soundcard, no 
> video) systems with *no* sources of entropy - and people using SSL.
> 
> I didn't really find any docs which describe what should have 
> IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM on it or not. I did find Matt Mackall describing it as:
>> We currently assume that IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM means 'this is a completely
>> trusted unobservable entropy source' which is obviously wrong for
>> network devices but is right for some other classes of device.
> 
> Currently - I see most things I see using IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM would also fail 
> the "completely unobservable" test. Other than the TRNG that are inside the 
> CPU - what does pass?

IMO it's not observation but rather that a remote host is essentially 
your source of entropy -- which means your source of entropy is 
potentially controllable or influenced by an attacker.

Furthermore, with hardware interrupt mitigation, non-trivial traffic 
levels can imply that interrupts are delivered with timer-based 
regularity.  This, too, may clearly be influenced by a remote attacker.

Thus I think IRQF_SAMPLE_RANDOM should be banned from network drivers... 
  but that is not a universal opinion.

	Jeff