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From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKLM <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	SE Linux <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v13 0/9] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2013 16:00:08 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <517863F8.7050606@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <3235150.vl4U7U54yV@sifl>

On 04/24/2013 02:15 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Wednesday, April 24, 2013 01:22:20 PM Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> On 4/24/2013 11:57 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>> I know we had a good discussion about this a while back and I just wanted
>>> to hear from you about this current patchset; how does the labeled
>>> networking LSM assignment work?  Is it first-come-first-served based on
>>> the 'security=' setting?
>>
>> It's explicitly set in security/Kconfig. The problem with
>> first-come-first-serve is that the LSMs don't actually register
>> in the order specified, either at build time or boot time.
>> Further, until the init phase is complete, you don't know which
>> LSMs are actually going to register. That, and I promised Tetsuo
>> I wouldn't go out of my way to prevent late module loading in
>> the future.
>>
>> I could do order checking on module registration and take
>> the networking component away from an LSM that registered
>> earlier, but with a larger order number I suppose.
> 
> Hmmm.  How difficult would it be to enforce the order during LSM registration?  
> As discussed previously, I'm not a big fan of assigning the network controls 
> at compile time when the LSMs can be toggled at boot time.
> 
> The real solution is to just get the netdev folks to accept a security blob in 
> the sk_buff so we can fix this (and many other problems) once and for all.  I 
> still haven't given up on this effort but I think it would be silly to hold up 
> the stacking effort for the sk_buff security blob.
> 
>> The default configuration gives xfrm and secmark to SELinux
>> and NetLabel to Smack. If Smack is not included NetLabel goes
>> to SELinux. When LSMs using any of these facilities are added
>> in the future we'll have to negotiate the defaults.
> 
> The defaults are always going to be wrong for someone.
> 
>> An interesting aside that may be relevant is that the error
>> condition behavior makes it advisable to have the LSM you care
>> about most go last. If the networking components were strictly
>> FCFS you might have to chose an ordering you might not want for
>> other reasons.
> 
> Well, maybe not ... I think.  If we take a FCFS approach to the network 
> controls then only one LSM is really ever going to throw an error on the 
> network hooks, yes?
> 
>> It would be possible to have a boot time specification for
>> the networking components if you think it's important. I do
>> worry about making it excessively complicated. I'd be much more
>> concerned if more LSMs used the networking components.
> 
> I think the "excessively complicated" boat has already sailed :)
> 
> I'm still in favor of assigning the network hooks to the LSM at boot based on 
> the "security=" configuration.
> 
yeah dealing with selection at boot time is going to be needed
at some point, whether its now or later ...



  reply	other threads:[~2013-04-24 23:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <5176ABB7.5080300@schaufler-ca.com>
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 0/9] LSM: Multiple concurrent LSMs Casey Schaufler
2013-04-24 18:57   ` Paul Moore
2013-04-24 20:22     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-24 21:15       ` Paul Moore
2013-04-24 23:00         ` John Johansen [this message]
2013-04-25  0:43           ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-25 14:16             ` Tetsuo Handa
2013-04-25 15:01             ` Paul Moore
2013-04-25 18:09               ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-25 19:14                 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-25 20:21                   ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-25 21:05                     ` Kees Cook
2013-04-25 21:26                     ` Paul Moore
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 1/9] LSM: Security blob abstraction Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 2/9] LSM: Complete conversion to kill_pid_info_as_cred Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 3/9] LSM: Multiple concurrent secids Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 4/9] LSM: Multiple security context maintenance Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 5/9] LSM: Networking component isolation Casey Schaufler
2013-04-24 18:51   ` Paul Moore
2013-04-24 19:09     ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-24 21:04       ` Paul Moore
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 6/9] LSM: Additional interfaces in /proc/pid/attr Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 7/9] LSM: remove Yama special case stacking Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 20:12   ` Kees Cook
2013-04-23 16:04 ` [PATCH v13 8/9] LSM: Hook list management Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 16:05 ` [PATCH v13 9/9] LSM: Documentation and cleanup Casey Schaufler
2013-04-23 19:02   ` Randy Dunlap

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