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From: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
To: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
	eric.dumazet@gmail.com, shaohua.li@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	mhocko@suse.cz, alex.shi@intel.com, efault@gmx.de,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL rcu/next] RCU commits for 3.1
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2011 16:09:19 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4EAE57AF.1060706@cn.fujitsu.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20111029182710.GG6160@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

(Let's cc Peter and Paul Turner for this perf cgroup issue.)

> Thank you for the analysis.  Does the following patch fix this problem?
> 
> 							Thanx, Paul
> 
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> fs: Add RCU protection in set_task_comm()
> 
> Running "perf stat true" results in the following RCU-lockdep splat:
> 
> ===============================
> [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
> -------------------------------
> include/linux/cgroup.h:548 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
> 
> other info that might help us debug this:
> 
> rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
> 1 lock held by true/655:
> #0:  (&sig->cred_guard_mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<810d1bd7>] prepare_bprm_creds+0x27/0x70
> 
> stack backtrace:
> Pid: 655, comm: true Not tainted 3.1.0-tip-01868-g1271bd2-dirty #161079
> Call Trace:
> [<81abe239>] ? printk+0x18/0x1a
> [<81064920>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xc0/0xd0
> [<8108aa02>] perf_event_enable_on_exec+0x1d2/0x1e0
> [<81063764>] ? __lock_release+0x54/0xb0
> [<8108cca8>] perf_event_comm+0x18/0x60
> [<810d1abd>] ? set_task_comm+0x5d/0x80
> [<81af622d>] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1d/0x40
> [<810d1ac4>] set_task_comm+0x64/0x80
> [<810d25fd>] setup_new_exec+0xbd/0x1d0
> [<810d1b61>] ? flush_old_exec+0x81/0xa0
> [<8110753e>] load_elf_binary+0x28e/0xa00
> [<810d2101>] ? search_binary_handler+0xd1/0x1d0
> [<81063764>] ? __lock_release+0x54/0xb0
> [<811072b0>] ? load_elf_library+0x260/0x260
> [<810d2108>] search_binary_handler+0xd8/0x1d0
> [<810d2060>] ? search_binary_handler+0x30/0x1d0
> [<810d242f>] do_execve_common+0x22f/0x2a0
> [<810d24b2>] do_execve+0x12/0x20
> [<81009592>] sys_execve+0x32/0x70
> [<81af7752>] ptregs_execve+0x12/0x20
> [<81af76d4>] ? sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x36
> 
> Li Zefan noted that this is due to set_task_comm() dropping the task
> lock before invoking perf_event_comm(), which could in fact result in
> the task being freed up before perf_event_comm() completed tracing in
> the case where one task invokes set_task_comm() on another task -- which
> actually does occur via comm_write(), which can be invoked via /proc.
> 

This is not true. The caller should ensure @tsk is valid during
set_task_comm().

The warning comes from perf_cgroup_from_task(). We can trigger this warning
in some other cases where perf cgroup is used, for example:

# mount -t cgroup -o perf_event xxx /mnt
# ./perf record -a -e 'sched:*' -G / true

[  171.603171] ===============================
[  171.603173] [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
[  171.603175] -------------------------------
[  171.603178] include/linux/cgroup.h:548 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
[  171.603180] 
[  171.603181] other info that might help us debug this:
[  171.603182] 
[  171.603184] 
[  171.603185] rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
[  171.603188] 2 locks held by perf/2899:
[  171.603190]  #0:  (&cpuctx_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<c04b2fe7>] sys_perf_event_open+0x4ed/0x62a
[  171.603201]  #1:  (&cpuctx_lock){......}, at: [<c04ac4bc>] perf_ctx_lock+0xe/0x1d
[  171.603210] 
[  171.603211] stack backtrace:
[  171.603214] Pid: 2899, comm: perf Not tainted 3.1.0+ #12
[  171.603216] Call Trace:
[  171.603222]  [<c07e7234>] ? printk+0x25/0x29
[  171.603227]  [<c046279d>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x90/0x9b
[  171.603232]  [<c04ac688>] perf_cgroup_from_task+0x5e/0x64
[  171.603236]  [<c04adfe7>] update_cgrp_time_from_event.clone.18+0x16/0x25
[  171.603240]  [<c04b01a1>] __perf_install_in_context+0xa0/0xcf
[  171.603244]  [<c04ac355>] ? pmu_dev_release+0xa/0xa
[  171.603248]  [<c04ac386>] remote_function+0x31/0x37
[  171.603253]  [<c0468aaa>] smp_call_function_single+0x7d/0xf5
[  171.603257]  [<c04ac41d>] cpu_function_call+0x29/0x2e
[  171.603261]  [<c04b0101>] ? perf_pm_suspend_cpu+0x9f/0x9f
[  171.603264]  [<c04ae85b>] perf_install_in_context+0x53/0x9f
[  171.603268]  [<c04b3033>] sys_perf_event_open+0x539/0x62a
[  171.603273]  [<c04566f5>] ? up_read+0x1b/0x2e
[  171.603277]  [<c07ec856>] ? do_page_fault+0x2e6/0x314
[  171.603283]  [<c07ef2df>] sysenter_do_call+0x12/0x38

> This commit fixes this problem by entering an RCU read-side critical
> section before acquiring the task lock and exiting this critical section
> after perf_event_comm() returns.
> 
> Reported-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> 
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index 25dcbe5..fb928d3 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_task_comm);
>  
>  void set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, char *buf)
>  {
> +	rcu_read_lock(); /* protect task pointer through tracing. */
>  	task_lock(tsk);
>  
>  	/*
> @@ -1069,6 +1070,7 @@ void set_task_comm(struct task_struct *tsk, char *buf)
>  	strlcpy(tsk->comm, buf, sizeof(tsk->comm));
>  	task_unlock(tsk);
>  	perf_event_comm(tsk);
> +	rcu_read_unlock();
>  }
>  
>  int flush_old_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2011-10-31  8:07 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20110930204503.GA32687@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
     [not found] ` <20111001152514.GA16930@elte.hu>
     [not found]   ` <20111003055302.GA23527@elte.hu>
     [not found]     ` <20111003161335.GA2403@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2011-10-04  7:46       ` [GIT PULL rcu/next] RCU commits for 3.1 Ingo Molnar
2011-10-24 10:05         ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-24 11:48           ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-26 20:30             ` Ingo Molnar
2011-10-27  7:59               ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-27  8:00                 ` Ingo Molnar
2011-10-28  2:34                   ` Li Zefan
2011-10-29 18:27                     ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-10-31  8:09                       ` Li Zefan [this message]
2011-10-31  9:32                         ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-01  2:37                           ` Li Zefan
2011-11-02 19:23                             ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-02 19:55                               ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-03 12:50                             ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-04  8:44                               ` Li Zefan
2011-11-04  9:02                                 ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 14:24                                   ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 14:41                                     ` Eric Dumazet
2011-11-07 14:44                                       ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 15:15                             ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 16:16                               ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 16:35                                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 16:56                                   ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-07 17:09                                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 17:55                                       ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-08 13:10                                         ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 17:11                                     ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 17:12                                     ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 17:26                                       ` Peter Zijlstra
2011-11-07 17:50                                         ` Stephane Eranian
2011-11-07 17:53                                         ` Paul E. McKenney
2011-11-07 17:53                                       ` Paul E. McKenney

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