From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Julia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] security/selinux: decrement sizeof size in strncmp
Date: Fri, 13 Nov 2009 19:06:17 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4AFE1EA9.60102@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <19857.1258147396@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>
Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
> On Thu, 12 Nov 2009 18:11:55 PST, Casey Schaufler said:
>
>> James Morris wrote:
>>
>>> Do you see potential for a buffer overrun in this case?
>>>
>
>
>> No, but I hate arguing with people who think that every time
>> they see strcmp that they have found a security flaw.
>>
>
> How do you feel about people who think every time they see strcmp()
> "Oh crap, something that needs auditing"? ;)
>
They have my deep sympathy. Which is why I'm advocating leaving
the perfectly functional and correct use of strncmp() as it is.
> The biggest problem with strcmp() is that even if it got audited when that code
> went in, it's prone to unaudited breakage when somebody changes something in
> some other piece of code, quite often in some other .c file in some other
> directory.
>
> Julia, is there a way to use coccinelle to detect unsafe changes like that? Or
> is expressing those semantics too difficult?
>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2009-11-14 3:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2009-11-12 7:49 [PATCH 3/4] security/selinux: decrement sizeof size in strncmp Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 8:16 ` James Morris
2009-11-12 14:53 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-11-12 14:57 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 16:21 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-12 18:28 ` David Wagner
2009-11-12 21:41 ` James Morris
2009-11-12 21:59 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-12 23:56 ` David Wagner
2009-11-13 2:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-13 20:32 ` David Wagner
2009-11-13 21:23 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-13 21:26 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-13 23:08 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-14 0:41 ` David Wagner
2009-11-14 5:08 ` Valdis.Kletnieks
2009-11-14 15:22 ` Julia Lawall
2009-11-13 23:06 ` David Wagner
2009-11-14 3:06 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2009-11-14 3:44 ` David Wagner
2009-11-14 3:48 ` Joe Perches
2009-11-14 5:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-14 5:26 ` Joe Perches
2009-11-14 7:20 ` Casey Schaufler
2009-11-15 7:45 ` Raja R Harinath
2009-11-15 18:44 ` Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=4AFE1EA9.60102@schaufler-ca.com \
--to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu \
--cc=eparis@parisplace.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=julia@diku.dk \
--cc=kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=serue@us.ibm.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox