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From: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
To: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>,
	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>,
	Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	George Wilson <gcwilson@us.ibm.com>,
	KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option
Date: Mon, 23 Nov 2009 14:34:03 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4B0B0DDB.4070504@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20091123222130.GA11325@us.ibm.com>

Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> As far as I know, all distros currently ship kernels with default
> CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y.  Since having the option on
> leaves a 'no_file_caps' option to boot without file capabilities,
> the main reason to keep the option is that turning it off saves
> you (on my s390x partition) 5k.  In particular, vmlinux sizes
> came to:
> 
> without patch fscaps=n:		 	53598392
> without patch fscaps=y:		 	53603406
> with this patch applied:		53603342
> 
> with the security-next tree.
> 
> Against this we must weigh the fact that there is no simple way for
> userspace to figure out whether file capabilities are supported,
> while things like per-process securebits, capability bounding
> sets, and adding bits to pI if CAP_SETPCAP is in pE are not supported
> with SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=n, leaving a bit of a problem for
> applications wanting to know whether they can use them and/or why
> something failed.
> 
> It also adds another subtly different set of semantics which we must
> maintain at the risk of severe security regressions.

Hi,

This is or is not the same security option that is referred to in
(new:) http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14675 ?


> So this patch removes the SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile
> option.  It drops the kernel size by about 50k over the stock
> SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES=y kernel, by removing the
> cap_limit_ptraced_target() function.
> 
> Changelog:
> 	Nov 20: remove cap_limit_ptraced_target() as it's logic
> 		was ifndef'ed.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
> Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
> ---
>  include/linux/capability.h |    2 -
>  include/linux/init_task.h  |    4 --
>  kernel/capability.c        |    2 -
>  security/Kconfig           |    9 -----
>  security/commoncap.c       |   72 +------------------------------------------
>  5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)



-- 
~Randy

  reply	other threads:[~2009-11-23 22:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-11-23 22:21 [PATCH] remove CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES compile option Serge E. Hallyn
2009-11-23 22:34 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2009-11-23 23:12   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-11-23 23:13 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2009-11-24  4:59 ` James Morris

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