From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756879AbZHGBVq (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Aug 2009 21:21:46 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S1756744AbZHGBVq (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Aug 2009 21:21:46 -0400 Received: from [222.73.24.84] ([222.73.24.84]:52995 "EHLO song.cn.fujitsu.com" rhost-flags-FAIL-FAIL-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756495AbZHGBVp (ORCPT ); Thu, 6 Aug 2009 21:21:45 -0400 Message-ID: <4A7B8149.3070901@cn.fujitsu.com> Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2009 09:20:09 +0800 From: Li Zefan User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.9.1b3pre) Gecko/20090513 Fedora/3.0-2.3.beta2.fc11 Thunderbird/3.0b2 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Steven Rostedt CC: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Fr=E9d=E9ric_Weisbecker?= , Ingo Molnar , LKML Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/3] tracing/filters: Support filtering for char * strings References: <4A7A72BD.5030201@cn.fujitsu.com> <4A7A72FA.9040102@cn.fujitsu.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org >> if (is_string_field(field)) { >> + pred->str_len = field->size; >> + >> if (field->filter_type == FILTER_STATIC_STRING) >> fn = filter_pred_string; >> - else >> + else if (field->filter_type == FILTER_DYN_STRING) >> fn = filter_pred_strloc; >> - pred->str_len = field->size; >> + else { >> + fn = filter_pred_pchar; >> + pred->str_len = strlen(pred->str_val); >> + } > > I'm a little dense here, where do we protect against someone making a > tracepoint that points to unsafe data? > We can't prevent anyone from doing insane things deliberately, but we prevent from doing wrong things unconsciously. Only if a TRACE_EVENT has a field defined as: __field_ext(char *, name, FILTER_PTR_STR) Here using FILTER_PTR_STR explicitly, he should know what he's doing. Anyway, he can make a ptr pointing to unsafe data this way: TP_STRUCT__entry( __field(char *, name) ) TP_printk("%s", name)