From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org,
pmatouse@redhat.com, agk@redhat.com, jbottomley@parallels.com,
mchristi@redhat.com, msnitzer@redhat.com,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices
Date: Thu, 05 Jan 2012 17:40:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4F05D286.7030205@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFwcZjxZsVV_9rsKgApDfEMdCdHYvkDW5Wz7j-=gd_tFeQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 01/05/2012 05:16 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 5, 2012 at 5:18 AM, Paolo Bonzini<pbonzini@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hence, changing scsi_verify_blk_ioctl to return ENOIOCTLCMD is not
>> really possible.
>
> What?
>
> "We have a bug in the block IO layer, so we cannot possible fix
> another problem?"
>
> Whjat the f*ck is the logic there?
>
> Just fix the *obvious* breakage in BLKROSET. It's clearly what the
> code *intends* to do, it just didn't check for ENOIOCTLCMD.
Aha, so this is clear and obvious. And who knows that something else
won't break? Such as the 32-on-64 logic that already uses ENOIOCTLCMD
for something else?
If the block maintainers want to fix that, fine. "git blame
block/ioctl.c" shows that it's been like this for 6 years and in general
the file has hardly seen changes. That's enough to make me steer away
from that code.
Foolish me who found a bug, and an exploitable one for that matter, and
even tried to fix it. Looks like security by obscurity would have
served users better.
Paolo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-01-05 16:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-12-22 18:02 [PATCH 0/3] possible privilege escalation via SG_IO ioctl (CVE-2011-4127) Paolo Bonzini
2011-12-22 18:02 ` [PATCH 1/3] block: add and use scsi_blk_cmd_ioctl Paolo Bonzini
2011-12-22 18:02 ` [PATCH 2/3] block: fail SCSI passthrough ioctls on partition devices Paolo Bonzini
2011-12-22 18:37 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-12-22 19:11 ` Willy Tarreau
2011-12-22 19:18 ` Paolo Bonzini
2011-12-22 19:44 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-12-22 20:23 ` Paolo Bonzini
2011-12-22 20:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-12-22 22:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2011-12-22 22:25 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-12-22 23:48 ` Alasdair G Kergon
2011-12-23 0:07 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-12-23 6:26 ` Willy Tarreau
2011-12-23 9:22 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-12-23 9:45 ` Willy Tarreau
2011-12-23 14:15 ` Paolo Bonzini
2011-12-23 22:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-05 13:18 ` Paolo Bonzini
2012-01-05 16:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-05 16:40 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2012-01-05 17:04 ` Linus Torvalds
2012-01-05 17:26 ` Paolo Bonzini
2012-01-05 23:49 ` Linus Torvalds
2011-12-26 1:41 ` Daniel Barkalow
2011-12-23 0:17 ` H. Peter Anvin
2011-12-22 18:02 ` [PATCH 3/3] dm: do not forward ioctls from logical volumes to the underlying device Paolo Bonzini
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