From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@mit.edu>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mcgrathr@google.com, indan@nul.nu,
netdev@parisplace.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, mingo@redhat.com,
oleg@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, rdunlap@xenotime.net,
tglx@linutronix.de, serge.hallyn@canonical.com,
pmoore@redhat.com, akpm@linux-foundation.org, corbet@lwn.net,
markus@chromium.org, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
keescook@chromium.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call
Date: Thu, 24 May 2012 17:38:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4FBED482.4050800@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAObL_7GSNbgceHQpNx3fbiCbV5u-_vJJO5cptwVCK34W7wFH5Q@mail.gmail.com>
On 05/24/2012 05:26 PM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote:
>
> Just to clarify: are you suggesting that, for now, the traced behavior
> should be:
>
> process -> seccomp -> ptrace -> kernel?
>
> If so, I think the man page or something should have a big fat warning
> that seccomp filters should *never* allow ptrace (even PTRACE_TRACEME)
> unless they fully understand the issue.
>
Yes, and yes.
> In any case, I think that the UML interaction is missing the point.
> UML will *emulate* the seccomp filter. If it chooses to use host
> seccomp filters for some business, that's its business.
I don't see why UML should have to emulate the seccomp filter. With the
proposed order, then it can simply use the seccomp filter provided by
the host. Furthermore, with this sequencing UML can actually *use*
seccomp to provide the simulation.
-hpa
--
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel. I don't speak on their behalf.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-05-25 0:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-05-21 18:21 seccomp and ptrace. what is the correct order? Eric Paris
2012-05-21 18:25 ` Roland McGrath
2012-05-21 19:20 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-22 16:23 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 16:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 17:39 ` Al Viro
2012-05-22 20:26 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 20:34 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 20:48 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 21:07 ` Al Viro
2012-05-22 21:17 ` Roland McGrath
2012-05-22 21:18 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 22:20 ` Al Viro
2012-05-22 21:09 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-22 21:14 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-22 21:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:07 ` [RFC PATCH 1/3] seccomp: Don't allow tracers to abuse RET_TRACE Will Drewry
2012-05-24 17:54 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 18:24 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 20:17 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 2/3] arch/x86: move secure_computing after ptrace Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:08 ` [RFC PATCH 3/3] arch/*: move secure_computing after trace Will Drewry
2012-05-24 16:13 ` [RFC PATCH 0/3] move the secure_computing call H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 18:07 ` Roland McGrath
2012-05-24 18:27 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 18:45 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-24 19:39 ` Indan Zupancic
2012-05-24 22:00 ` Andrew Morton
2012-05-25 1:55 ` Will Drewry
2012-05-24 23:40 ` James Morris
2012-05-24 23:43 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-24 23:56 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-05-25 0:26 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-25 0:38 ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]
2012-05-25 0:55 ` Andrew Lutomirski
2012-05-21 18:47 ` seccomp and ptrace. what is the correct order? richard -rw- weinberger
2012-05-21 19:13 ` H. Peter Anvin
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