* [PATCH 2/3] integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
2013-04-24 12:10 [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl Mimi Zohar
@ 2013-04-24 12:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-04-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] evm: audit integrity metadata failures Mimi Zohar
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2013-04-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Hugh Dickins, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
linux-kernel
This patch moves the integrity_audit_msg() function and defintion to
security/integrity/, the parent directory, renames the 'ima_audit'
boot command line option to 'integrity_audit', and fixes the Kconfig
help text to reflect the actual code.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt | 10 +++---
security/integrity/Kconfig | 15 +++++++++
security/integrity/Makefile | 1 +
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 12 -------
security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 1 -
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 14 --------
security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c | 64 ------------------------------------
security/integrity/integrity.h | 14 ++++++++
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
9 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 96 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
create mode 100644 security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
diff --git a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
index 4609e81..6c8c335 100644
--- a/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -1078,11 +1078,6 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
The builtin appraise policy appraises all files
owned by uid=0.
- ima_audit= [IMA]
- Format: { "0" | "1" }
- 0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
- 1 -- enable informational integrity auditing messages.
-
ima_hash= [IMA]
Format: { "sha1" | "md5" }
default: "sha1"
@@ -1107,6 +1102,11 @@ bytes respectively. Such letter suffixes can also be entirely omitted.
inport.irq= [HW] Inport (ATI XL and Microsoft) busmouse driver
Format: <irq>
+ integrity_audit=[IMA]
+ Format: { "0" | "1" }
+ 0 -- basic integrity auditing messages. (Default)
+ 1 -- additional integrity auditing messages.
+
intel_iommu= [DMAR] Intel IOMMU driver (DMAR) option
on
Enable intel iommu driver.
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 4bb3a77..245c6d9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -17,6 +17,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
usually only added from initramfs.
+config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+ bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
+ depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
+ default y
+ help
+ In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
+ option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
+ controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
+ 0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
+ 1 - additional integrity auditing messages
+
+ Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
+ be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
+ command line.
+
config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index ebb6409..0f9cffb 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
#
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index d232c73..39196ab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -38,18 +38,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
-config IMA_AUDIT
- bool "Enables auditing support"
- depends on IMA
- depends on AUDIT
- default y
- help
- This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
- allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
- at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity
- auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
- the kernel command line.
-
config IMA_LSM_RULES
bool
depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 3f2ca6b..56dfee7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
ima_policy.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a41c9c1..b3dd616 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -62,20 +62,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
};
extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-/* declarations */
-void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
- const char *cause, int result, int info);
-#else
-static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *fname,
- const char *op, const char *cause,
- int result, int info)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
/* Internal IMA function definitions */
int ima_init(void);
void ima_cleanup(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c586faa..0000000
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
- * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
- *
- * File: integrity_audit.c
- * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
- */
-
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include "ima.h"
-
-static int ima_audit;
-
-/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
-static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
-{
- unsigned long audit;
-
- if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
- ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
- return 1;
-}
-__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
-
-void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
- const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
-{
- struct audit_buffer *ab;
-
- if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
- return;
-
- ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
- audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
- current->pid,
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_cred()->uid),
- from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
- audit_get_sessionid(current));
- audit_log_task_context(ab);
- audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
- audit_log_string(ab, op);
- audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
- audit_log_string(ab, cause);
- audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
- if (fname) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
- }
- if (inode) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
- audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
- audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
- }
- audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
- audit_log_end(ab);
-}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 84c37c4..78cf02c 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -113,5 +113,19 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+ const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname,
+ const char *op, const char *cause,
+ int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
/* set during initialization */
extern int iint_initialized;
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da44e98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: integrity_audit.c
+ * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "integrity.h"
+
+static int integrity_audit_info;
+
+/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
+static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long audit;
+
+ if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
+ integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
+
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+ const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1) /* Skip info messages */
+ return;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
+ current->pid,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_cred()->uid),
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=");
+ audit_log_string(ab, op);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " cause=");
+ audit_log_string(ab, cause);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+ if (fname) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
+ }
+ if (inode) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
--
1.8.1.rc3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [PATCH 3/3] evm: audit integrity metadata failures
2013-04-24 12:10 [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl Mimi Zohar
2013-04-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] integrity: move integrity_audit_msg() Mimi Zohar
@ 2013-04-24 12:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2013-04-24 17:00 ` [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl Casey Schaufler
2013-05-14 2:50 ` Hugh Dickins
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2013-04-24 12:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-security-module
Cc: Mimi Zohar, Hugh Dickins, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler,
linux-kernel
Before modifying an EVM protected extended attribute or any other
metadata included in the HMAC calculation, the existing 'security.evm'
is verified. This patch adds calls to integrity_audit_msg() to audit
integrity metadata failures.
