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Date: Wed, 05 Dec 2012 17:21:44 -0800
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
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To: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>, Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
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        "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Subject: Re: Use PCI ROMs from EFI boot services
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On 12/05/2012 05:13 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>
>
> "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
>
>> And that presumably would be something that cannot be exposed to root?
>> If so we may want to use one of the bits in the setup_data type field
>> as
>> a security flag, perhaps...
>
> Yeah, it needs to be hidden from root - but ideally we'd be passing it to the second kernel if we kexec. Alternative would be for it to be capability bounded to a trusted signed kexec binary if we implement Vivek's IMA-based approach.
>

Either way a security flag in the type field makes sense.

	-hpa

-- 
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel.  I don't speak on their behalf.