Re: kernel.org status: establishing a PGP web of trust

Heiko Carstens
2011-10-04T12:51:39Z

On Mon, Oct 03, 2011 at 01:19:27PM +0200, Jiri Kosina wrote:
> On Fri, 30 Sep 2011, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
>
> > Since the kernel.org status announcement last week a number of you
> > have contacted me about re-establishing credentials. In order to
> > establish a proper PGP web of trust we need keys that are cross-signed
> > by other developers. As such, we ask that you follow the following
> > steps:
> >
> > 1. Make sure your systems are uncompromised. We will address specific
> > recommended steps for that in a separate email.
> >
> > 2. Create a new PGP/GPG key, and also generate a key revocation
> > certificate (but don't import it anywhere -- save it for the
> > future) for your new key. In the near future we are considering
> > setting up an escrow service for key revocation certificates.
> >
> > I recommend using a 4096-bit RSA key. Given how fast computers are
> > these days, there is no reason to use a shorter key. DSA keys
> > should be considered obsolete; substantial weaknesses have been
> > found in DSA.
> >
> > $ gpg --gen-key
> > $ gpg -u <key ID> -o <key ID>.revoke --gen-revoke
> >
> > 3. If you are reasonably certain that your old key has never been
> > jeopardized, sign the new key with the old key.
>
> I have a question here. In case people are 'reasonably certain' that the
> old key has never been jeoparadized, why are they required to create a new
> key?
>
> (if the old key would have been compromised, the attacker could as well
> generate a new key and sign it with the old key himself, so I fail to see
> any benefit of this PGP excercise).
>
> It doesn't make too much sense to force people to live with two different
> personalities in this "PGP web of trust" world just for the sake of
> kernel.org, does it?

Also same question here. And as far as I can tell nobody has given an
answer yet.