Reported-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
---
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cdbde17..0c4c6e7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,9 @@
int evm_initialized;
+static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
+ "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
char *evm_hash = "sha1";
int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
@@ -262,9 +266,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
- return -EPERM;
+ goto out;
}
evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+out:
+ if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+ -EPERM, 0);
return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
}
@@ -357,6 +367,10 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
(evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
return 0;
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+ -EPERM, 0);
return -EPERM;
}
--
1.8.1.rc3
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl
2013-04-24 12:10 [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl Mimi Zohar
2013-04-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] integrity: move integrity_audit_msg() Mimi Zohar
2013-04-24 12:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] evm: audit integrity metadata failures Mimi Zohar
@ 2013-04-24 17:00 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-05-14 2:50 ` Hugh Dickins
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Casey Schaufler @ 2013-04-24 17:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar
Cc: linux-security-module, Hugh Dickins, Eric Paris, linux-kernel,
Mimi Zohar, Casey Schaufler
On 4/24/2013 5:10 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> (Reposting with expanded 'cc' list.)
>
> Included in the EVM hmac calculation is the i_mode. Any changes to
> the i_mode need to be reflected in the hmac. shmem_mknod() currently
> calls posix_acl_init(), which modifies the i_mode, after calling
> security_inode_init_security(). This patch reverses the order in
> which they are called.
I haven't tried this with Smack, but I don't anticipate any issues.
> Reported-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
> ---
> mm/shmem.c | 16 ++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
> index 1c44af7..398c195 100644
> --- a/mm/shmem.c
> +++ b/mm/shmem.c
> @@ -1937,6 +1937,13 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
>
> inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev, VM_NORESERVE);
> if (inode) {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
> + error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
> + if (error) {
> + iput(inode);
> + return error;
> + }
> +#endif
> error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir,
> &dentry->d_name,
> shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
> @@ -1946,15 +1953,8 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
> return error;
> }
> }
> -#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
> - error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
> - if (error) {
> - iput(inode);
> - return error;
> - }
> -#else
> +
> error = 0;
> -#endif
> dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
> dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
> d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl
2013-04-24 12:10 [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl Mimi Zohar
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2013-04-24 17:00 ` [PATCH 1/3] evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl Casey Schaufler
@ 2013-05-14 2:50 ` Hugh Dickins
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Hugh Dickins @ 2013-05-14 2:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar
Cc: linux-security-module, Eric Paris, Casey Schaufler, linux-kernel,
Mimi Zohar
On Wed, 24 Apr 2013, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> (Reposting with expanded 'cc' list.)
>
> Included in the EVM hmac calculation is the i_mode. Any changes to
> the i_mode need to be reflected in the hmac. shmem_mknod() currently
> calls posix_acl_init(), which modifies the i_mode, after calling
generic_acl_init()
> security_inode_init_security(). This patch reverses the order in
> which they are called.
>
> Reported-by: Sven Vermeulen <sven.vermeulen@siphos.be>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
> ---
> mm/shmem.c | 16 ++++++++--------
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
> index 1c44af7..398c195 100644
> --- a/mm/shmem.c
> +++ b/mm/shmem.c
> @@ -1937,6 +1937,13 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
>
> inode = shmem_get_inode(dir->i_sb, dir, mode, dev, VM_NORESERVE);
> if (inode) {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
> + error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
> + if (error) {
> + iput(inode);
> + return error;
> + }
> +#endif
> error = security_inode_init_security(inode, dir,
> &dentry->d_name,
> shmem_initxattrs, NULL);
> @@ -1946,15 +1953,8 @@ shmem_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
> return error;
> }
> }
> -#ifdef CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL
> - error = generic_acl_init(inode, dir);
> - if (error) {
> - iput(inode);
> - return error;
> - }
> -#else
> +
> error = 0;
> -#endif
> dir->i_size += BOGO_DIRENT_SIZE;
> dir->i_ctime = dir->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
> d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
> --
> 1.8.1.rc3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread