From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
libseccomp-discuss@lists.sourceforge.net,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: ANN: libseccomp
Date: Mon, 09 Apr 2012 18:46:02 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5076094.qra9nCCzS0@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CABqD9haXLBDxEkC3+3AN4d4PDVYE-JrqH4P6iTJ95mqYxoR=yA@mail.gmail.com>
On Monday, April 09, 2012 04:51:30 PM Will Drewry wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> > On Monday, April 09, 2012 12:16:30 PM Kees Cook wrote:
> >> On Mon, Apr 9, 2012 at 11:58 AM, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
> >> > With the seccomp patches finally stabilizing a bit, it seems like now
> >> > is a
> >> > good time to announce libseccomp: a library designed to make it easier
> >> > to
> >> > create complex, architecture independent seccomp filters.
> >> >
> >> > * http://sourceforge.net/projects/libseccomp/
> >> > * git clone git://git.code.sf.net/p/libseccomp/libseccomp
> >>
> >> This looks really great; nice work!
>
> Agreed -- this is great to see!
Not as much as the actual kernel support :)
> >> I see that the arch check happens during _gen_bpf_build_bpf(), which
> >> is excellent. Do you have any thoughts about including a call to
> >> prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) by default as well?
> >
> > That is a good question, and I guess it comes down to another question of
> > if anyone would want to use seccomp without NO_NEW_PRIVS. If the answer
> > is no then I'm comfortable adding it into the seccomp_load() function;
> > however, if the answer is yes we might want to do something different.
> >
> > I haven't given much thought to this yet, so if you or anyone else feels
> > strongly about the issue - either pro or con - I'd appreciate hearing the
> > argument.
>
> I guess the question is if there is an expectation that this library
> be used with something like lxc, where a whole, functional system with
> suid/fcaps binaries is contained. In that world, it may not be
> desirable to set the nnp bit. The same is true if, for some reason,
> the init task was to set a system-wide filter.
>
> Most likely, default use of nnp is probably "the right thing", but
> it'd be nice to be able to annotate when you really want to allow
> privileged contexts to set filters without nnp.
Okay, that seems reasonable: default to NO_NEW_PRIVS, but provide an override
mechanism.
I've been wanting a mechanism/API for tweaking some of the default library
parameters for the past few weeks, this is likely the last bit of motivation I
need to start working on this. I'll look into it once the license issue is
sorted.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-04-09 22:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-04-09 18:58 ANN: libseccomp Paul Moore
2012-04-09 19:16 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-09 21:32 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-09 21:51 ` Will Drewry
2012-04-09 22:46 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2012-04-13 20:14 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-14 2:47 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2012-04-16 14:15 ` [libseccomp-discuss] " Paul Moore
2012-04-09 22:56 ` Serge Hallyn
2012-04-09 19:25 ` Josh Boyer
2012-04-09 20:02 ` H. Peter Anvin
2012-04-09 20:14 ` Josh Boyer
2012-04-09 21:28 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-10 20:29 ` Paul Moore
2012-04-11 0:27 ` Josh Boyer
[not found] ` <CAEXv5_jiZsd6t=H1KWMNhUdgMez0B-WdC5XAHzdHffjOQh_J4A@mail.gmail.com>
2012-04-15 16:20 ` Kees Cook
2012-04-16 14:09 ` [libseccomp-discuss] " Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=5076094.qra9nCCzS0@sifl \
--to=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=libseccomp-discuss@lists.sourceforge.net \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=wad@chromium.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox