Re: [PATCH] ptrace: allow restriction of ptrace scope

[Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>]

Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Theodore Tso <tytso@MIT.EDU> writes:
>
>   
>> i think we really need to have stacked LSM's,

!

>>  because there is a large set
>> of people who will never use SELinux.  Every few years, I take another 
>> look at SELinux, my head explodes with the (IMHO unneeded complexity),
>> and I go away again...
>>
>> Yet I would really like a number of features such as this ptrace scope idea ---
>> which I think is a useful feature, and it may be that stacking is the only
>> way we can resolve this debate.   The SELinux people will never believe that
>> their system is too complicated, and I don't like using things that are impossible
>> for me to understand or configure, and that doesn't seem likely to change anytime
>> in the near future.
>>
>> I mean, even IPSEC RFC's are easier for me to understand, and that's saying
>> a lot...
>>     
>
>
> If anyone is going to work on this let me make a concrete suggestion.
> Let's aim at not stacked lsm's but chained lsm's, and put the chaining
> logic in the lsm core.
>   

It's 35 years since my data structures course. What's the important
difference between the two?

> The core difficulty appears to be how do you multiplex the security pointers
> on various objects out there.
>   

That and making sure that the hooks that maintain state get called
even if the decision to deny access has already been made by someone
else.

> My wishlist has this working so that I can logically have a local security
> policy in a container, restricted by the global policy but with additional
> restrictions.
>
> Eric
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